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Abstract 
 
The aim of this research is to focus on a key issue in Islamic finance, i.e. the corporate 
governance (CG) of Islamic banks, which arises because of the way they raise deposits using 
profit-sharing contracts. More specifically, the research addresses some key CG issues 
relating to unrestricted investment account holders (UIAHs) as major stakeholders, 
comparing their status, as a type of equity investor, to that of shareholders. In fact, UIAHs 
do not have any governance rights (other than the right to withdraw their funds) and there 
is a lack of transparency in banks’ dealings with them. The research reviews the relationship 
of UIAHs with the Islamic banks (IBs), since UIAHs as savers or depositors are likely to have 
different risk-return preferences compared to shareholders, and in particular to be more 
risk-averse.  This research shows that this lack of governance rights and transparency leads 
not only to unfair treatment in a significant number of cases, but also to ambiguity regarding 
their status and rights. 
A comparative analysis of the rates of return received by shareholders and UIAHs was 
carried out using the coefficients of variation (CV) as a measure of risk-adjusted rates of 
return, to test whether current CG practice in IBs shows fairness of treatment to UIAHs in 
terms of risk-adjusted returns. Both UIAHs and shareholders face the same investment risk 
in the asset pool held by an Islamic bank in which their funds are invested, whereby banks 
utilise these funds to finance their operations. The results showed not only that there was 
a difference in rates of return, since on average shareholders received far higher rates of 
return than UIAHs with comparable levels of variation, but also that more than 32% of the 
UIAHs had a higher CV of rates of return than shareholders, which indicates that on a risk-
adjusted basis the UIAHs in these banks had lower rates of return for the same level of risk. 
An empirical study was conducted using a panel data model to test certain relevant and 
well-established CG variables that might have influenced the difference in rates of return. 
Again, the results showed a bleak picture for the UIAHs in many of the banks. The panel 
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data analysis focused on the profit sharing and revealed that the main driver, which seems 
to have great explanatory power, is the size of the return on assets (ROA). 
It seems important to look at other aspects besides the sharing of the accounting profit, 
especially in the light of the interview with Kuwait Finance House (KFH-Kuwait) 
management, by further investigating the UIAHs’ issue of fair treatment. This was done in 
the first place through conducting a mixed methods approach that involves a two-phase 
project called explanatory sequential design. The focus was the behaviour of the stock 
market: the amount of value for shareholders that could be attached to retained earnings 
as suggested by the Gordon growth model. However, the value of retained earnings to 
shareholders depends on such earnings flowing through into share prices, but, given the 
lack of market efficiency in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stock markets, it is not 
possible to base a significant conclusion on the behaviour of share prices. In addition, 
because of the 2008 financial crisis and its effects in the following years, any share price 
benefit to shareholders from retained earnings was effectively wiped out. 
These results led to another look at the difference in rates of return between the 
shareholders and the UIAHs, emphasising the dividend yield against UIAHs’ yield, which are 
similar in that both are based on cash payments. For a sample of 20 IBs, the result was that 
the mean dividend yield was 83 basis points higher than the rate of return of payouts to 
UIAHs. It was also found that in one third of the cases the CV of the rates of returns paid 
out to UIAHs was higher than that of the dividend yields. The issue of whether such a 
difference of 83 basis points is justified (for example, as a return for the bank as asset 
manager) is not easy to resolve because of the lack of transparency which makes it virtually 
impossible for UIAHs to make that judgement for themselves; in addition, this was the mean 
for the entire sample, not the difference for any individual bank. By contrast, the fact that 
the CVs of the rates of return paid to UIAHs were higher than the CVs of the dividend yields 
for a significant proportion of IBs in the sample is clearly indicative of a lack of fairness and 
raises an important CG issue with respect to such banks. 
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Thesis 
 
1.1 Research Background and Problems 
This thesis is concerned with certain issues of corporate governance (CG) in Islamic banks. 
These institutions face some specific CG issues because their operations require compliance 
with the principles and rules of Shari’ah1, or Islamic religious law, and the Fiqh al Muamalat, 
or Shari’ah commercial jurisprudence. One of the most important of these principles is the 
avoidance of interest, which has major implications for the business model and operations 
of Islamic banks (IBs).   
This chapter sets the background to the thesis in terms of an initial discussion of CG with 
reference to some authoritative definitions of it, both in general terms and with specific 
reference to banks. This is followed by an overview of the reasons why IBs face some 
specific CG issues, one of which goes to the heart of their current business model and 
constitutes the subject of this thesis.   
CG is a key component of a corporation’s top management policy and development, and it 
plays an essential part in the operation of its business model. It is concerned with the 
relationships within the social and economic environment of any organisation, where the 
policy, laws and regulations come together to define the way that the corporation should 
be directed and controlled, as well as its relationships with its various categories of 
stakeholders. CG has become a vital element for businesses in guiding the creation of value 
                                                     
 
1 Shari’ah is the law and moral code of Islam, which governs how Muslims interact and integrate their daily 
life. Shari’ah includes both faith and practice, comprising worship, individual attitude and conduct. It also 
deals with social norms and laws, such as crime, politics, economics, family and civil matters. Shari’ah is often 
interchangeably used with the word Din (religion), meaning the way of life. There are two main sources of 
Shari’ah law: The Muslim holy book, the “Quran” as the law of God, and the Sunnah, illustrated by Prophet 
Muhammad (Elasrag, 2014). Also important is Islamic jurisprudence: human interpretation of the laws 
commonly called Fiqh, Ijma (consensus), Maslaha (consideration of the public good or common need), and 
Quays (reasoning by analogy). 
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and maintaining sustainability and growth. According to Grais and Pellegrini (2006), good 
CG can facilitate a firm’s relationships with providers of external finance; if investors feel 
satisfied with its CG, they are likely to be more confident about investing in the firm. 
According to Claessens (2006), good CG can lead to a firm’s improved growth and 
development by lowering the cost of capital, reducing the internal risk and facilitating 
access to external finance, and to better operational performance by having an enhanced 
allocation of resources and an effective management that creates wealth. 
Furthermore, CG can be an even more essential factor when it comes to the banking 
industry since this sector plays an important role in a country’s economy (Anderson and 
Campbell, 2004). In fact, banks deal with the public, and poor corporate governance may 
lead to a bank’s management engaging in illegal practices which expose the bank to large 
fines as well as severe reputational damage, potentially leading to massive withdrawals of 
funds, which may in turn cause systemic risk that impacts the whole economy of a country. 
In addition, in emerging economies, banks play a crucial role in capital allocation since they 
act as financial intermediaries between parties that have surplus funds for investment and 
firms in need of funds for their development, thus promoting capital formation and 
increasing productivity growth (Levine, 2003). 
An important task of CG is to ensure the accountability of certain individuals within an 
organisation, using mechanisms that reduce or eliminate the so-called principal-agent 
problem. This involves resolving the problems that exist in the agency relationships 
between shareholders as principals and company executives as agents of the principals. For 
example, some of the problems that agency theory endeavours to address exist when a 
situation arises between the principal and the agent involving conflicts in their interests or 
goals, and there is asymmetry of information between the agent (who is better informed 
about the organisation’s affairs) and the principal. Such a situation arises, for example, 
when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. 
The issue of CG has been discussed in depth in the related literature and it continues to 
receive significant attention, particularly since the last global crisis and the major collapse 
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of dominant corporations. The CG of Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS), 
notably including Islamic banks (IBs), is even more complex, yet an interesting and 
important area of research. 
Even though the issues of CG that arise in conventional financial institutions have been 
extensively analysed, specific issues of CG that arise in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) 
have not been examined to anything like the same extent, which makes them more 
challenging to discuss and investigate. Nevertheless, some of these specific issues are of 
great importance and urgently need addressing. Despite the fact that the Islamic financial 
industry is still at a relatively early stage of development, and notwithstanding its small 
share of the global financial system, it forms an increasingly significant part of the global 
financial market (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Ariss and Sarieddine, 2007). According to the 
Global Financial Development Report produced by the World Bank (2014), there are more 
than 400 institutions offering Islamic financial services worldwide, serving both Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike, with an annual growth rate of more than 15 per cent in the last five 
years. 
The main target of IIFS is Muslims seeking Islamic financial services for religious reasons. 
This group represents approximately 22 per cent of the world’s population, primarily in 
developing countries. Although the initial establishment of IIFSs in the 1970s (Asutay, 2010), 
was originally intended to attract Muslims who had previously avoided the conventional 
interest-based financial system into the financial market (Rammal and Parker, 2010), 
nowadays, in addition to IBs, conventional banks globally are offering Islamic “windows” to 
customers who are seeking Shari’ah-compliant financial services. Furthermore, IIFSs are 
attempting to attract foreign investors and to expand their businesses worldwide. 
The Islamic banking system faces different challenges in its structures and operations as a 
result of the additional risks carried in comparison to the conventional banking system 
(Makiyan, 2008). This is in spite of the fact that IBs avoid speculation as a matter of Shari’ah 
compliance. For not only are a number of the hedging methods used by conventional banks 
impermissible for IBs, some of their transactions expose them to risks that conventional 
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banks do not face. For example, according to Ahmed and Chapra (2002), conventional banks 
have a number of factors that determine the level of credit risk, such as credit ratings of 
counterparties, quality of collateral, the legal system’s environment, the size of the bank 
and its trading books, maturity of credit facilities, utilisation of credit derivatives, and 
internal control systems. Because the Islamic banking sector has only existed for a few 
decades, IBs do not benefit fully from such factors, and Shari’ah constraints forbid them 
from using certain risk management tools such as credit derivatives. Moreover, IBs face 
additional factors due to the nature of their business, which means, for example, that they 
may be exposed to market risk in financing transactions as well as credit risk (Ahmed and 
Chapra, 2002). In addition, IBs run the risk of failing to comply with the requirements of the 
Shari’ah principles and rules that are the fundamental aspect of their business model 
(Shari’ah non-compliance risk), in connection with which they may be faced with different 
opinions among Shari’ah scholars about matters such as the permissibility of the 
introduction of a new product to the market, which may result in a loss of potential profit2. 
As well as resulting in the inability of IBs to use credit derivatives, Shari’ah restrictions 
impede the rescheduling of debts under certain credit contracts which involve a mark-up in 
place of interest. Therefore, IBs may face different challenges in their corporate governance 
development, and it is the duty of the management and supervisory authorities to 
understand and pay attention to these additional risks as they may affect the structure of 
their CG. 
Apart from the potential CG implications of the risk exposures just mentioned, there is 
another major CG issue with IBs that results from the way in which they typically raise retail 
deposits which pay returns based on profit sharing instead of interest. Thus, depositors at 
                                                     
 
2 For example, if an Islamic bank wants to invest in a successful Western hotel that serves alcohol or in a 
restaurant that sells pork, Shari’ah opinions may cause the BOD not to proceed with the investment. 
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IBs face different levels of risk, since, as profit sharing investment account3 holders, they 
face risks not borne by conventional depositors. In particular, this applies to unrestricted 
profit sharing investment accounts, widely used as a Shari’ah-compliant alternative to 
interest bearing deposit accounts, where the funds are commingled in the bank’s pool of 
assets with other funds such as those of shareholders and current account holders. Thus, 
the issues of asset allocation, profit seeking and risk appetite, given the likely differences 
between those of shareholders and those of depositors, raise additional challenges and 
uncertainty in IBs, whose existing governance structures deny UPSIA holders any 
monitoring mechanism, although in principle they are a type of equity investor (Archer et 
al., 1998). 
1.2 Profit Sharing Investment Deposits 
IBs have developed PSIA for customers’ savings and repository accounts in place of 
conventional interest bearing deposit accounts, in order to mobilise funds on which IBs and 
their customers can earn Shari’ah-compliant returns (Archer and Karim, 2007d). Customers 
deposit their funds in so-called “profit sharing investment accounts” as capital providers, 
and the bank invests these funds on the customers’ behalf in return for a share of the profit 
or for a fee as remuneration for management. There are two types of PSIAs: 
1. A restricted profit sharing investment account (RPSIA), a separately managed 
fund that does not commingle with other funds of the IIFS. This is similar to 
mutual funds and is considered by Islamic banks for the purpose of financial 
reporting as “off balance sheet funds” under management. 
                                                     
 
3 A profit sharing investment account (PSIA) is a product structure based on a Mudarabah (profit sharing) 
contract, where PSIA holders and an Islamic bank agree to share the profit generated from the assets funded 
by the PSIA based on an agreed ratio. However, losses will be borne by PSIA holders except in cases of 
misconduct or negligence. 
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2. An unrestricted profit sharing investment account (UPSIA) refers to an account 
where an Islamic bank has full discretion to utilise and invest UPSIA funds. These 
are widely used by IBs in place of conventional interest bearing deposits. 
The contractual bases for this type of account are the Mudarabah or Wakalah contracts, 
where in a Mudarabah the customers as Rabb Almaal (provide capital) and the bank 
provides work as Mudarib (entrepreneur or asset manager) and shares profit, or the bank 
in Wakalah acts as Wakeel (agent) and receives a fee  plus (typically) a performance related  
bonus  (Archer and Karim, 2006).  
This profit sharing concept leads to a quite different business model in comparison to that 
of conventional banks. Under the Mudarabah model, which is most commonly used, UPSIA 
holders as Rabb Almaal and the bank as Mudarib agree to share the profit generated from 
assets funded by UPSIA based on an agreed ratio (Agil et al., 2011). However, losses will be 
borne by UPSIA holders except in cases of misconduct or negligence. This is strikingly 
different from the treatment of conventional bank depositors whose funds are 
remunerated based on a predetermined interest rate or a predetermined spread over a 
benchmark, while the principal amount is “capital certain” (i.e. guaranteed by the bank) 
and, in a number of countries, protected at least up to a certain level by a deposit guarantee 
scheme such as that offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the 
USA. Therefore, unrestricted investment account holders (UIAHs) are significantly exposed 
to the performance of the IB’s management in earning profits and protecting their capital. 
Yet, despite the fact that UIAHs are major stakeholders, in many cases contributing (in the 
form of UPSIA) the majority of the funds managed by the bank, they nevertheless have no 
governance rights.  This lack of governance rights, including rights to information about the 
performance of their investment, prevents UIAHs from being able to monitor management 
or receive appropriate financial reports, since the contents of the financial reports are 
aimed at shareholders.  
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1.2.1 Issues with Profit Sharing Investment Deposits 
It has been observed by different researchers that IBs do not sufficiently address the issue 
of UIAHs rights, especially with regard to UPSIA. IBs lack clarity regarding their relationship 
with UIAHs; that is, are the latter a type of equity investor or a type of creditor? This issue 
raises a major concern from the perspective of CG in terms of UIAHs’ rights as major 
stakeholders, as well as that of banks’ behaviour towards the rights of UIAHs. The IBs are 
using contracts that deny the rights that should be granted to UIAHs as a type of equity 
investor in terms of transparency and fairness in return on investment as compared to 
shareholders, since both share the same degree of risk in the Mudarabah asset pool. Such 
ability and governance rights are normally granted to equity investors. In fact, it may be said 
that there is an anomaly from a CG perspective as UIAHs are a type of equity investor with 
no governance rights. According to Williamson (1996), equity investors need to have a 
governance structure to be able to follow their investment and conduct any monitoring as 
part of their expectation of the transaction costs of governance. 
By contrast, shareholders have the right to vote in general meetings, to elect the members 
of the BOD, and thus typically have a powerful influence to appoint or dismiss senior 
management through their control of the BOD. In fact, the BOD answers to shareholders in 
general meetings. However, if UIAHs are dissatisfied, they can only withdraw their funds 
from IBs with a possible loss according to the contractual agreement between them and the 
bank. Moreover, they typically lack the information to establish a sound basis for such 
decisions. 
In line with the above-mentioned challenges, adequate policies and effective regulations 
are required to accompany the recent expansion of IBs and to maintain their growth and 
integration into the global financial system. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)4 has 
                                                     
 
4 The IFSB is an international standard-setting organisation based in Malaysia that issues many standards and 
principles to enhance the stability of IFIs. It also establishes many guideline principles to regulate and ease the 
implications of Islamic banks. 
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issued a variety of standards and guideline principles to enhance prudent management and 
governance in IBs. For example, in December 2005, it issued its first capital adequacy 
standard (IFSB-2, 2005) (based on Basel II) for IBs, so as to meet the specific characteristic 
of Shari’ah compliance. In addition, the IFSB introduced a Principles of Corporate 
Governance Standard in December 2006 (IFSB, 2006). The IFSB’s corporate governance 
standard proposed to establish a governance committee attached to the board of directors 
that could monitor and act on behalf of UPSIA holders. However, the evidence in Chapter 5 
below suggests that this proposal has not been generally adopted or used effectively by IBs.   
1.3 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
The aim of this research is to focus on CG of IBs, which arises because of the way they raise 
deposits using profit-sharing contracts. In particular, the issue of UIAHs lack of governance 
rights in spite of being a type of equity investor, since their funds get commingled with other 
funds such as shareholders.  Also to examining the difference in the rates of return between 
the two investors and to see whether the current CG practice in IBs shows any fairness of 
treatment to UIAHs in terms of risk-adjusted returns. Although, it has been well discussed 
in the literature about the lack of governance rights for UIAHs, however still there is a gap 
in the empirical work of the topic, in specific what is the consequences of that absence of 
governance rights, with the objectives to: 
1. Address the CG issues related to UIAHs as major stakeholders, comparing their 
status, as a type of equity investor, to that of shareholders, and evaluate the CG 
practice. 
2. Examine the exercise of profit distribution between two categories of stakeholders 
(shareholders and UIAHs), since both are considered equity investors, and face the 
same risk in the commingled fund, where IBs utilize the funds to finance its 
operations, however with different rewards to both stakeholders. 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 9 
3. Address the issue of whether UIAHs are treated fairly as providers of funds to IBs, 
given the potential conflict of interest between UIAHs and shareholders and UIAHs’ 
lack of governance rights. 
In this context, the research will examine whether the basis of remuneration of UIAHs (as 
UPSIA holders) is straightforward profit sharing or a particular form of profit sharing where 
the “profit shares” paid to UIAHs are largely a result of management decisions based on 
market conditions. The absence of UIAHs’ control rights is well attested to in the literature, 
including in research conducted by Archer et al. (1998); Sundararajan (2007); Archer and 
Karim (2013b); Magalhães and Al-Saad (2013). The focus of this thesis is the consequences 
of this absence of control rights rather than the control rights themselves. As a result, in 
order to achieve the objectives of the research, the aim is to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Insofar as UPSIA holders place their funds with Islamic banks on a profit-sharing 
and loss bearing basis, to what extent do the lack of governance rights and the 
absence of control rights have consequences in terms of the fairness of the level of 
returns paid to UIAHs? Moreover, what are the implications of the UIAHs’ lack of 
information for monitoring management in considering fairness of treatment?  
 
In this context, it is relevant that shareholders and UIAHs are likely to have different 
attitudes to risk, with UIAHs probably being considerably more risk averse.  
 
2. How in fact is the profit sharing and loss bearing principle for UPSIA implemented 
in Islamic banks? 
a. Given that UPSIA are a Shari’ah-compliant substitute for conventional 
deposits, to what extent do Islamic banks attempt to make them behave 
similarly to conventional deposits, in terms of: 
i. Stability of returns? 
ii. Protection against losses? 
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Given that, in principle, shareholders and UIAHs share the same risk in the commingled 
funds used to finance the bank’s asset pool, yet are likely to have different risk-return 
preferences, it is important to examine the rates of return on investment for both UIAHs 
and shareholders and to evaluate how IBs treat UIAHs in comparison to shareholders. 
Hence, the rates of return adjusted for risk will be analysed for a sample of IBs, and the 
differences in rates of return will be analysed as dependent variables in order to evaluate 
the possible influence of corporate governance factors. 
 
1.4 Rationale and Motivation of the Research 
This study undertakes an analysis and comparison of risk-adjusted returns to examine 
whether, in the absence of governance rights, the UIAH are treated equitably compared to 
shareholders in IBs and tests whether the current practice of CG in IBs does balance the 
rights of UIAHs with those of shareholders. One way to look at the governance issues is to 
examine the difference in the rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs. The study 
will also attempt to ascertain what drives the difference in the risk-adjusted profit 
distribution between shareholders and UIAHs and the extent to which independent CG 
variables influence this difference, a topic that has not yet been researched. The results will 
have policy implications and may help the supervisory authorities or central banks better 
understand how IBs are treating UIAHs, which may help them to evaluate the current CG 
standards and practices. The research will contribute as well to the existing body of 
knowledge concerning CG in IBs and fill the gaps in the literature related to UIAHs’ lack of 
governance rights and lack of transparency, which lead to unfair treatment in terms of 
return and to ambiguity regarding their status and lack of rights.  UIAHs do not have any 
governance rights (other than the right to withdraw their funds) and there is a lack of 
transparency in banks’ dealings with them. The background of the research has centred on 
the issue of the fair treatment of UIAHs from CG perspective of the rights of stakeholders. 
As the results of the research show that this lack of governance rights and transparency 
leads not only to unfair treatment in a significant number of cases, but also to ambiguity 
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regarding their status and rights.  Also the research will be useful in policymaking, especially 
regarding regulation and supervision of how UIAHs are paid returns on their funds which 
call for urgent reform of the CG of IBs. To shed light on the effect of UIAHs’ lack of 
governance rights and how they may be exposed to a potential conflict of interest with the 
management of IBs and ways in which management may look after the interests of 
shareholders at the expense of UIAHs.  
 
1.5 Research Structure 
To achieve the goal of this thesis, it is important to set out the significance of CG and to 
explain how it plays a key role in the world of finance. Therefore, the thesis will firstly raise 
the issue of the nature of UPSIA, and chapter 2 will provide a brief outline and discussion of 
Islamic financial transactions and governance, as well as setting the scene and providing 
some history about specific aspects of Islamic finance. It will also shed light on the 
importance of the issues of transparency and market discipline in IBs. Chapter 3 will present 
an overview of the relevant literature and provide some background on CG from a 
theoretical perspective. Chapter 4 will discuss the risk and return involved in UPSIA and 
present the coefficient of variation test as a measure of risk-adjusted accounting rates of 
return on equity (ROE) of shareholders and the rates of return (return on investment) paid 
to UIAHs, respectively, for a substantial sample of IBs. A special case of Saudi banks (since 
they use a type of restricted PSIA instead of UPSIA) will also be examined in the Appendix A 
to chapter 4. ROE is used to measure shareholders’ rates of return rather than stock market 
returns for two reasons: in the first place, UIAHs are profit sharing and profit sharing is 
supposed to be the essence of UPSIA, so how the profits are shared in practice is highly 
relevant. Secondly, stock market returns are not a reliable measure in the inefficient stock 
markets on which the IBs’ shares are listed. However, dividend yield information, which was 
available for only a subset of the sample IBs, is considered in chapter 7, with results that are 
largely similar to those obtained using ROE. 
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Chapter 5 will analyse the impact of CG on rates of return and differences in these between 
shareholders and UIAHs, using panel data, to examine to what extent CG variables may 
explain the differences in the rates of return of shareholders and UIAHs, respectively, which, 
as well as being of interest per se, can also serve as a proxy for differences in the CVs of 
returns which cannot be handled cross-sectionally in a panel data approach. Chapter 6 will 
focus on a Kuwait Finance House case study by examining why the UIAH of the subsidiary 
banks have a better risk-adjusted return than those of the parent company. This chapter 
will include an interview with Kuwait Finance House management in Appendix F, and an 
analysis thereof. Chapter 7 will focus on comparing the cash payouts using dividend yield 
for shareholders to evaluate the differences between the levels and variability of the rates 
of return of shareholders and those of UIAHs. Chapter 8 will present a general discussion 
and conclusion of the research as well as some final remarks. It is worth noting that, in this 
research, the terms UIAHs and UPSIA are used to refer to UIAHs as a type of depositor.  This 
does not include restricted IAH, which are generally considered to be a form of off-balance 
sheet funds under management.  
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Chapter Two: Overview of Islamic Financial 
Transactions and Governance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the background of Islamic finance with regard to Shari’ah as well 
as some aspects of central bank regulations in Islamic banking. Furthermore, it will examine 
the ideological context of IBs in terms of shareholder and stakeholder theory relating to 
PSIA and the CG issue of UPSIA in respect of transparency and market discipline. Finally, 
there will be an analysis of the smoothing technique employed by IBs. 
2.2 Background to Islamic Finance 
As Islamic finance and banking structures are based on Shari’ah (Islamic religious law), their 
business model differs from conventional banks. For example, IBs are prohibited from using 
Riba5 (interest, a term that connotes “usury” but is interpreted by the vast majority of 
modern Islamic scholars to mean any interest (Archer et al., 1998)) to generate money and 
therefore they use different methods to employ their funds. This means that IBs face 
different challenges because of the additional risk carried, such as Shari’ah non-compliance 
risk, in comparison to the conventional banking system. Another potential difficulty involves 
liquidity risk where IBs cannot borrow money when needed, while the liquidity facilities 
available from central banks to IBs are more limited than those available for conventional 
                                                     
 
5 According to Lewis (2001), Riba could be translated as usury, meaning an addition or increase or expansion 
or growth. There are different meanings of the Arabic word Riba, one of which could be defined as paying or 
receiving interest, which is forbidden by the Quran. Lewis also states that Riba means a loan in which the 
borrower makes a return to the lender that is more or better than what was borrowed. No financial 
transaction should be based on the payment or receipt of interest. Profits from indebtedness or the trading 
of debts are seen to be unethical. Instead, the investor and investee should share in the risks and profits 
generated from the project. However, not every increase or growth is prohibited by Islam. Under Shari’ah, 
Riba technically refers to the premium that must be paid without any consideration. 
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banks, which makes liquidity risk management particularly challenging for IBs. Shari’ah 
imposes different requirements from the models and methods employed in conventional 
financial services (Archer and Karim, 2007a). In addition to avoidance of Riba, IBs have to 
comply with the prohibition of Maysir (speculation) and Gharar (uncertainty of contract or 
contractual outcomes; for example, contingent liabilities or contingent assets such as 
guarantees and insurance contracts). IBs are also prohibited by Shari’ah law from making 
any profit from gambling, alcohol, pornography or pork products. Therefore, the fact that 
the Islamic banking model is based on the principles of Shari’ah imposes different 
restrictions compared to the conventional profit-seeking banking practices. However, Islam 
by no means rejects the profit motive. Shari’ah prohibitions are constraints on profit-
seeking behaviour, such as the ethical constraints advocated by the proponents of ethical 
or responsible finance. Therefore, Shari’ah is not against profits but against Riba and 
speculation, and it is in favour of social responsibility6. 
2.3 Meaning of Shari’ah 
Shari’ah7 comes from the Arabic term for the way to the source of life, or the path, or also 
the waterway which leads to a main stream, but it is also used to refer to the set of Islamic 
legal principles and rules (Anas and Mounira, 2009) which is intended to regulate the 
relationship between God and Muslims. In addition, it regulates the relationship between 
Muslims socially, economically and spiritually (including both faith and practice, 
incorporating worship, individual attitude and conduct). Therefore, Shari’ah extends to 
influencing the economic, banking and financial activities of Muslims. 
                                                     
 
6 In modern Islamic finance, Riba is equated with a “pure rent on money” which is deemed to be unethical. 
However, a small minority of Islamic scholars interpret Riba in its more conventional sense of “usury”, i.e. 
excessive or exploitative interest (as in the “payday loans” industry). 
7 Shari’ah literally means a road, which refers to Islamic law as ordained by Allah, or the Law of Allah. Most 
prominent in this category are the Quran and Sunnah (Lewis, 2001). Shari’ah governs all secular and religious 
life of Muslim people, including day-to-day activities, religious rituals, politics, economics, banking and law. 
Shari’ah is the legal and social modality of a people, which is based on the revelation of Prophet Muhammad 
(PBOH).  
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2.3.1 Sources of Shari’ah 
There are two main sources of Shari’ah law. The primary source consists of the Islamic holy 
book the “Quran” as the law and Word of God revealed to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
(Elasrag, 2014), and of Sunnah (the teachings (Hadith) and practices of Prophet 
Muhammad), illustrated by Prophet Muhammad. The secondary source of Shari’ah comes 
from Islamic jurisprudence and human interpretation of the laws, commonly called: 
1. Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and ijtihad (endeavour of a Muslim scholar to derive a 
rule of divine law from the Quran and Hadith). 
2. Fatwa (personal opinion on a Shari’ah issue expressed by an authoritative person 
or institution, but not a law based on one of the different schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence)8. A fatwa may perhaps be compared to a barrister’s opinion 
obtained in a consultation in the barrister’s chambers. 
3. Ijma (consensus). 
4. Quays (reasoning by analogy). 
5. Al-masala Almursala (consideration of the public interest). 
6. Istihasan (juristic preference). 
7. Urf (custom or knowledge). 
8. Istishab (presumption of continuity). 
                                                     
 
8 There are different schools of jurisprudential thought; however, the main four schools of thought from which 
jurists and scholars derive their Fiqh when making a fatwa are: 
1. Hanafi School, which is followed mainly in the Middle East and South Asia: Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, 
Turkey, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. 
2. Maliki School (traditionalist), which is followed in Africa. 
3. Hanbali School, which is followed in Saudi Arabia. 
4. Shafii School, which is followed in South East Asia. 
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9. Fiqh al Muamalat and the “nominate contracts” which form the basis of Shari’ah-
compliant financial instruments. 
2.4 Regulation of Islamic Financial Institutions 
2.4.1 Central Banking System and Islamic Banking 
The rapid growth in the Islamic financial industry required the central banks in some 
jurisdictions to modify their regulations and create an environment to suit the Islamic 
banking system. Central banks have to adopt new regulations for the Islamic banking system 
that give other alternatives and functions to IBs that enable them to work efficiently and 
differently from conventional banks. For example, in 2008, the Central Bank of Bahrain 
(CBB) issued a new regulation allowing Islamic Sukuk (investment certificates that are a 
Shari’ah-compliant alternative to bonds), which were to be issued as a liquidity instrument 
to provide a much-needed liquidity management tool for IBs9 (Islamic Finance Review 
Bahrain, 2008). Depending on the national central bank laws, banking systems can adapt 
new regulations to be appended to the current ones or have a completely new Islamic 
system that best suits the Islamic bank. Generally, systems of banking regulation may be 
classified according to the jurisdiction, for example: 
1. Single system (only Islamic law is provided) such as in Iran and Sudan. 
2. Two systems with two sets of laws (conventional and Islamic law), mostly in the 
Middle East and Asia. 
3. Hybrid systems such as the UK’s (which cannot offer or implement all laws of Islamic 
finance). 
                                                     
 
9 The CBB Salam Sukuk are not tradable but have a tenor of 90 days which makes them fairly liquid. 
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2.4.2 Business Transactions 
Since the establishment of Islamic financial institutions in the 1970s as a part of the large 
example of Islamic moral economy (Asutay, 2010), IBs have been developing different 
approaches to generate profit in place of the conventional interest rate spreads between 
interest received on assets and interest paid on deposit accounts. As noted in chapter 1, a 
common approach is the Mudarabah contract, where customers deposit their funds in 
UPSIA as Rabb Almaal (capital provider), and the bank as Mudarib (entrepreneur or asset 
manager) invests these funds on the customers’ behalf in return for a share of the profit as 
management remuneration10 (Archer et al., 1998; Sundararajan, 2008). Under the rules of 
Mudarabah, losses on investment due to market or credit risk are carried only by UIAHs as 
Rabb Almaal, but losses due to misconduct or negligence due to operational risk are carried 
by the Islamic bank as Mudarib11. In another type of profit sharing contract, Musharakah, 
the investment losses are borne in proportion to the partners’ ratios of invested capital (in 
Mudarabah, the Mudarib as such invests no capital, only effort). Musharakah contracts are 
not generally used by IBs to raise funds, except in certain Sukuk structures.  In the case of 
UPSIA, the funds on an IB’s balance sheet can be considered to contain a Mudarabah nested 
within a (de facto) Musharakah between the Mudarabah fund and the other funds 
managed by the bank. IBs usually mobilise funds using two main sources that constitute 
their capital structure: shareholders’ equity and UPSIA. Additionally, current accounts as 
non-investment deposits are used by the bank which is entitled to any profits and bears any 
risk of loss as it guarantees to pay the related balances on demand. Current account holders 
are not entitled to any returns since current accounts are considered to be Qard Hasan 
(beneficial loan) from depositors to the bank under Shari’ah. Because of the prevention of 
                                                     
 
10 Fees are paid to the bank when the accounts operate on the basis of Wakalah, where the bank acts as 
Wakeel (agent) for a fee which may have a performance-related component. 
11 In principle, according to the Mudarabah contract, Mudarib has no financial capital in the venture to lose, 
but in some cases, such as mismanaged risk (speculation or lack of due diligence), Mudarib carries the losses. 
 
Chapter 2                                                            Islamic Financial Transactions and Governance 
 18 
Riba, Islamic financial institutions cannot offer conventional financial products. Instead, the 
financial institutions have introduced products that are acceptable under Islamic law, 
including Mudarabah and Musharakah (profit and loss sharing products), Murabahah12 
(mark-up-based credit products), Ijarah (leasing) and Sukuk (Islamic bonds) (Rammal, 2004). 
In addition, IBs are now raising CMT-based term deposits, whereby a commodity is bought 
on credit with a mark-up using a Murabahah contract and sold on the spot market to raise 
immediate funds. 
2.5 Islamic vs. Conventional Finance 
There are considerable differences between Islamic and conventional banks including their 
structure, their products and their business models, with differing associated risks. Errico 
and Sundararajan (2002) argued that IBs have different challenges with regard to risk in 
comparison to conventional banks; this is natural due to the fact that greater difficulties 
arise from the nature of the specific risks and profit/loss sharing concepts with which IBs 
deal. The main argument about the differences in practice between Islamic and 
conventional banks is concentrated on the business structure of their models. IBs were 
constructed using Shari’ah compliance (Islamic law) and their banking products are derived 
from Shari’ah law which prohibits them from charging interest on their business 
transactions, especially the nominate contracts of Fiqh al Muamalat, which creates a 
significant difference in operating conditions compared to conventional banks. Samad 
(2004) studied the financial performance of interest-free Islamic banking against interest-
based conventional banking in Bahrain with respect to profitability, liquidity risk and credit 
risk during the period 1992–2001 (the post-Gulf War period). Nine financial ratios were used 
to make this comparison. The results showed that there is no significant difference between 
IBs and conventional banks in terms of profitability and liquidity. However, there are some 
degrees of difference in credit performance. 
                                                     
 
12 Murabahah is a sale based on a cost-plus mark-up basis where payment of the price (including the mark-
up) is deferred to a later date. 
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2.6 Islamic Banks’ Business Models 
The discussion in the literature of Islamic financial institutions originates with the 
prohibition of transactions involving interest (Riba), regardless of how low the rate of 
interest is (Gafoor, 1996). Because of this restriction, Islamic financial institutions cannot 
offer conventional financial products. Instead, IBs have introduced financial instruments on 
both sides of the balance sheet that are acceptable under Shari’ah, being based on the 
nominate contracts of Fiqh al Muamalat. Islamic financial institutions and financial products 
are now available in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, and the total assets of the sector 
were expected to exceed USD 1 trillion by the end of 2010 (Čihák and Hesse, 2010); in the 
2016 Islamic finance market, assets range from USD 1.66 trillion to USD 2.1 trillion, and 
could reach USD 3.4 trillion by the end of 201813. 
Even though the mission statements of IBs can vary, the foremost objective is to meet the 
stakeholders’ needs by conducting business according to Shari’ah compliance (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006). This obligation to stakeholders makes the IBs adopt social responsibilities, 
which might suggest that they are leaning towards the Franco-German “stakeholder 
model”14. However, in fact, the evidence suggests that IBs tend to adopt a shareholder-
oriented (neo-classical) approach in their business model.  
2.6.1 Islamic Moral Economy Model 
The moral economy nature of Islamic finance distinguishes it from conventional finance and 
banking, and the direct reference to the moral economy brings social justice, growth, 
allocation of resources, prohibition of interest, where Islamic moral economy is a novel 
mechanism of looking at economic and financial reality. According to Asutay (2010), 
                                                     
 
13 Source: Islamic Financial Market, “Saudi IPO Drive May Push Global Islamic Finance Assets Past $12 Trillion”. 
Retrieved 5 March 2016 from: https://www.islamicfinance.com/2014/12/size-islamic-finance-market-vs-
conventional-finance/ 
14 See Chapter 3 for the shareholder and stakeholder model. 
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“against the rationalist, self-maximizing and efficiency-oriented capitalist market economy, 
Islamic moral economy emerged to stress the importance of moral behaviour in the market 
place by filtering the market mechanism to produce socially optimal economic choices in 
which social justice was claimed to be the essential element. Thus, with such construction 
emphasis comes the expected shift from a neo-classical notion of efficiency to a morally 
informed equity. Consequently, in addition to the normative principles found in the Qur’an, 
with the positive and normative principles derived from the tradition and sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah), a new economic and financial paradigm has been attempted 
in its modern version".  However due to the globalisation, IBs now focus on efficiency and 
profitability rather than social justice, including fairness to UIAHs, which represent a 
convergence to conventional finance.  Even the prohibition of Riba (interest) was mainly for 
social justice but also have the economic reasons, and IBs nowadays work with the same 
objectives as conventional banks without interest. As well, certain level of gharar 
(uncertainty) is now acceptable by some scholars to facilitate modern financial instruments 
for IBs, which was prohibited with the same rationale as interest.  This makes IBs divergence 
away from the moral economy nature, which makes IBs serve the markets for profit instead 
of serving the communities and eliminate the social expectations as part of Islamic financial 
principles such as justice, fairness to stakeholders, i.e. UIAHs do not get their fair share from 
their investment as compared to shareholders (Asutay, 2007).  In fact, Islam does not object 
to the profit motive as such, but insists on equity and fairness. Islamic economics seeks to 
promote profit and loss sharing (PLS) on both sides of the balance sheet.  The reason why 
IBs don’t follow this is the agency and transactions costs involved when banks offer 
financing on a PLS basis. In addition, IBs are driven more by juristic considerations (Fiqh al 
Muamalat and the Nominate Contracts) than by the ethical notions of the ‘moral economy’ 
and Shari’ah Boards have a similar perspective. 
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On the other hand, various mission statements of the IIFS, Shari’ah compliance tends to 
come in three parts. First is the prohibition of Riba15 (Ayub, 2008; Masood, 2011; Iqbal and 
Llewellyn, 2002) which is the key difference between Islamic business and conventional 
commercial business. Second, the IIFS should promote social goodwill, and third they should 
develop the combined Islamic financial system which covers capital formation, capital 
markets, financial intermediation and risk transfer. As Masood (2011) argued, the Islamic 
system puts equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social and religious aspects, pursuant to 
equality and fairness in society as a whole. This prompts the IBs to lean more towards a 
comprehensive banking system that is based on Shari’ah principles rather than a specific 
financial system to serve the needs of Muslim people who are trying to avoid Riba. As 
pointed out by Grais and Pellegrini (2006), the need for a combination of Shari’ah 
compliance and business performance raises specific challenges and agency problems in 
the daily operations of IBs, hence the necessity for distinctive CG structures. To achieve this 
and to meet acceptable standards of business conduct, IBs need to have a sound CG 
structure. Because IBs face some limitations in terms of Shari’ah compliance (for instance, 
different restrictions on the type of business to engage in, or the financial operations which 
forbid interest-based transactions), they have an obligation to establish a sound CG 
structure. 
 As a result of Shari’ah prohibitions, IBs are constrained by a shortage of Shari’ah-compliant 
liquid assets, as well as by a lack (in most jurisdictions) of a Shari’ah-compliant interbank 
market and lender of last resort (LOLR) facilities. This presents them with specific problems 
                                                     
 
15 Islam prohibited Riba but allowed trade and commercial activities (al-bay’). Riba means excess or increase, 
the extra earnings obtained without the medium of exchange. Riba can also be translated as usury but it is 
interpreted by the modern Islamic scholar as interest and is forbidden in Islamic economic jurisprudence. In 
the holy book of Muslim, the “Quran”, Surah Al-baqarah verse No. 275 states: “Those who devour usury will 
not stand except as stands one whom Satan by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say, 
‘trade is like usury’, but Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden usury.” Islam recognises trade and 
commerce not only as a lawful profession but also as a moral duty, and it forbids Riba, which is a loan with 
the condition that the borrower will return to the lender more than and better than the quantity borrowed. 
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in terms of liquidity risk management and it obliges them to hold large cash balances on 
which they earn no returns. This may affect their profitability and business growth, and 
create a scarcity in investment opportunities. It also contributes to difficulties in refinancing 
their capital which reduces profits and in extreme cases may drive them to bankruptcy16. 
2.7 Shari’ah and Stakeholders 
One purpose of Shari’ah is to protect the interests of the public (Maslaha al-almmah), as 
explained by Masood (2006), including the protection of property (al-maal). While IBs may 
pursue different business aims and strategies, their overall mission is to meet their 
stakeholders’ needs by conducting business in compliance with Shari’ah (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006). Besides the avoidance of Riba and the other prohibited transactions 
mentioned above, IBs are involved in implementing zakat17 (a form of levy on wealth for 
charitable purposes), payment of which is one of the Five Pillars of Islam (Masood, 2011). 
This obligation to the indigent is consistent with IBs’ duties towards a wide set of 
stakeholders and with the undertaking of activities for the public good.  
Therefore, there is a need to develop adequate Shari’ah governance as IBs should be 
concerned about their stakeholders. From an Islamic perspective, Shari’ah governance has 
been further defined by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) as a set of institutional 
and organisational arrangements through which institutions offering Islamic financial 
services provide an effective independent oversight of Shari’ah to comply with issuance of 
relevant Shari’ah pronouncements and resolutions. Another function is to ensure the 
effective independent dissemination of information on such Shari’ah pronouncements and 
resolutions to the operative personnel of the institutions offering Islamic financial services 
who monitor the day-to-day compliance with Shari’ah  pronouncements and resolutions 
(IFSB-10, 2009). 
                                                     
 
16 Arcapita bank filed for bankruptcy in March 2012. 
17 Zakat is payable by physical persons (i.e. investors in Islamic banks) but the banks typically collect and pay 
the tax on their behalf. 
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Each Islamic financial institution has a Shari’ah supervisory function, typically a Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) consisting of three Shari’ah scholars, which supervises the 
institution’s business operations to ensure compliance with Shari’ah law. The function of 
the SSB is to certify that the financial institutions operate under Shari’ah law (Greuning and 
Iqbal, 2007), and to clarify any Shari’ah-related questions that the financial institutions may 
have (Safieddine, 2009; Usmani, 1998). These SSBs are appointed by the management of 
the financial institutions and they act as an internal control body within the organisation 
(not as external auditors), enhancing the credibility of the Islamic financial institutions in 
the eyes of its customers or anyone they exchange business with, and also strengthening 
its Islamic credentials (Algaoud and Lewis, 1997). 
2.8 Importance of Transparency and Market Discipline 
According to the BCBS (2010), the practice of good CG can be emphasised and reinforced 
by transparency, whereby reliable information made available to investors on a regular 
basis with easy access reduces the asymmetric information and the uncertainty of the 
financial market (IFSB-5, 2007). Crowther and Sefi (2010) discussed eight principles of 
governance that account for good governance practice, namely transparency, rule of law, 
participation, responsiveness, equity, efficiency and effectiveness, sustainability, and 
accountability18. The principle of transparency is more important to external users or 
investors than to internal ones since the former cannot access the information available to 
the latter. Even though UIAHs are supposed to be insiders, it seems that they are treated as 
“outsiders” when it comes to information rights. In order to be beneficial, transparency 
should involve a useful public disclosure of information, including business activities, rates 
of return and risk19, to enable investors to make well-informed decisions about their 
investments. Having the disclosed information available in a regular and timely manner will 
                                                     
 
18 For more details on the principles of governance, see Crowther and Sefi (2010). 
19 Under Basel II Pillar 3, there is certain issues that banks are required to disclose. Also, under IFRS 7, for 
example, banks could disclose the market risk and the credit risk issues. However, this is not the same as 
disclosing the risk on rate of return in the annual report. 
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help the users of this information to have a better understanding of the financial condition, 
performance, governance structures and policies of the invested firm or bank or even the 
market (OECD, 2004). The study conducted by Healy and Palepu (2001) on financial 
reporting and voluntary disclosure of information by management suggested that better 
disclosure would have a positive impact on the efficiency of the capital market; for example, 
the increased level of entrepreneurship and globalisation has increased the sound 
information provided by firms in capital markets.  
 In contrast, other people may argue conversely that too much disclosure may give more 
information to rivals about future opportunities and investments. However, the efficiency 
of market discipline largely depends on the type of disclosure and the efficiency of 
information available to the participants in the market and the investors, especially the 
information about risk and the financial condition of the firm or banking organisation 
(Ariffin et al., 2007). The disclosure of material information modifies the market 
environment in response to such information and thereby provides incentives to IBs to limit 
excessive risk-taking and to pursue good governance. To be effective, market discipline 
requires a set of mechanisms through which markets can penalise excessive risk-taking or 
inadequate transparency (IFSB-4, 2007). 
Good practices in financial policy transparency are found in a number of sets of 
international standards; for instance, in September 1999 the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) issued the Code of Good Practices on Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency. 
These policies encourage sound CG through the effect of monitoring, and the capacity to 
influence banks in this manner. Moreover, international efforts to develop standards in an 
attempt to regulate and help supervision of banking industries, such as BCBS Basel II Pillar 
3, aim to improve public disclosure which increases market discipline and helps to improve 
the supervisory role. 
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2.9 Banking and Risk Environment of IBs 
Since the development of Islamic financial institutions in the 1970s and their fast growth 
and increasing presence in the global financial markets, a number of research studies have 
been conducted focusing mainly on the viability, design and operations of profit sharing in 
IBs. However, little has been done concerning the transparency issue in these institution, 
apart from the IFSB standards and those of AAOIFI. Despite the obstacles, risks and 
challenges faced by IBs, significant progress and steady growth in market penetration have 
been achieved. As a result, they have gained recognition worldwide in the financial markets. 
This vast growth and recognition has created a need to develop appropriate policies to help 
IBs identify their risk exposures and to work in healthy environments and continue their 
integration into the global financial system.  
According to Greuning and Iqbal (2007), banking risk falls into four categories: financial, 
operational, business and event. However, to a certain extent, risks in IBs are different from 
those in conventional banks. To understand the key differences in the nature of risk 
between conventional and IBs, it is important to differentiate the function of the bank in 
terms of being a financial intermediary; IBs use other financial products such as 
Musharakah20, Wakalah and Mudarabah contracts to mobilise funds and generate money, 
which conventional banks do not carry. For example, UIAHs provide the capital under a 
Mudarabah contract for a return, which forces them to face different types of risk 
compared to conventional banks. As a result, UIAHs logically require specific disclosures in 
connection with profitability and the associated risks. IBs should therefore logically provide 
information concerning the disclosure of profit allocation, while providing clarity and 
transparency in respect of the policies used in managing the rate of return sought and the 
associated risks. In addition, this disclosed information should be simplified in the reporting, 
using simple language which can be understood by the majority of UIAHs, since most of 
                                                     
 
20 There is not much Musharakah on the liabilities side, except for Sukuk. Murabahah (CMT) is increasingly 
being used as an alternative to Mudarabah. 
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them are inexperienced retail customers seeking a Shari’ah-compliant alternative to 
conventional deposits. On the other hand, some may argue that more transparency is not 
in the interests of IBs (or at least their management) since they (in common with other 
banks) regard greater transparency as exposing them to “withdrawal risk”, i.e. depositors 
withdrawing their funds and causing a liquidity crisis. Therefore, there is a lack of interest 
on the part of the banks’ management in providing greater transparency, which may be 
quite rational from their point of view.  
This alternative means that the relationship between the depositors and the bank is based 
on a profit sharing and loss bearing “investment” account, not an interest bearing deposit. 
Consequently, it may be argued that IBs should strengthen transparency in reporting the 
risk associated with the depositors’ funds, especially since the depositors have no 
representative on the banks’ BOD. Providing a high-quality standard of transparency to 
UIAHs leads to meeting their best interests and to better management of their investments. 
It is important to disclose adequate information to UIAHs as this would help them to 
determine whether or not they leave their funds invested with the bank. According to IFSB-
4, disclosure to UIAHs should include information about how the funds are being managed 
and where they have been invested, in accordance with Shari’ah requirements. This 
disclosure would show UIAHs the level of risk they are facing. Also, the basis of asset 
allocation, expenses and profit to UIAHs should be included in the general qualitative 
disclosures. The ratios of PER, IRR, return on assets, return on equity and other information 
such as profit distribution to UPSIA should be included in the general quantitative 
disclosures (IFSB-4, 2007), but banks will not follow this unless compelled to do so by the 
industry regulator or supervisors. In addition to the above-mentioned disclosures, other 
important disclosures should be included in the annual reports, such as risk sharing policies 
including commingling of UIAHs fund, methods showing how profit distribution has been 
calculated and governance rules on how PER and IRR are being used and transferred. 
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2.9.1 Smoothing Technique Exercise by IBs 
The practice of PER and IRR as smoothing mechanisms at IBs raises some governance issues 
that need attention. The PER is set up in order to maintain a certain level of return on 
investment for UIAHs, by making appropriations to this reserve in periods of high returns 
on the underlying investments and releasing amounts from the reserve when the returns 
are low. The appropriations are made from the Mudarabah income, and the releases are 
made before allocating the Mudarib share. Even though the Islamic bank has full discretion 
to make appropriations to this reserve out of the profits on UPSIA funds, the basis for 
computing the amounts appropriated is predefined in the contractual conditions accepted 
by UIAHs, and after formal review and approval by the BOD. In certain jurisdictions, the 
supervisory authority lays down requirements relating to the maintenance of the PER. 
As Archer and Karim (2012) described, from an accounting point of view, PER consists of 
two components: one is made up of the proportion of appropriations attributable to the 
Mudarib share and included as shareholders’ equity, while the other consists of the 
proportion attributable to the share of the UIAHs as UPSIA equity. However, the latter do 
not have any influence over the decision as to the use or distribution of the PER. 
Furthermore, use of the PER does not “equalise” profits, it only smooths profit payouts. This 
in fact adds to the lack of transparency, as returns on the underlying investments typically 
appear more stable than they actually are. 
The other smoothing mechanism reserve that IBs have developed, to smooth losses to 
UIAHs, is the IRR. This reserve is constituted by appropriations from the UIAHs share of 
profits after allocating the Mudarib share, and may be released to cover losses on UPSIA 
funds. Using the IRR in conjunction with the PER can enable an Islamic bank to make a 
payout to UIAHs even when the underlying result is a loss. This practice, which aggravates 
the bank’s lack of transparency from the UIAHs’ point of view, is thus used to cushion the 
effects of the risk of future investment losses on UPSIA. UIAHs have neither control over, 
nor adequate information about, the use of these reserves, which is determined by senior 
management and the board of directors at IFIs. 
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 The PER and IRR reserves are somewhat analogous to conventional revenue reserves used 
to smooth dividend payouts to shareholders; however, in the case of IBs, UIAHs have no 
right to participate in the decision about the distribution of PER or IRR, which is decided by 
the bank’s board of directors (Archer and Karim, 2006; Archer et al., 2010; Sundararajan, 
2007; Sundararajan, 2008; Farook et al., 2012). In addition, UIAHs face a lack of 
transparency in financial reporting, which includes the above-mentioned smoothing 
mechanism; for example, the lack of information on how and when IBs use these reserves, 
and the fact that the bank usually has full discretion over managing these reserves. Even 
though UIAHs agreed with the smoothing practice on entering into the Mudarabah 
contract, and there is no legal issue here, there is also no guarantee that the practice of 
smoothing is done in the best interests of UIAHs rather than those of shareholders (as a 
mitigant of DCR) or management (Nienhaus, 2007). Therefore, the practice of smoothing 
the returns to UIAHs tends to be a substantial obstacle to transparency.  
As result of these governance conflicts, the IFSB (IFSB-3, 2006) has recommended that IBs 
should establish a governance committee attached to the BOD to monitor and act on behalf 
of UIAHs. IBs should increase transparency in terms of profit allocation between UIAHs and 
shareholders. They should disclose information on smoothing mechanisms including the 
use of reserves such as PER and IRR (IFSB-4, 2007). In addition, AAOIFI21 FAS 11 has a clear 
definition in terms of regulations and guidance; in particular, it requires IBs to disclose 
actual profits and returns before any deduction, and the profit part kept in PER and IRR 
(AAOIFI, 1999b; AAOIFI, 1999a). From a CG perspective, the UIAHs voice should be counted 
                                                     
 
21 The acronym AAOIFI refers to the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, 
an international autonomous non-profit organisation based in Bahrain responsible for developing accounting, 
auditing, ethics, governance and Shari’ah standards for the international Islamic banking and finance industry. 
The AAOIFI was created on February 26, 1990 and is supported by over 200 institutional members of 45 
countries. It has issued some accounting standards and guidance in common with the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). However, according to (Archer et al., 1998), the AAOIFI lacks the power 
to enforce its standards. Now, it is working on having its standards adopted by IFIs and regulatory and 
supervisory countries. Furthermore, market forces are driving IFIs to adopt AAOIFI standards since 
international credit rating agencies now include compliance with the AAOIFI in their criteria for evaluating 
Islamic banks. 
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in the decision-making process or at least they should have a representative on the BOD. 
For this reason, CG is important to any business, including Islamic, to protect and define the 
interests of its stakeholders (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). 
 
2.9.2 Strategy towards Risk 
The Muslim community seeks IBs in preference to conventional banks mainly because of 
the Shari’ah compliance issue. On the other hand, choosing one Islamic bank over another 
depends on potential customers’ degree of confidence in the bank (Dusuki and Abdullah, 
2007). The level of transparency in terms of rates of return and investment risk would 
logically have a bearing on this degree of confidence. If UIAHs lack such confidence, this 
may result in them withdrawing or withholding their funds, which in turn reduces the bank’s 
liquidity and its opportunity to invest in assets and hence earn more profit. According to 
Ariffin et al. (2007), because of the nature of the Islamic bank’s capital structure and 
business model, including the use of unrestricted profit sharing (and loss bearing) 
investment accounts as a type of deposit product, transparency of risk is more important 
than it is for conventional banks, especially to UIAHs. Since these UIAHs do not have similar 
governance rights to those of shareholders, and for information can only rely on annual 
reports at the very most, financial statements in annual reports should be reliable and easily 
accessible by them. However, if the bank has inadequate financial reporting disclosure, this 
will prevent UIAHs from receiving the necessary information and will lead to them not being 
able to make well-informed decisions about their UPSIA with the bank, which significantly 
increases moral hazard. In addition, transparency and adequate accounting disclosure in a 
timely manner is a costly process, involving such matters as hiring independent auditors to 
have high-quality financial reporting consistent with international standards. For this 
reason, certain banks favour poor transparency. In fact, IBs see no advantage in greater 
transparency with regard to the returns payable to UPSIA. Indeed, they engage in 
“smoothing” to give the impression of very stable returns and do not wish to disclose the 
true underlying returns and reduce the level of transparency (Archer and Karim, 2007c). 
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Although this does not appear to be very enlightened behaviour on their part, the argument 
that greater transparency would be in their interests is not supported by their behaviour.   
In general, market discipline can also be a useful tool to limit the bank from taking 
unnecessary risks, and to make the process of taking excessive risks very costly, which in 
return reduces the moral hazard problems. However, to make market discipline effective, 
investors need to have sufficient and reliable information on a regular basis. Having the 
correct transparent reporting practices may ultimately increase the liquidity and 
profitability of the bank, since more investors will come back and reinvest their funds if they 
perceive that adequate information is provided. Also, the authority supervisor can and does 
require information that is not publicly disclosed, in order to be able to assess the bank’s 
risk profile. Having accurate information in regulatory reports may reduce the incentive of 
the supervisory authority to impose additional restrictions on banks or alternatively ease 
them. In the presence of effective market discipline, high-quality disclosure arguably helps 
the supervisor, as the market will exercise a certain amount of supervision. However, 
effective market discipline in the (emerging market) countries where IBs operate may not 
exist. 
2.10 The Issue of Transparency 
Given the nature of IBs’ capital structure and the business model in which they mobilise 
funds, their use of Musharakah Sukuk and Mudarabah should encourage IBs to be more 
transparent. In particular, reporting on how the fund is being mobilised requires disclosing 
the rate of return and risk associated with these types of sources of funds. According to 
Archer et al. (1998), the Mudarabah contract currently used by IBs raises several moral 
hazard issues in terms of the nature of the governance structure applicable to UIAHs, which 
leaves the management of the IBs with a great degree of discretion concerning the funds 
provided by UIAHs. Ariffin et al. (2009) pointed out that IBs should, in principle, be more 
transparent than conventional banks because of the characteristics involved in mobilising 
their funds. This is especially true when it comes to reporting their risks, which can help 
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UIAHs to monitor their investment properly and assist them to better understand their risk 
exposure as well as protecting their interests. 
2.10.1 Transparency and Protection of UIAHs 
 The IFSB has issued a number of standards addressing the protection of UIAHs. As 
mentioned earlier, in terms of disclosure of information in IFSB-4 (2007), the IFSB has issued 
Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline for Institutions offering Islamic 
Financial Services which was intended inter alia to address the issue of transparency to 
UIAHs and to set recommendations to be followed by IFIs when making disclosures. The 
standard was designed to set a principle and to act as a guideline to IFIs, including Islamic 
windows to achieve transparency and promote market discipline as well as to address the 
supervisory authorities with different recommendations to set up the necessary policy to 
be implemented in terms of a bank’s disclosure and risk profile. In addition, the IFSB 
standard helps with the role of the supervisory authority to encourage IBs to publish 
simplified and easy-to-understand information for normal investors who are looking for a 
safe return as an alternative to conventional deposits. Also, the IFSB standard provides the 
supervisory authority with a guideline to apply to IBs with regard to their reporting the 
return and risks in respect of UIAHs and to motivate them to produce a comprehensive but 
not technical report (IFSB-4, 2007). 
The standard was based on the guidelines in international standards, such as those issued 
by BCBS Basel II (Pillar 3) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 7) in relation to bank transparency and 
governance with reference to disclosure22. These guidelines then reflect the specific 
information needed by UIAHs and shareholders, which arise from the unique risk and 
characteristics of IFIs that may not be properly addressed by the IFRS alone. The ability to 
                                                     
 
22 For more information, see IFSB-4 – “Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline or 
Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services”, published in December 2007. 
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have effective market discipline in IBs is reduced by inadequate disclosure, which may 
increase the banks’ tendency to adopt a risk appetite (having shareholders’ risk-return 
preferences in mind) greater than that of the risk-averse UIAHs (Archer and Karim, 2013). 
The importance of the IFSB standard comes from the fact that UIAHs have no 
representation on the BOD or the Shari’ah Supervisory Board. The position taken by the 
standard is that it is essential to have adequate disclosure since UIAHs have a right to expect 
accountability and transparency concerning investments made on their behalf. One of the 
objectives of the IFSB standard is to enable the market participants, especially UIAHs, to 
have access to relevant and reliable information wherever possible, thereby enhancing their 
monitoring capacity. According to Van Greuning and Iqbal (2008), although IBs have made 
several efforts to improve and enhance their level of transparency, there are still some 
areas that need to be developed. For example, IBs do not have uniform reporting standards 
that organise the financial reports. Moreover, different jurisdictions impose different levels 
of disclosure requirements on IBs in addition to other international regulation standards in 
order to achieve the desired level of disclosure needed. For instance, before the 
establishment of the AAOIFI, IBs rarely disclosed adequate information, and therefore 
information revealed on UIAHs funds, such as the smoothing percentage of the returns of 
UIAHs, was insufficient. Moreover, some IBs reported PSIA funds as liabilities on their 
balance sheets, while others treated them as equity, and yet others treated them as “off 
balance sheet” funds under management (Archer and Karim, 2007d). This lack of 
transparency created information asymmetry between UIAHs and management of IBs, 
which prevented UIAHs from accessing proper information to manage and best protect 
their investments, while giving management the freedom to act in favour of shareholders 
at the expense of UIAHs. Although the AAOIFI and the IFSB have created awareness of CG 
issues and transparency, very few regulations have been issued by national authorities 
where IBs operate with respect to CG issues in terms of equity investors, and some financial 
supervisors have approached UIAHs regulations from the deposit protection perspective. In 
addition, only a few countries have adopted the standards of the AAOIFI, and the adoption 
of IFSB standards varies between countries and is rarely complete. However, no protection 
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yet exists that fully covers the rights of UIAHs, and no country has deposit protection 
schemes that are fully applicable to UIAHs. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter will present the literature review, including the implications of CG for 
unrestricted profit-sharing investment accounts (UPSIAs), and it will discuss a general 
definition of CG and its background, extended to incorporate the perspective of CG in 
Islamic finance. It will also illustrate the IBs’ business model and the dilemma of the UPSIA. 
Finally, this chapter will define the contribution of the research. As James D. Woldfensohn 
(1999), president of the World Bank, states, ‘the proper governance of companies will 
become as crucial to the world economy as the proper governing of countries’. 
3.2 Corporate Governance in General 
To understand CG, it is important to state a general definition, together with the aim of CG, 
then focus on specific definitions including the Islamic viewpoint. Several international 
organisations have formulated best practices for CG and there are a number of definitions 
of CG. For example, in 1999 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) issued its first set of CG principles, which then became an international benchmark 
for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide (OECD, 1999).  
Then in 2004, the CG principles was revised to increase its suitability for the economic 
environment around the rest of the world. CG is ‘a set of policies, processes, and laws, which 
affect the way a corporation is managed’.23 The last publication of G20/OECD principles of 
CG was conducted in 2015, which contains the results of second review of principles of CG 
(OECD, 2015).  As the OECD has described it, ‘Corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
                                                     
 
23 Principles of corporate governance available at http://www.oecd.org 
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stakeholders’. CG also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. Good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should 
facilitate effective monitoring (OECD, 2015).24 The OECD has stated the aims of CG as 
follows: ‘The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to its 
impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for 
market participants and the promotion of transparent and efficient markets’ (OECD, 2015, 
p. 14). Similarly Cadbury Committee (1992) as the first UK CG Code, define CG as ‘the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the 
directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The 
board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting’. 
From the banking industry viewpoint, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
points out that CG is concerned with allocating authority and responsibility. For example, 
the practice of how the bank’s board of directors (BOD) and management lead the bank, 
including setting the bank’s strategy and objectives, determining the bank’s risk tolerance, 
protecting the interests of depositors, and meeting the shareholders’ obligations, as well as 
protecting the interests of stakeholders. Sound CG practices are essential in the banking 
system to achieve public trust and confidence. On the other hand, poor CG practices can 
lead to a failure in the banking industry, which will in turn affect the public sector due to 
their potential impact on the deposit system; this could then have macroeconomic 
implications such as impact on payment systems (BCBS, 2010). In addition, BCBS notes that 
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poor CG could lead the markets to lose confidence in the banking system’s capacity to 
manage assets and liabilities, including deposits, which may create a liquidity issue. 
From the perspective of investors, Metrick and Ishii (2002) define CG as ‘both the promise 
to repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm, efficiently 
given investment’. Claessens (2006) emphasises that the definitions of CG fall into two sets 
of categories. The first set is concerned with the behavioural patterns of corporations, in 
terms of measuring performance, efficiency, financial structure, growth and treatment of 
stakeholders. For example, this type of definition considers how BOD operate. The other 
set involves the normative framework, such as the rules that firms operate under, for 
example, the legal system or the judicial system. 
Choudhury and Hoque (2006) highlight the fact that CG deals with the legal and 
organisational structures that look after the internal integrity of a firm. They describe CG as 
a bundle of contracts and rules that firms work under, enacted by the legal tenets of 
government. The objective of CG is to identify and set the criteria by understanding the 
relationships between the variables in corporations. 
CG explains the relationships inside the business environment, and defines the way that a 
corporation should be directed and controlled and its relationships with its other 
stakeholders. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis the approach of the OECD on CG will 
lead us to consider the legal rights and the relationship between UIAHs and IBs because it 
also focuses on stakeholders. The OECD points out that CG is a set of relationships between 
a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and stakeholders. We also take into 
consideration the viewpoint of BCBS on the CG of the banking industry, regarding allocation 
of authority and responsibility, such as the way that the BOD and management run the 
business. 
3.3 The Perspective of Corporate Governance 
Since the collapse of major companies like the Enron Corporation and MCI Inc. there has 
been a greatly increased interest in the CG practices of corporations. However, CG had been 
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discussed long before, and the general view of CG was recognised in the classical agency 
theory problem in the 1930s by Berle and Means (1932), who point out that CG issues arise 
from the separation of ownership and management in the modern corporation. They 
suggest that concentration of ownership would have a positive impact on firm value 
because it would reduce the conflict of interest between owners and managers. Most 
corporations in the 19th century belonged to a small number of wealthy shareholders, who 
had control of them, whereas 20th and 21st century corporations are different: there is a 
much wider range of shareholders in large firms in certain countries, notably the UK and 
the USA. Typically, shareholders do not have any control, and, due to the asymmetry of 
information and dispersion, shareholders could not impose a policy of maximising their 
interests. As described by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), this may have led to corporate assets 
being deployed to benefit managers instead of shareholders. Nevertheless, dispersed 
ownership still holds in the 21st century and shareholders only have control through the 
BOD. These factors led to the initial development of agency theory, which highlights the 
implications of the separation of ownership and control, and the conflict of interest 
between management and shareholders. However, the discussion of principal and agency 
in the corporate context originated earlier, in The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1776), 
who highlighted the fact that ‘the directors of joint stock companies are managers of other 
people’s money more than of their own, and [it] cannot be expected that the managers’ 
action would be taken in the same vigilance as the owner of the company’.  
Coase (1937) presented transactions cost theory in terms of the nature of the firm, 
explaining why individuals want to establish a partnership or a firm, while trying to avoid 
and reduce some of the transactions costs. By creating a firm that serves as an intermediary 
between consumers and suppliers, transactions costs can be reduced, such as contracting, 
coordinating, enforcing and discharging rights and obligations under contracts (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987). 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) refine the view of the firm by focusing on the principal’s cost 
of monitoring the agent, believing that the firm’s management should continue the process 
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of negotiating contracts. They consider that contractual structure arises to enhance 
organisational efficiency in the factors of production. Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop 
the theory of the ownership structure of the firm, presenting the concept of agency costs 
and their relationship to separation and control issues, which may affect the value of the 
firm, as a contract where the principal (shareholders) – one or more persons – can engage 
with the agent (managers) – another person – to perform some service on their behalf that 
may involve delegating decision-making authority to the agent, with the objective of 
maximising the principal’s value. Crucially, however, the agent or manager might not 
maximise value for the principal but might instead focus more on maximising the managers’ 
own personal wealth. These divisions of interest create agency costs, although principals 
may limit such failure to maximise their interests by imposing monitoring such as having a 
BOD act on the principal’s behalf to monitor and control the agent’s activities and limit the 
issue of asymmetry of information to ensure the maximisation of shareholders’ value. Also, 
principals may create appropriate incentives for the agent by contracting them to 
undertake actions in the interest of the principal or to avoid certain actions that conflict 
with the principal’s interest. For example, the agent’s activities may be restricted by 
commitment to contractual obligations to stay with the firm even if the firm is acquired by 
another firm, in a process called bonding costs. In addition, residual loss may be incurred as 
agency costs from the principal’s and agent‘s interests, independent of the use of 
monitoring and bonding costs, which is the costs of providing incentives to the agent to act 
in the principal’s interests. Fama and Jensen (1983b) indicate that the agency problem is a 
result of conducting a costless contract that is not enforced; however, these could be 
mitigated by developing a controlling process that ensures that the decisions taken by the 
management are to the benefit of shareholders. Therefore, the implication and 
development of agency theory led to the shareholder theory of CG. 
In addition to the traditional principal–agency conflicts, there is the principal–principal 
model. Villalonga and Amit (2006) distinguish between the type I agency problem and type 
II: the issue in the type II agency problem is not between shareholders and managers but 
between different types of shareholders. For example, in a family firm, one concentrated 
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owner can take advantage of the company to their private benefit, while the other minority 
owners do not receive very much, because of the nature of ownership. This model of CG 
deals with the conflicts of interests between concentrated shareholders who have power 
and minority ones who have weak or no legal protection (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
Williamson (1996) argues that equity investors normally have governance rights that 
involve them in transactions costs of governance, namely, costs of monitoring as a result of 
agency issues, via various mechanisms including a BOD that is answerable to them and 
periodic financial reports. Williamson also points out that creditors, who do not need to 
perform monitoring as equity investors do, typically have certain governance rights in the 
event of default. 
3.4 Two Schools of Thought on CG 
The CG perspective recognises that there are at least two classes of stakeholders. The 
‘shareholder theory’ recognises only shareholders as stakeholders, whereas the 
‘stakeholder theory’ recognises several. The original idea of CG emphasises the 
management and shareholder relationship; for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
highlight the separation of ownership and control, and the potential conflict of interest, 
where the problem could be mitigated by governance structures. However, in the second 
half of the 20th century, the notion of stakeholders was extended and there emerged two 
views of stakeholders: one which continues to focus on shareholders, and one that is a more 
extended body of modern CG theory with a developed notion of the stakeholder. 
Franks et al. (2006) point out that governance of Anglo-American firms reflects shareholder 
theory whereas the governance of German corporations reflects stakeholder theory. For 
example, British and American firms have some dispersed shareholders, whereas German 
corporations tend to have more concentrated ownership. Yunis (2007) also highlights the 
difference in the CG objectives, especially in the Anglo-American model (neoliberal) and the 
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Franco-German or Continental European model (societal).25 Both models treat stakeholders 
differently, for example the Anglo-American model, which exists mainly in the UK and the 
USA, concentrates on maximising shareholders’ value, emphasising the fact that 
management should take decisions in the interest of shareholders. On the other hand, the 
Franco-German model, in addition to shareholders’ interest, also concentrates on the 
interest of other stakeholders, which include groups other than shareholders that are 
affected by organisational activities and decisions. The Franco-German model considers 
corporations as being in industrial partnerships that are more like long-term relationships, 
and therefore posits that the interests of employees, groups and other communities should 
not be subordinated to those of shareholders. 
3.4.1 Shareholder View 
The contracts and relationships between shareholders and managers, which the CG 
structure focuses on, are often referred to shareholders’ model. The Anglo-American model 
argues that the agency theory conflict occurs between dispersed shareholders and 
managers, who have several governance mechanisms to reduce the conflict of interests 
between them, such as the BOD (internal mechanism), and the managerial labour market 
(external mechanism) (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). For example, the BOD can encourage the 
managers to make a project profitable by paying them well; since profit increases the 
shareholders’ value, this will align the interests of the managers and shareholders (Padgett, 
2012). 
Shareholder theory is concerned only with maximising the shareholders’ interest, where 
shareholders have control and the board have a fiduciary duty towards shareholders. The 
emphasis on the shareholders, since they are regarded as the guardian of the interest of 
other stakeholders, for example, in ‘vicarious monitoring’ hypothesis, holders of voting 
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shares monitor on behalf of holders of non-voting shares. However, an alternative 
perspective, the stakeholders’ view, rejects this and argues that shareholders cannot be 
relied upon to safeguard the interests of other stakeholders; the latter should be more 
involved in the structure. For example, the continental European view (or neo-corporatist) 
includes in their supervisory board (in listed companies), representatives of the workforce 
and local government in decision-making. This is a typical German model; a representative 
of the Land (local state) typically sits on the Supervisory Board of German stock 
corporations, as does a representative of the workforce. They have adopted a view of CG 
that takes a wide view of who the stakeholders are. Customers and suppliers are also 
stakeholders but are not represented on the board. 
3.4.2 Stakeholder View 
Stakeholder theory developed in response to the agency problem occurring between the 
agent and a larger set of stakeholders. As a result of shareholders’ awareness of their rights, 
and apart from the agency theory perspectives on CG, which tend to focus on shareholders, 
much of the discussion has questioned different issues of CG (Ahmed and Chapra, 2002). 
For example, many arguments in the CG literature focus on whether CG should be 
concentrated on protecting shareholders’ interests and maximising their value, or whether 
it should also include the protection of other stakeholders’26 interests (Archer and Karim, 
2007d). Stakeholder theory has a different view of the principal–agent relationship, where 
the optimal responsibility is to stakeholders rather than only to shareholders. Freeman 
(1984) offers a broad organisational definition of ‘stakeholders’ as any individual or group 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. This 
includes the relationships defining stakeholder involvement and the goals for which the 
                                                     
 
26 Stakeholders were defined in the first stage by the Stanford Research Institute (1963) as ‘those groups 
without [whose] support the organization would cease to exist’. Then the theory was later developed by 
Freeman (1984), who refers to a person, group or organisation that has interest in an enterprise or project, 
which can be affected by the organisation's actions, objectives and policies, such as employees, creditors, 
directors, owners as shareholders, suppliers, and even government, unions and the community from which 
the business draws its resources. 
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corporation is governed. The stakeholders are thus not only the shareholders, but also 
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and the community at large. Phillips et al. (2003) 
note that, in stakeholder theory, the focus of management is more than just maximising 
shareholder wealth. Therefore, stakeholder theorists argue that managers in any 
organisation should have a network of relationships to serve that includes employees, 
suppliers and business partners (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). Freeman et al. (2004) point 
out that stakeholder theory is managerial and that it reflects and directs how management 
operates rather than just addressing management theorists or economists. Pouloudi and 
Whitley (1997) suggest extending the definition of stakeholder theory, as opposed to 
neoclassical shareholder theory, by looking at inter-organisational information systems in 
which all individuals, groups or even organisations whose actions can effect or be influenced 
by the development and the use of the information system,27 whether directly or indirectly, 
should be considered as stakeholders. These interested parties, or stakeholders, have 
important roles to play for the initiation and the continuation of inter-organisational 
systems. The theory of stakeholders, which emerged to address the issue of agency problem 
between management and a wide range of stakeholders, has received wide acceptance in 
business practice in relation to CG and corporate social responsibility. 
3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
According to Deakin and Hughes (1997), CG focuses on the relationship between the 
internal governance mechanisms of firms and society’s view of corporate accountability. CG 
structure, including the BOD, plays a very important role in the effectiveness of CG. 
However, the BOD cannot perform its important role without proper qualifications, such as 
awareness of business risk and the complexities of the banking industries (Ahmed and 
Chapra, 2002). Also, in the case of banks, the BOD should have moral integrity and have full 
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control over the affairs of the bank, clearly specifying the strategic objective, and setting up 
the code of conduct for senior management and staff. The roles of non-executive directors, 
CEO-chair duality28, remuneration, audit and nominating committees have also been 
discussed in the context of effective CG (Mayer, 1997). 
3.5.1 Importance of Structure of the Board 
One of the important principles of CG is the election by shareholders of the BOD, which in 
turn selects top management.  The BOD has two completely separate functions, one of 
which is to be the ultimate decision making body of the firm as a strategic function, and the 
other one is monitoring device, whereas the BOD carries out the monitoring function on 
behalf of shareholders.  Therefore, according to John and Senbet (1998) the effectiveness 
of the BOD in its monitoring function is determined by the size of the board, its 
independence, and its composition. On one hand, the UK CG Code (previously known as the 
UK Combined Code published by the Financial Reporting Council) views duality in the 
composition of the board as unfavourable since it give one person too much power over 
the decision-making function (McKnight and Weir, 2009). Alternatively, empirical evidence 
from Donaldson and Davis (1991) shows that return on equity (ROE)  ratio tend to be 
superior when there is CEO-chair duality. They argue that stewardship theory, concerning 
leadership by a CEO-chair, better explains maximisation of shareholders’ interests than 
agency theory. In contrast, agency theory argues that CG is weaker when the bank has the 
same person as its chair (having an overseeing function over the CEO) and as its CEO, which 
is an executive role. For example, according to agency theory, the board of KFH-Kuwait had 
a weaker form of CG from 2003 to 2010 than when these roles were separated from 2011. 
The argument is that the chair is overseeing himself or herself as CEO and this is a form of 
weak CG. However, stewardship theory views the combination of CEO and chair as 
indicative of power and higher profit potential. The main difference between the two 
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theories remains in the method of operation, though, in both cases, management is 
assumed to be self-seeking, which is not the same as profit maximising in the shareholders’ 
interest.29 The key difference is that in stewardship theory management is assumed to 
believe that the best way to get on and be paid more is by doing what the shareholders 
want (Padgett, 2012), and there is considerable evidence that shows firms attain better 
financial performance with a single CEO-chair than with separate CEO and chair.  From this 
perspective combining the chair and CEO is unproblematic.  In contrast, in agency theory 
management is assumed to pursue its own interest by creating benefits for itself at the 
expense of shareholders, for example by giving itself generous perquisites or by shirking 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Also, empirical studies show that board size has its own influence on the ability of the board 
to control, monitor, disclose (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009) and to perform other tasks of the 
company directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). For example, a small board is believed to 
encourage faster information processing and may enhance communications among the 
company’s top management and senior executives (Zahra et al., 2000). However, Zahra et 
al. (2000) also suggest that a larger board brings its own benefits, such as increasing 
company value by providing the expertise and knowledge of members on board. 
Additionally the size of the board has an effect on the level of voluntary disclosure; for 
example, Chen and Jaggi (2001) argue that a larger board size may reduce information 
asymmetry, which may increase company value. Birnbaum (1984) suggests that a larger 
board reduces uncertainty and lack of information. The effect of CG in reducing the agency 
problem between shareholders and management is thus assumed to be influenced by the 
BOD structure, generally composed of both insiders and external members. 
On the other hand, several studies have tested the financial performance of IBs using 
various financial ratios including return on assets (ROA). For example, Hanif et al. (2012) 
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examine the performance of Islamic and conventional banks in Pakistan during the five-year 
period from 2005 to 2009, in terms of internal and external banking factors. The internal 
factors include a measurement of profitability using ROA, liquidity, credit risk and solvency. 
Nine financial ratios are used in their empirical study to measure the differences in the 
internal factors as well as a model known as Bank-o-meter to gauge solvency. The external 
factors indicator includes customer behaviour and perceptions of both Islamic and 
conventional banks. Their study finds that the conventional banks’ performance was better 
in terms of profitability and liquidity than that of the IBs. However, the performance of IBs 
in terms of credit risk and solvency was better than that of conventional banks. There are 
other dimensions of performance from bank customers’ point of view. Hanif et al. (2012) 
include a customer survey on a sample group of mostly Pakistani males between the ages 
of 20 and 29 years old. The majority of the sample customers have five years of experience 
with their bank, which shows that customers’ choice of bank is influenced by factors 
including Shari’ah-based banking, friendliness of personnel, facilities provided by the bank, 
image of the bank, effectiveness in handling problems, cost-effectiveness, and others. 
Results show 36% would tend to choose an Islamic bank over a conventional bank based on 
Shari’ah compliance when opening an account in a bank, whereas 30% would choose a 
conventional bank over an Islamic bank based on the facilities provided by the bank. There 
is some evidence that Muslim customers are willing to make a trade-off between quality of 
service and value for money on the one hand, and Shari’ah compliance on the other hand, 
especially in Takaful (Islamic insurance). Conversely, with the increasing number of IBs 
globally and the fact that Muslim customers are ordinary investors, they are looking for 
quality of service and value for money. 
Alternatively, a different perspective on Islamic and conventional banks based on various 
financial ratios is provided by Ika and Abdullah (2011), who examine Indonesian banks to 
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compare financial performance with consumer choice.30 The study makes a comparison 
analysis of profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and efficiency. The study finds that there 
is no significant difference between IBs and conventional banks in their financial 
performance using ROA; but in the case of liquidity ratios there is a difference, with IBs 
shown to be more liquid than conventional banks.  
3.6 Corporate of Governance in IIFS 
CG of institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) has also gained attention lately 
because of the steady growth of Islamic finance and investment. Even though the Islamic 
financial industry is still in its initial development stage, and despite its small share of the 
global financial system, IIFIs remain essential to the financial market, especially in the 
Muslim world. In addition, conventional banks now offer Islamic windows to customers who 
are seeking Shari’ah compliance. 
Much research has been conducted on viability, design and operations of profit sharing in 
IBs (Greuning and Iqbal, 2007); however, it is clear that insufficient research has been 
completed on the CG issue from an Islamic perspective (Hasan, 2009), particularly on 
governance structures and the potential conflict of interest between UIAHs and 
shareholders (Yunis, 2007). Some studies, such as those by Siddiqi (1981); Haneef (1995), 
looking at contemporary literature on Islamic economic thought, highlight the lack of 
references to and discussion on matters concerning CG from an Islamic perspective. 
Mannan (1984) also notes the absence of specific research on Shari’ah governance. 
Research carried out by Ahmed and Chapra (2002) addresses Islamic corporate governance, 
specifically focusing on the issue of the governance framework of IBs. These studies cover 
CG only from the viewpoints of accounting, auditing and the general framework in IBs. 
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According to El-Hawary et al. (2004), to be consistent with core principles and current 
practice, there is a need to contrast the risks and regulations in IBs. Furthermore, Rosly and 
Zaini (2008) add that there is an absence, in the theoretical studies in the literature, of 
consideration of risk–return relationships in Islamic capital markets. This may have impeded 
consideration of the important CG issue of possible conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and UIAHs in IBs and the implications of the lack of governance rights of the 
latter. 
To remain successful and continue steady growth, and to promote financial stability in the 
Islamic financial sector and more widely, it is arguably important that IBs should have a 
robust CG framework (IFSB-3, 2006). However, any rigid rule-based approach adopted with 
the intention of strengthening the CG of IBs may threaten their potential and healthy 
growth (IFSB-3, 2006). Furthermore, there is no quick fix to apply to implement a good 
governance culture in IBs, but given a suitable environment in which they are given an 
adequate timeline, encouragement and incentives, one may expect that a good CG culture 
will continue to develop within the Islamic financial services industry.31 However, so far as 
the legal and institutional environment is concerned, most countries in which IBs operate 
fall into the ‘emerging market’ category, which implies weaknesses from the standpoint of 
developing robust CG (IFSB-Report, 2015; IFSB-3, 2006). 
3.7 Ideological Context of Islamic Banks 
3.7.1 Shareholder Theory Perspective Related to UPSIAs 
Considering the contractual relationship between UPSIAs and the IBs from an agency theory 
perspective, the bank, as the Mudarib (agent), has a fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the UIAHs as principals (as well as the best interests of shareholders). However, 
the UIAHs are generally unable to monitor the activities of the Mudarib, because they lack 
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the governance rights that would enable them to do so. We may observe some 
characteristics of the agency problem (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002), especially in the 
Mudarabah contract, where information asymmetry may exist. Therefore, risk and profit 
sharing contracted in the agency theory framework relate to two parties: one (in this case, 
the Mudarib) has no funding but has knowledge about a risky profitable investment, and 
the other (UIAHs) has the funding but not the knowledge (Khalil et al., 2002). The problem 
of asymmetric information in this characterisation is very clear. 
Another example is a principal–agent problem between the bank as agent and the UIAHs as 
principal, which indicates a need for governance mechanisms or rights to help safeguard 
the interests of UIAHs. Moreover, it should be noted that shareholders and UIAHs face the 
same investment risk in their portfolio when the funds of both parties are commingled and 
invested in the same asset pool, as is normally the case; yet the interests of shareholders 
and UIAHs may be in conflict, regarding both the sharing of profits and risk appetite. Hence, 
in addition to the potential ‘principal–agent’ issue, CG issues in IBs with respect to UIAHs 
can also be considered to include a ‘principal–principal' agency problem (Archer et al., 
1998). UIAHs might in principle be able to count on shareholders to perform monitoring on 
their behalf, since shareholders need UIAHs to provide them with the Mudarib’s share of 
profits, which is an important part of their profits from the bank. However, this may be 
somewhat implausible because of a misalignment of incentive in terms of risk–return 
preferences, as pointed out in the Islamic Financial Services Board’s (IFSB) guiding principles 
for CG of IFIs. According to IFSB-3 (2006), UIAHs are generally risk-averse and seek to avoid 
losses and to receive stable returns, whereas shareholders are more aggressive in terms of 
risk appetite, seeking an investment strategy aimed at higher but riskier returns. Tektas et 
al. (2005) explain that risk-takers are willing to bear higher risk for higher returns, where on 
the opposite side the risk-averse accept low returns to avoid risk. Likewise, Taktak (2011) 
states that the two categories of stakeholders (UIAHs and shareholders) have different 
desires regarding risk: UIAHs are considered to be defensive, seeking moderate and steady 
levels of Shari’ah-compliant returns, while the shareholders are more aggressive and desire 
riskier activities, which lead to a higher level of returns. Similarly, Archer et al. (2010) 
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mention that there is a potential conflict of interest between shareholders and UIAHs due 
to the different appetites for risk and the preferred risk–return trade-off for each category 
of stakeholders, hence UIAHs tend more towards risk aversion and shareholders are less 
risk averse. Thus, the difference in the levels of appetite for risk and return may lead to a 
conflict of interests. Therefore, when IBs commingle the funds of these two stakeholders 
into one asset pool, either to invest the funds in different projects for profit or to use them 
at their discretion, sound CG would require them to take into consideration and to balance 
the differences in risk appetite between these two types of stakeholders. However, the 
governance structures of IBs give shareholders the governance rights of equity investors (as 
residual claimants), such as the right to participate in general meetings and to appoint and 
remove members of the board of directors, while UIAHs have no such rights. Hence, 
management is likely to pursue policies that accord with shareholders’ preferences, rather 
than those of UIAHs (Archer and Karim, 2007b; IFSB-3, 2006). This problem is mitigated to 
some extent by the desire of shareholders and management to maintain a given level of 
UPSIAs as a source of income from the Mudarib’s share of profits from investment of UPSIA 
funds, since UIAHs may ‘vote with their feet’ by withdrawing their funds (Archer and Karim, 
2006). However, as the research for this thesis has indicated (see chapters 4, 5, and 7 
below), UIAHs are typically very passive and appear to be content with modest levels of 
profit payout. 
It may be argued that, although UIAHs, being profit-sharing and loss-bearing, are residual 
claimants with respect to cash flows from operations, as Rabb Almaal they have a right to 
recover the net asset value (NAV) of the assets financed by their funds in the event of the 
liquidation of the Islamic bank., i.e. they have a right similar to that of secured creditors. 
However, it is by no means certain that the insolvency regimes of various jurisdictions would 
uphold this right, which exists in Shari’ah law but not necessarily in secular law. 
Be that as it may, even if UIAHs have as sole control right that of ‘voting with their feet’, it 
would seem reasonable that the CG regime should give them ‘information rights’, i.e. a right 
to accountability and transparency on investments made on their behalf. As mentioned 
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earlier in section 3.3, Williamson (1996) analyses the respective governance rights of debt 
and equity, where equity investors generally have governance rights that involve them in 
transaction costs of governance, namely, costs of monitoring via various mechanisms 
including the BOD. As Archer et al. (1998) argue, UPSIAs raise many issues regarding the 
relationship between them and the bank from different perspectives, such as agency theory 
and transaction cost economics. IBs have made some efforts to improve and enhance the 
level of transparency, for example in Bahrain, where the Central Bank of Bahrain has 
required the adoption of the standards of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). However, there are still some areas of transparency 
that need to be developed. IFIs do not have uniform reporting standards that organise the 
financial reports for IBs, or even comprehensive regulations to govern them (Greuning and 
Iqbal, 2007). Therefore, information asymmetry and the separation of ownership and 
control give rise to numerous instances of the agency problem. 
In particular, the assumption of ‘vicarious monitoring'32 raised by (Archer et al., 1998), 
where UIAHs can rely on shareholders to safeguard their own interest on their behalf, 
cannot be relied on because of a misalignment of incentive in terms of risk–return 
preferences. Both shareholders and UIAHs experience the same level of investment risk in 
their portfolio, since the funds of both parties are commingled and invested in the same 
pool. The hypothesis that the CG problems of IBs with respect to UIAHs can be considered 
to cause a ‘principal–principal' agency problem makes the assumption of ‘vicarious 
monitoring' unreliable, as both investors have different appetites for risk. Even though 
Siddiqi (1991) argues that the Mudarabah contract, with its sharing of risk and returns, 
reflects the core of Islamic banking, Ahmed (2002) points out that the agency and 
transactions cost problems with Mudarabah financing by IBs have led to the use of other 
financial instruments to provide financing to customers, such as Murabahah (mark-up-
based financing), which have become the main method of financing in IBs. Iqbal et al. (1998) 
                                                     
 
32 For more information on vicarious monitoring, see (Archer et al., 1998). 
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supports the view that using Mudarabah in profit-sharing methods of financing entails 
moral hazard, i.e. the agency problem. 
As a result, there is a potential principal–agent problem concerning the relationship 
between UIAHs as principals and management as agents. There is, also, as Archer et al. 
(1998) identify, a ‘principal–principal problem’ with respect to the relationship between the 
UIAHs and the shareholders as two sets of principals whose interests may not necessarily 
correspond. The agency theory literature does not specifically consider principals such as 
UIAHs, who are a form of stakeholder specific to IBs, but it does consider conflicts of interest 
between different economic actors including shareholders and management of the firm. 
However, according to Hart (1989), a firm is viewed as a relationship of contracts including 
creditors, employees, suppliers, customers and others which are essential part of the firm 
who usually face different problems and observe asymmetries of information. 
3.7.2 Stakeholder Theory Perspective Related to UPSIAs 
‘Stakeholder theory’ in the CG literature refers to theory which gives importance to other 
stakeholders in the corporation together with the shareholders (Al-Sadah, 2008). The 
stakeholder theory of CG provides a clear place for UIAHs as stakeholders, whereas 
shareholder theory fails to do so. Heath and Norman (2004) point out that stakeholder 
theory is about the fundamental nature of corporations, where a firm serves stakeholders’ 
interests. For example, stakeholders provide capital to firms (as is the case with UIAHs) in 
exchange for returns on their investment, where firms have a fiduciary duty to maximise 
stakeholders’ value (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) adds that, in addition to the banks’ 
responsibilities to shareholders, banks have other duties to their depositors and to other 
relevant stakeholders (BCBS, 2010). This implies that stakeholder theory is particularly 
relevant in banking industries, including (and perhaps especially) IBs. Furthermore, IBs are 
expected to act with social responsibility, engaging in activities for the public good as part 
of the business establishment. As part of the community, they can thus play an important 
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role in the local environment, without forgetting that IBs are profit-seeking business 
entities, not charities. The issue is thus one of finding an acceptable trade-off between profit 
seeking and socially responsible business conduct. 
Agency theory originally focused on the relationship between shareholders and managers, 
and this perspective is still pervasive in much of the CG literature. However, the later 
developments in agency theory examine principal–principal issues and other issues 
involving stakeholders other than shareholders. Hence, the perspective of stakeholder 
theory seems more appropriate for this research, especially in the area of potential conflicts 
of interest between UIAHs and shareholders. The key concern is how the management of 
Islamic enterprises balances the interests of UIAHs and shareholders, with particular 
reference to profit-sharing practices and the provision of relevant information to UIAHs. 
According to Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004), the increased attention to CG and to finding an 
appropriate governance structure is due to multiple factors, including a shift from focusing 
only on the traditional shareholder value to focusing on a wider circle of stakeholders in the 
governance structure.33 Baums et al. (1993) state that the neo-institutional economists’ 
theory relies on agency theory to define the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’; they also point 
out  that the neo-institutional economists argue that firms’ claimants are a broader set than 
just shareholders and should include other stakeholders with whom the firm has explicit 
and implicit contractual interactions, such as customers, employees, creditors and others. 
As indicated earlier, the firm exists as a substitute for the costly forms of transactions 
(Coase, 1937), whereby the transactional costs of negotiating, contracting and other 
activities such as enforcing or discharging contracts can be reduced by the formation of the 
firm. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim, contractual designs emerge to reduce the 
transactional costs between factors of production. Thus, the formulation of the agency 
                                                     
 
33 In addition to other factors that include the growth of institutional investors such as pension and mutual 
funds, plus the global trend of deregulation of financial sectors. 
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problem suggests that creating an effective monitoring structure can reduce adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. 
Nevertheless, the original formulation of the CG problem is based on the relationship 
between investors and managers and focuses on the protection of shareholders’ interests 
only. On the other hand, business ethicists have considered this exclusion of other non-
shareholder groups to be ethically unjustified and unacceptable. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) 
also indicate that stakeholder theorists reject the characteristics of the ‘shareholder’ model, 
which states that the fiduciary duty34 of firm managers should serve and maximise 
shareholders’ wealth only and that control should be in the shareholders’ hands alone. 
Stakeholder theorists argue that other stakeholders should have a say in firms’ decision-
making that affects them, and managers should also include in their fiduciary duty all 
stakeholders’ interests, not just those of shareholders, and hence the firm should promote 
the interests of all stakeholders as well. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) furthermore state that 
the Islamic economic system provides a strong basis for a stakeholder theory of CG, because 
Islam recognises the right of all forms of life in society, not just those of certain individuals.  
Therefore, the Islamic economic system refers to property rights and contracts to govern 
the economic and social behaviour of all forms of life in society including individuals, society 
and state. As Shari’ah provides a comprehensive protection of rights to every individual, 
community, society, and state, their property rights should not have conflicts of interest 
with one another. At the same time, Islam clearly defined stakeholders to have decision-
making and accountability of an economics agent’s activities, as well to protect their rights 
since the Islamic economic system is based on the rules of Shari’ah, where the goal is to 
maintain social justices.  
                                                     
 
34 Fiduciary duty occurs when one party controls another party’s assets, having discretion in decision-making 
but with care and loyalty, in order to benefit and maximise profits on the assets for the other party (Padgett, 
2012). 
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On the other hand, Islam expects the managers of a firm to uphold social justice and not to 
be any different from the behavioural of any member in the society (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2004).  It is the fiduciary duty of the managers of the firm to have economic and moral 
behaviour toward all stakeholders not just the owners of the firms.  This is why we might in 
principle have expected a better treatment of UIAHs in receiving their returns, and because 
Islamic economic system insures the compliance with the rules ensure effective governance 
system to have social justice among all members. However, IBs have been influenced by the 
juristic theories of Fiqh as Muamalat, notably the Nominate Contracts, rather than by 
Islamic economics, which is the main reason why IBs don’t follow the precepts of Islamic 
economics in their operations. Their Shari’ah Boards accept this and don’t seek to enforce 
Islamic economics.   
3.8 UPSIA Rights and Risks 
Equity investors typically have governance rights, as claimed by Williamson (1996) and, 
following this logic, all equity investors including UIAHs would be entitled to such 
mechanisms of governance (Archer et al., 1998). For example, shareholders have the right 
to information (such as an annual report) and can participate in voting to elect the board of 
directors; however, UIAHs have no such rights. Subsequently, UIAHs have no voice in the 
investment strategy for their invested funds – in particular, regarding asset allocation and 
risk exposures. UPSIAs are a major funding source for IBs; for example, UPSIA-funded assets 
constituted on average about 62% of total assets for a sample of IBs in 12 countries in the 
Middle East and South East Asia (Sundararajan, 2008). Also Rosly and Zaini (2008) indicate 
that UPSIAs constitute the bulk of total deposits in Malaysia. With this significant source of 
funds in IBs, one would expect appropriate account to be taken of risks that are relevant to 
UPSIAs since their funds are likely to be combined with other sources of funds such as 
shareholders’ and current account funds (Archer and Karim, 2006). 
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3.9 Corporate Governance Issues concerning UPSIA 
IBs offer different customer accounts that are Shari’ah compliant, including current 
accounts, and both restricted and unrestricted investment accounts35. However, while 
other types of deposit account may raise CG or Shari’ah issues, those raised by UPSIA are 
the most challenging and involve a potential conflict of interest with shareholders (Grais 
and Pellegrini, 2006). According to Archer and Karim (2012), the issue of CG with UPSIA 
raises serious concerns. Normally, shareholders and UIAHs are entitled to a return from this 
combination of funds when bank investments turn a profit, except that UIAHs have no right 
to a share of income from assets financed by shareholders’ funds and current accounts. 
UIAHs as Rabb Almaal have no right to interfere in managing the funds. This issue raises a 
potential conflict of interest in terms of investment strategy and asset allocation. 
Comparing the characteristics of UPSIA and shareholders with regard to governance rights 
reveals enormous differences between them. For example, the board of directors does in 
fact answer to shareholders in general meetings. Shareholders have the right to vote and 
can elect members of the BOD. In practice, through their control of the BOD, shareholders 
may enforce a point or dismiss senior management. By contrast, UPSIA have no governance 
rights either as investors or as creditors, and in cases of conflicts of interest with 
shareholders, the shareholders will always prevail (Archer et al., 2010). Even the 
mechanisms that IBs establish to smooth the payouts to the UPSIA are in favour of 
shareholders; for example, the use of Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER) and Investment Risk 
Reserve (IRR) to cover possible losses on assets funded by UPSIA (Sundararajan, 2008; 
Farook et al., 2012). The disclosure of such reserves to UIAHs is limited or non-existent and 
they have no rights to influence the use of these reserves (Greuning and Iqbal, 2007). UIAHs 
                                                     
 
35 It is worth mentioning that Islamic banks have different names for investment accounts; for example, 
according to its annual report of 2012, the Kuwait Finance House generally invests 100% of investment 
deposits for an unlimited period for “Khumasia”, and about 90% of investment deposits for an unlimited 
period for “Mustamera”, as well as 70% of investment deposits for an unlimited period for “Sedra” and 60% 
of investment savings accounts for “Tawfeer” (see chapter 6 section 6.3 for more information). 
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lack transparency rights as investors and have poor information, not only about PER and 
IRR but also about the rate of return and associated risk. IBs have limited disclosure in their 
annual report concerning the fund allocation and risk that is associated with UIAHs (of 
course this may vary across jurisdictions), with those that apply AAOIFI standards having a 
better quality of disclosure. Banks generally disclose the rate of return on UPSIA but they 
do not disclose risk or losses to UIAHs. 
 
3.10 The Dilemma of UPSIAs as Investment or Deposits Account 
IBs in general are characterised by ambiguity on the nature of UPSIA attributes or status 
(Archer et al., 2010), depending on the regulations and capital requirements of the 
countries that IBs operate in. For example, a few jurisdictions treat UPSIAs as a type of 
deposit account, the principal amount invested being protected with ‘capital certainty’ and 
the bank being liable for the amount of the deposit plus any accrued return. Hence, the 
‘capital’ is ‘certain’ provided the bank is solvent.36 However, this attribution of UPSIAs to 
being a deposit-like product does not seem to be in accordance with Shari’ah compliance, 
or at least compliant with the conditions of Mudarabah, where losses should be borne by 
the capital provider, except in cases of negligence and misconduct of the Mudarib (Archer 
and Karim, 2012; Ahmed, 2002). 
A somewhat extreme example of regulatory interference in Islamic banking practices is 
provided by the case of a UK Islamic bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) (IBB has changed 
its name to Al Rayan Bank). IBB offers a ‘deposit’ product (a type of UPSIA) for which the 
returns are based on profit sharing, as in a Mudarabah, but the regulator (at the time, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), now replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)) 
requires IBB to offer the UIAHs ‘capital certainty’ in line with UK banking regulations. 
                                                     
 
36 Solvency refers to the ability to service liabilities. 
Chapter 3  Literature Review 
 57 
However, to make the product Shari’ah compliant for depositors who insist that the 
Shari’ah rules of Mudarabah be applied, in the case of a loss such depositors may inform 
the bank of their willingness to absorb the applicable share of that loss (Archer and Karim, 
2012). 
As noted by Archer and Karim (2007b), some jurisdictions provide UIAHs with a deposit 
guarantee, but this is not Shari’ah compliant unless it is arranged on the basis of Takaful37 
or provided by the central bank free of charge. Deposit guarantees of conventional deposits 
give rise to moral hazard, since they induce banks to take excessive risks in the knowledge 
that losses will be covered by the guarantee. This increases the need for regulation of capital 
adequacy. In principle, if UPSIAs are considered a type of collective investment scheme 
(CIS), the deposit guarantees might lead to regulatory arbitrage since UPSIAs would enjoy a 
protection denied to investors in other collective investment schemes, which are typically 
regulated by the capital markets regulator. However, UPSIAs, being designed as a Shari’ah-
compliant alternative to conventional deposits, are not normally thought of as being a type 
of CIS, although restricted profit-sharing investment accounts (RPSIAs) might be so 
considered. Consequently, while extending deposit guarantees to RPSIAs (which seems very 
unlikely) would be problematic, the same would probably not apply to UPSIAs. 
In jurisdictions where capital certainty is not required by the regulator of IBs, the latter 
typically treat UPSIAs as a type of deposit account but without any capital certainty. 
However, apart from the fact that the returns are dependent on the income from the 
underlying investments, such accounts are a far-from-perfect substitute for conventional 
deposits, due to the lack of capital certainty and the fact that returns are entirely dependent 
not just upon the performance of the underlying investments but also on the discretion of 
management as a result of various “smoothing” techniques as described below. In contrast, 
some jurisdictions treat UPSIAs as a type of investment account, although they are based 
                                                     
 
37 This is a type of Islamic insurance, where the money is funded by members who contribute to a pooling 
system to guarantee each other against losses or damages, which is based on Shari’ah. 
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on conventional banking regulations. In this case, the central bank may not have specific 
regulations for IBs that take the characteristics of UPSIAs (such as the rules of Mudarabah) 
and principles into account, and in particular the appropriate levels of disclosure and 
transparency are not required. Hence, UIAHs are not treated as ‘normal’ investors in 
investment schemes, because they are subject to a lack of information about the riskiness 
and performance of their investments. 
Some other regulators apparently allow IBs to offer UPSIAs based on Mudarabah while 
nevertheless insisting that losses should not be passed on to the UIAHs, as well as requiring 
the use of profit equalisation reserves (PERs) and investment risk reserves (IRRs) to ‘smooth’ 
the payouts to them.38 IBs have developed these two types of reserves to smooth the profit 
returns to UIAHs (Farook et al., 2012). 
The ambiguity as to whether an UPSIA is a deposit-like account or a type of investment 
presents a challenge to the regulatory and supervisory authorities of IBs in assessing the 
actual risk exposures of shareholders and the implications for capital adequacy. In 
particular, the practice of ‘smoothing’ the returns to the UIAHs gives rise to displaced 
commercial risk (DCR).39 For example, an IB may invest the UPSIA funds in long-maturity 
assets that yield a lower rate of return compared to the current market expectations, 
leading to ‘withdrawal risk’ in respect of UPSIA funds. ‘Smoothing’ may be achieved by 
reducing the bank’s Mudarib share of the profits, or even ‘donating’ a part of the bank’s 
share of profit from other funds, which increases the variability (i.e. the riskiness) of returns 
to shareholders (Sundararajan, 2008; IFSB-GN3, 2010). This additional riskiness has been 
termed DCR because it results in displacing part of the credit and market risks of UPSIAs 
                                                     
 
38 This used to be the policy of the Bank Negara Malaysia, but this policy was abandoned when the Malaysian 
Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 was passed. UIAHs in Malaysia are now treated strictly as Rabb Almaal in 
a Mudarabah. 
39 DCR rises when an IB risks having to forgo part or all of its Mudarib share of profits, or even of the profits 
on investments funded by its own capital and current accounts, in order to ‘smooth’ upwards the rate of profit 
payout to UPSIA holders and so to mitigate the risk of withdrawals of funds by the UIAHs. 
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onto the shareholders. From a capital adequacy standpoint, this implies a need for the IB to 
hold capital to cover DCR (Archer and Karim, 2006).40 PERs and IRRs are intended to mitigate 
this DCR. 
3.11 The Implication of UPSIAs in Adding Risks to Islamic Banking 
As noted above, an Islamic bank’s capital structure is typically based on the funds of 
shareholders and UPSIAs,41 which (unlike RPSIAs) are normally recognised on the balance 
sheet, where they take the place of deposits (although according to the AAOIFI they are 
classified not as liabilities but as a separate item: ‘equity of unrestricted investment account 
holders’).42 In addition, IBs have current accounts, which are liabilities and in some cases 
constitute a very important source of funds. Recently, there has been an increased use of 
term deposits based on Reverse Commodity Murabahah transactions (CMT), in which the 
bank purchases a commodity on credit using a Murabahah contract and sells it immediately 
to raise cash. In many cases, UPSIAs are the major source of funding, and these Mudarabah 
assets, which the bank manages as the Mudarib, are usually commingled with other assets 
on the bank’s balance sheet in a pool. The bank therefore has the right to the profits from 
these other assets as well as a Mudarib share (which may well exceed 50%) of the profits 
from the Mudarabah assets. In this situation, the bank’s rate of return on equity is typically 
an order of magnitude greater than the rate of return on the UPSIA, even though the latter 
are exposed to the same credit and market risks as the bank on the pooled assets, with the 
exception of DCR, as previously explained. 
                                                     
 
40 It should be noted that such ‘smoothing’ does not include the covering by the IB of overall losses on the 
investment funded by UPSIA, but only of lack of profits due to poor asset performance resulting from credit 
and/or market risks.  
41 CMT-based term deposits tend to be short-term. A source of longer-term funds is that of credits based on 
syndicated Murabahah (i.e. CMT), which may be securitised to facilitate the syndication. Islamic banks have 
also started to issue Sukuk as Basel-III-compatible capital instruments.  
42 As previously noted, according to IAS 32, UPSIAs fall into the category of ‘puttable instruments’, which are 
recognised by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a type of liability. 
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Haron and Hock (2007); Archer and Haron (2007) point out that DCR and Shari’ah 
noncompliance risk are unique types of risk to which IBs are exposed,43 together with other 
risks that are common to both Islamic and conventional banks, such as credit and market 
risk. However, risks may affect each type of bank differently because of the Shari’ah 
restrictions on the risk mitigation available to IBs. For example, IBs are very restricted in 
how to manage liquidity risk, and although the risk is the same as that of conventional 
banks, the mitigations available to IBs are not the same. 
3.11.1 Risks Specific to IFIs 
DCR raises an issue of capital adequacy for IBs, since it implies a need for a bank to hold 
capital against the proportion of assets financed by UPSIAs. According to IFSB-15 (2013), 
this proportion is designated ‘alpha’. As pointed out by (Archer et al., 2010), the capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) of an IB is very sensitive to any changes in the value of ‘alpha’. For 
example, if an IB calculates its CAR without using a realistic value of alpha,44 then the 
calculated CAR will not provide an accurate measure of the IB’s capital adequacy. Therefore, 
the value of alpha depends on IB policies towards returns paid to UIAHs in relation to 
unsmoothed returns of UPSIAs, which result in DCR, subject to mitigation through use of a 
PER. 
The estimation of the value of alpha requires historical data on returns to be measured 
accurately, and it is necessary to make the relevant data available to the banking supervisor, 
with public disclosure in the annual report, especially of UPSIAs concerning PERs and IRRs, 
to the relevant stakeholders to come up with the best realistic value of alpha, as these 
reflect a CG issue at IBs (Farooq and Vivek, 2012). There may be a need for a good level of 
disclosure about DCR, how it arises and how it is managed, in the notes to the annual 
financial statements, in addition to full disclosure to the supervisor. Consequently, the IFSB 
                                                     
 
43 Shari’ah noncompliance risk is the risk to an IB of failing to comply with Shari’ah rules and principles. 
44 The IFSB Capital Adequacy Standard refers to the proportion of risk-weighted assets financed by UIAHs’ 
funds that need to be included in the denominator of the CAR as ‘alpha’. 
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Capital Adequacy standard (IFSB-15, 2013) proposes two forms of CAR for IBs. For example, 
if the UPSIAs are treated as pure Mudarabah investment accounts, where the UIAHs absorb 
all market and credit risk, then the formula excludes from the denominator of the CAR the 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) in respect of credit and market risk funded by UPSIAs, so that 
there is no capital requirement for risk arising from these assets (except for operational 
risk). However, if UPSIAs are treated as deposit accounts for which, owing to regulation or 
market pressures, UIAHs do not fully absorb the credit and market risks, then the Islamic 
bank has to hold regulatory capital to absorb the DCR ‘displaced’ from the UIAHs, and the 
IFSB standard requires that a proportion (‘alpha’)45 of RWA for credit and market risks 
funded by UPSIAs be included in the denominator of the CAR. The determination of ‘alpha’, 
which is intended to reflect the bank’s level of exposure to DCR, is a matter of supervisory 
discretion (Archer and Karim, 2012). The IFSB has published a Guidance Note on the 
estimation of alpha for a range of IBs (IFSB-GN4, 2011). 
In fact, according to a strict interpretation of the Mudarabah contract, the only risk that an 
IB, as the Mudarib, should face in dealing with UPSIAs is operational risk, including the 
fiduciary risk,46 which arises when an IB breaches the contract, for example by not 
complying with the Shari’ah requirements. This may represent a reputational risk, such that 
depositors may lose confidence in the bank and possibly withdraw their money. Also, a low 
rate of return compared to the market may raise a potential issue of fiduciary risk, if 
                                                     
 
45 In practice, there are two views of PSIA characteristic of Islamic banks, depending on the jurisdiction; some 
may view them as deposit-type accounts that carry no risk of losses provided the bank is solvent, and other 
jurisdictions may view them as pure investment accounts, which bear the risk of losses on the underlying 
investments. The IFSB Capital Adequacy Standard recommends the fraction of alpha to be included in the 
denominators of the UIAHs’ funds, called the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) formula, used according to 
supervisory discretion. For example, when Islamic banks determine alpha to be near zero, this indicates the 
PSIA to be an investment-type account, and alpha near one indicates a deposit-type account. 
46 Fiduciary risk (also called reputation risk) can be defined as the bank’s risk of facing legal action if it violates 
its contract with its customers and fails in its’ fiduciary responsibility to its depositors and shareholders. This 
risk may expose UIAHs and shareholders to economic losses, as they will lose the potential profit, since any 
profit accrued by the bank from non-Shari’ah-compliant activities will go to charity (El-Hawary et al., 2004). 
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investors perceive that as breach of the investment contract by virtue of negligence or 
mismanagement of the funds by the bank (AAOIFI, 1999b). 
However, for the reasons explained above, an IB may be obliged to absorb some of the 
profit variations (but not losses, which would not be Shari’ah compliant) that would 
otherwise be reflected in the profits attributable to the UIAHs. 
3.12 Other Issues and Regulation of Islamic Banks 
As indicated above, UIAHs are exposed to a potential conflict of interest on the part of the 
BOD and senior management of IBs, in so far as the latter may be inclined to pursue the 
interests of shareholders (who elect the members of the BOD) at the expense of the 
interests of UIAHs, who have no such governance rights. Furthermore, the members of the 
Shari’ah supervisory board are in most cases appointed by the BOD and the UIAHs have no 
say in this. UIAHs nevertheless have a right to expect accountability and transparency 
regarding the investments made on their behalf.  
IBs do not have comprehensive financial reporting standards, since the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) fail to unambiguously address various issues such as the recognition of UPSIAs 
(on or off the balance sheet) or profit recognition in Murabahah contracts (on signing or on 
conclusion of the contract, or pro rata temporis), while the AAOIFI standards, which are 
clear on these points, are accepted only in a small minority of jurisdictions (Greuning and 
Iqbal, 2007; Van Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). It is fair to say that the IFSB’s guidance on 
disclosure in IFSB-4, while it does not cover such issues as profit recognition, goes further 
than AAOIFI’s as regards disclosure since it covers product disclosures other than purely 
financial ones47. 
                                                     
 
47 See IFSB-4 (2007) for more information. 
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3.13 The Gap in Empirical Research on the CG Issue of UPSIAs 
The CG issues of UPSIAs have been discussed in the literature, but there is an absence of 
empirical work on the topic. One of the problems in doing empirical work on Islamic finance 
is the insufficiency of the primary and secondary data. Partly because Islamic finance only 
started in the 1970s and partly because there is not a very large number of such institutions 
around the world, this imposes quite severe methodological constraints. For example, to 
obtain enough observations to fit a regression model we have to use panel data, which 
means we cannot directly test the coefficient of variation but must use proxy measures. If 
similar research had been conducted for conventional finance, it would cover hundreds if 
not thousands of institutions and would have a much longer time series. 
 An examination is necessary to evaluate the CG and its role in IBs bearing in mind the 
potential conflicts of interest between UIAHs and shareholders and the governance rights 
held by the latter. The major issue is the effectiveness of the current CG practice in IBs of 
balancing the interests of UIAHs as a major stakeholder with those of shareholders, in 
protecting the rights of UIAHs to transparency and fair returns. With respect to the fairness 
of returns, one obvious way of doing this is to examine the risk-adjusted rates of return 
received by each category of stakeholder. 
In principle, one would expect UIAHs as profit-sharing investors to earn a risk-adjusted rate 
of return on their capital not substantially inferior to that earned by shareholders. 
Therefore, the research tries to identify the implications for CG of UPSIAs from a practical 
point of view, and through certain theoretical issues, since CG is concentrated in four key 
principles: justice or integrity, responsibility, accountability and transparency (Hasan, 2009). 
According to Shari’ah, behaviour should be fair and equally balanced towards all 
stakeholders. Therefore, adopting a stakeholder model would be the best way to explain 
and represent the relationship of IFIs and UPSIAs. The CG practices of IFIs with respect to 
UPSIAs need to be investigated and it is necessary to utilise different approaches by using 
both qualitative and quantitative research methods to deal with the unique relationship 
between IFIs and UPSIAs.  
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3.13.1 Specific Corporate Governance Motivation 
While some problems are common to financial institutions, IBs raise specific CG issues, in 
particular with respect to asset allocation, risk appetite, transparency in financial reporting, 
and potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and UIAHs. The funds of 
shareholders and UIAHs face the same underlying asset risk in so far as their funds are 
commingled with those of current accounts48 to finance the same pool of assets, and so 
they raise some concerns regarding governance rights. Therefore, the motivation for this 
research is concern about the practices of IBs in these areas, which raise specific CG issues 
that cannot be mitigated within the current regulations. The research also casts light on 
some severe anomalies in the treatment of UIAHs, which call for urgent reform of the CG of 
IBs. This implies that IBs have unique CG requirements that fit their business model and that 
function effectively to address the issues concerning UIAHs. 
This research will examine the CG issues in IBs from the perspective of stakeholder theory, 
especially the potential conflicts of interest between UIAHs and shareholders, by studying 
how effectively (or ineffectively) the current practice of CG in IBs protects the interests of 
UIAHs as a major stakeholder. The research will further evaluate current practices of CG in 
IBs in accordance with principles set out in IFSB standards and guidelines. In particular, 
there will be an examination of the fairness (or otherwise) of the treatment of UIAHs with 
respect to the percentage returns on their funds, comparing returns and risk with those of 
shareholders. Since information about IFIs is still limited, it is necessary to expand the scope 
from focusing purely on a single country to include a number of countries, including Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE),49 and other Islamic countries adopting Islamic financial 
services, such as Malaysia. 
                                                     
 
48 The bank (i.e. the shareholders) receives the returns on assets funded by current accounts.  
49 Oman will not be included in the sample, since that country only recently opened Islamic banks and would 
not have sufficient data for comparison. 
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As indicated in the introduction, a comparison between shareholders’ and UIAHs’ returns 
will be made in chapter 4 to illustrate the decisions made by IBs, using the coefficient of 
variation analysis for a comparison of risk-adjusted returns. However, IBs are relatively new, 
hence comparison is challenging. Therefore, in chapter 5, panel data analysis is undertaken 
to illuminate the effect of CG on the CV difference between shareholders and UIAHs, by 
including several CG variables and non-CG variables that may influence the difference in 
return. 
The inaccessibility of some information may mean that certain research methods using 
secondary data are difficult or impossible to apply. Therefore, research will utilise an 
embedded case study approach in chapter 6, with comparative analysis between KFH-
Kuwait and its subsidiaries, including other IBs in Kuwait. Subsequently, chapter 7 will focus 
on dividend yields as a cash payout for shareholders comparable to the UIAHs’ payout. 
 
 66 
 
Chapter Four: Risk and Return in Unrestricted 
Profit-Sharing Investment Accounts 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is written from the perspective that UIAHs are remunerated on a ‘profit-
sharing’ basis, and it aims to analyse the returns to UIAHs compared to the shareholders’ 
returns in terms of profit sharing. The focus in this and the following chapter is on 
accounting returns rather than, in the case of shareholders, stock market returns. There are 
two reasons for this focus. First, the concept and practice of ‘profit sharing’ place the 
emphasis on accounting measures of profit. Second, the shares of the banks in this sample 
are not listed on exchanges in efficient stock markets. Some are unlisted, while the majority 
are listed on exchanges in markets that are not even weak-form efficient (Jamaani and Roca, 
2015). The coefficient of variation (CV) of the annual rate of return is used to provide a risk-
adjusted measure of the returns. 
4.2 Overview of the Research 
IBs have been in the spotlight and receiving significant attention concerning CG as an 
outcome of the unique characteristics of IBs’ transactions, which have to be Shari’ah 
compliant (Islamic law). As mentioned in chapter 3, the use of profit-sharing contracts as an 
alternative to conventional deposits raises certain governance issues, especially when IBs 
mobilise funds through Mudarabah and Wakalah contracts, which involve the agency 
problem. For example, the bank’s management acts as agent for the shareholders, and at 
the same time the bank also acts as agent (Mudarib) to UIAHs, which raises a potential 
conflict of interest for the management of IBs, due to the fact that both shareholders and 
UIAHs have different strategies and different levels of risk tolerance. Indeed, UIAHs may not 
be aware of the risk to their investment and may therefore be satisfied with a rate of return 
that is equivalent to the market rate of return on deposits (Nienhaus, 2007). 
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This situation would give the management of IBs the advantage of keeping for their 
shareholders the extra profit that should be paid to the UIAHs to compensate them for their 
investment risk exposure. In addition, the UIAHs may be aware of the risk of their 
investment; however, they may not have an alternative, such as the option to place their 
funds into a different Shari’ah-compliant account (for instance when KFH was the only IB in 
Kuwait from 1977-2005) and therefore they may be obliged to keep their funds in IBs 
regardless of the risks and returns. Alternative options would include the withdrawal of the 
funds to deposit them into other Islamic institutions, such as Islamic funds or collective 
investment schemes. On the other hand, it is better for depositors such as UIAHs to place 
their funds in investment accounts rather than just holding cash, since, according to Muslim 
law (as one of the five pillars of Islam), Muslims are required to pay zakat50 of 2.5% annually 
on unused money. Therefore, it is more beneficial to place the fund into an investment 
account and get a return to reduce the 2.5%, or offset the percentage of zakat if the return 
is more than 2.5%. 
4.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim in this chapter is to analyse the rates of return to UIAHs compared to the 
shareholders’ rates of return, in terms of profit sharing, concentrating on accounting 
returns rather than stock market returns. Although UIAHs are major stakeholders and 
investors who, since they absorb the loss on the Mudarabah investment, bear financial risk, 
they nevertheless do not have any board representation or other governance rights like 
those of shareholders. There is no clear model that represents the specific relationship of 
UIAHs and IBs, since both UIAHs and shareholders are considered equity holders but with 
different governance rights. Archer and Karim (2007d) best described the relationship as a 
‘principal–principal’ agency problem, which could serve as a starting point to explain the 
                                                     
 
50 Profit share or transfer of ownership. 
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type of relationship between IBs and UIAHs. According to Shari’ah concepts of fairness 
imply that UIAH should have their rights as stakeholders properly acknowledged by IBs. 
The objective of this research is to examine the consequences of the absence of governance 
rights, where UIAHs lack governance rights and may suffer from a conflict of interest with 
the shareholders of IBs as the BOD and management are subject to the shareholders’ 
governance rights. UIAHs and shareholders share the same risks in the commingled fund, 
and in principle both should get similar rates of return relative to the level of risk, while 
making allowance for the bank’s remuneration as asset manager. Therefore, the aim is to 
evaluate CG practice by examining the exercise of profit distribution between two 
stakeholders (shareholders and UIAHs), since both are considered equity holders. It is worth 
mentioning that not all IBs practise 100% commingling, which is visible from their annual 
reports, or have different types of accounts that use different proportions of commingling. 
For example, KFH-Kuwait generally invests approximately 100% of investment deposits for 
an unlimited period in a Khumasia investment account, 90% of investment deposits for an 
unlimited period in a Mustamera account, 70% of investment deposits for an unlimited 
period in a Sedra account, and 60% of investment savings accounts in a Tawfeer account. In 
another bank (Al Salam, based in Bahrain), as stated in their annual report of 2012,51 the 
UIAHs’ funds are commingled with the bank’s own funds. Al Salam Bank then utilises the 
funds to invest in Islamic modes of finance as previously agreed by the terms of acceptance 
of the unrestricted investment accounts. Of the UIAHs’ funds, 100% is employed and 
invested, taking into consideration the relevant weightage, and the Mudarib share of profit 
ranges between 40% and 50%. However, Al Baraka Bank, also based in Bahrain, does not 
mention the percentage of commingled funds in its annual report, but, as Mudarib, took 
70% of the profits of UIAHs as the bank’s share in 2012 and, similarly, up to 70% in 2011.52 
                                                     
 
51 Al Salam Bank annual report 2012. 
52 Al Baraka Bank annual report 2012. 
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4.4 Different Levels of Risk Appetite 
As equity holders, shareholders and UIAHs, have different levels of risk appetite; by nature, 
UIAHs are more risk-averse, even though some of the literature sees some shareholders as 
being risk-averse. However, even the more risk-averse shareholders are less so than either 
conventional depositors or UIAHs.  According to Sundararajan (2008), shareholders are 
compared with the naive UIAHs, who are in general more risk-averse. Even though from a 
common sense perspective, when UIAHs receive much lower risk-adjusted returns (i.e. risk 
premia) which may be because of the lower degree of financial sophistication of UIAHs or 
because they are more constrained in the array of financial options available to them. 
However, since UIAHs are not profit maximisers, and are defensive investors, they cannot 
complain if they get much lower returns if at the same time they are facing much lower risk 
than shareholders, but the problem is that in a significant proportion of cases UIAHs have a 
higher risk-adjusted returns than shareholders, meaning that they have higher CV.  It needs 
to be borne in mind that even when compensating for the respective levels of risk, 
shareholders are likely to get a “better deal” than UIAHs, because the governance structure 
works in favour of shareholders and does not work for UIAHs.  The UIAHs do not have voice 
in the governance structure; all they can do is “vote with their feet” by withdrawing their 
funds (Archer and Karim, 2013a), although they lack the information  to make a well-
informed decision about doing so. Therefore, given that lower returns for UIAHs may be 
justifiable if at the same time they are facing lower risk than shareholders, arguably UIAHs 
should not complain about their returns (although they may justifiably do so about the lack 
of transparency). 
Investors who are characterised as risk-averse are typically willing to invest funds in the 
market at low risk and usually prefer investments that have a low risk premium (Bodie et 
al., 2011). Generally speaking, there is a trade-off between return and risk for investors, 
which could be measured by the utility value that investors receive from holding the 
portfolio. The higher utility value is given to a portfolio with higher expected return and 
lower risk. For example, the capital market line (CML) was developed to show that an 
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efficient portfolio could be constructed by combining risky assets with a riskless asset. The 
slope of the CML reflects the increase in risk as a greater proportion of risky assets is 
included. By using a combination of risky and riskless assets, we get a straight line, which 
represents the efficient frontier. In fact, the CML becomes the new efficient frontier. 
It is true that in their asset portfolios IBs can include some very low-risk assets, such as the 
Islamic Development Bank’s (IDB’s) Sukuk (AAA-rated Islamic security). The bank could use 
CML-type logic in constructing the portfolio; shareholders, being more aggressive, want to 
be more toward the market portfolio or to the right-hand side of the CML line (see figure 
4-1) and UIAHs want to be further to the left-hand side toward the risk-free assets. UIAHs 
want to have less risk and accept less return, while shareholders tend to be more diverse 
and are prepared to take a risk on individual investments in expectation of a greater return. 
Therefore, we have two different investment mentalities, and by looking at the CML graph 
we can see the issue of the conflict of interest, in that the management would usually go 
with what the shareholders desire. 
According to the CML, the management of a bank may develop its strategy based on risk 
aversion in their investment, which may position the management of the bank in a conflict 
of interest with shareholders, since shareholders desire more profit and usually desire a 
more aggressive investment strategy. On the other hand, if the management chooses a 
management strategy that is based on greater risk-taking, which in this case takes no 
account of the UIAHs’ low risk appetite and desire for an investment strategy that is more 
risk-averse, this again puts the management into a conflict of interest with UIAHs. UIAHs 
are usually looking for a safe place to put their money and for moderate return on their 
money, keeping in mind that Muslim people have to pay 2.5% as zakat on their money if it 
goes untouched or unused for a whole year. This situation may create what is known in 
agency theory as a ‘principal–principal’ issue of conflict of interest, and, so far as UIAHs and 
management are concerned, a ‘principal–agent’ issue, since management tends to act more 
in the interest of shareholders, who have governance rights over them while UIAHs do not.  
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Figure 4-1: The capital market line 
The capital market line (CML) shows the trade-off between risk and return of risk-free assets and market 
portfolios for investors – for example, an increase in the expected return with each increase of standard 
deviation (SD); in other words, as risk increases, the expected return would increase with it. From UIAHs’ point 
of view they would go for a less risky portfolio towards the left-hand side of the graph toward the risk-free, 
while the shareholders tend to go further to the right-hand side of the CML. 
 
𝑀 = Market portfolio 
𝑟𝑓 = Risk-free rate 
𝐸(𝑟𝑀)- 𝑟𝑓 = Market risk premium 
[
𝐸(𝑟𝑚)−𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑚
] = Market price of risk 
𝜎 = Market standard deviation 
4.4.1 The Rationale of Using the Coefficient of Variation 
The CV and the Sharpe ratio are close in theory.  
CV = SD of rate of return/(mean rate of return) – see equation 4-2 below 
and the Sharpe ratio is the risk premium in the return divided by the SD: 
Capital market line
rf
𝝈𝑴
CML
M
𝑬(𝒓𝑴) 
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𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑟𝑥 −  𝑅𝑓
𝑆𝐷𝑟𝑥
 Equation 4-1 
𝑥 = Investment 
𝑟𝑥 = Mean average rate of return of 𝑥 
𝑅𝑓 = Best available rate of return of a risk-free security 
𝑆𝐷𝑟𝑥 = Standard deviation of rate of return of 𝑥 
 
Using the Sharpe ratio in Islamic finance is problematic; theoretically every transaction 
should have or should involve some risk. The closest thing to the risk-free transaction in 
Islamic finance would be the bank current account, which is considered Qard Hasan and has 
no return or risk to it.53 Therefore, there is no true risk-free rate to make a comparison with 
in Islamic finance. However, there are AAA-rated Islamic securities (Sukuk), which might be 
used as proxies, although data for Sukuk is still not widely available and Sukuk are still traded 
in the over-the-counter market. This problem does not arise if the CV is used. 
4.5 Research Question 
Despite the fact that UIAHs may contribute the majority of the commingled fund, and they 
may bear the losses, except in cases of misconduct or negligence, shareholders still typically 
get a substantially higher accounting rate of return on their investment regardless of the 
risk exposure. In theory, both types of investor should at least get a rate of return relative 
to their risk; however, shareholders invest a relatively small portion into the funds and 
generally get a large share of the returns. Therefore, it is necessary to examine what drives 
the rate of return spread between shareholders and UIAHs, and how risk exposure 
motivates profit distribution to both types of investor. What explains the difference in the 
                                                     
 
53 Empirically, there is no ‘riskless asset’ that produces a return. Conventionally, US 90-day Treasury bills are 
used as a proxy for the riskless asset. 
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accounting rates of return for these investors, and what influences those differences in a 
way that produces a significant spread between them? This chapter will attempt to answer 
the following question: 
1. Does the current practice of corporate governance in Islamic banks as reflected in 
profit sharing show fairness of treatment of UIAHs in terms of risk-adjusted 
returns? 
 Are the differences between the ROE to shareholders and the rates of 
return to UIAHs compensated for by differences in the levels of risk 
(volatility) of the returns, taking account of the bank’s right to some 
remuneration as asset manager? 
Of course, there are other ways of considering and comparing rates of return, for example 
based on cash payouts, which are examined later in this thesis, but given the strong 
emphasis on ‘profit sharing’ in Islamic banking it seems reasonable to commence the 
comparison on the basis of (accounting) profits. Moreover, as regards stock market returns, 
another possible reason is that the relevant stock markets are ineffective. According to 
Sultan et al. (2013), the GCC stock markets are not even weak-form efficient and so do not 
provide a satisfactory basis for comparison. 
4.6 Research Methodology 
There are different methods of measuring risk within the theoretical work of portfolio 
theory, including variance and standard deviation (SD), which are widely used as dispersion 
measures (Curto and Pinto, 2009). The SD is used to measure risk (i.e. variability) in an 
investment that has the same expected rate of return and is the absolute measure of 
dispersion of returns. For example, when comparing variation between two different 
datasets, SD can be used only if the two compared variables have the same unit of scale and 
have relatively similar means. However, if the two variables have different units or different 
means then SD would not make sense and could be misleading; in this case, coefficient of 
variation (CV) would be a better test. The CV is calculated as the ratio or a percentage of 
the standard deviation from the sample mean and determines how much risk or volatility 
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is assumed in comparison to the amount of return expected from investment. The CV is 
used to compare risk relative to return between two or more investments if there are major 
differences in the expected rates of return (Chikobvu et al., 2010). Indeed, unadjusted 
variance may give an incorrect result. For this reason, when there are two or more 
investments with a different mean then it is necessary to use the measure of relative 
variability to indicate risk per unit of expected return. In fact, CV is widely used among 
researchers in different fields such as engineering, medicine, agricultural economics, 
archaeology and financial management (Weber et al., 2004). A lower ratio of standard 
deviation to mean return leads to a better risk–return trade-off. A larger value of the 
coefficient indicates greater risk (dispersion) relative to the mean rate of return. Therefore, 
CV can measure the risk that is associated with the expected return. 
 
Coefficient of variation = 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛
 ∗ 100 Equation 4-2 
 
In addition, SD is an absolute measure of risk, whereas CV is a relative measure and could 
be more useful when used in the context of more than one investment; in any investment, 
someone expects some percentage of profit as an expected return and most expected 
returns are different from actual returns. Those differences, either a loss or a gain of 
returns, are accompanied by risk, where the difference in return on an investment or the 
spread between the actual and the expected return is a measure of risk (Spaulding, 2013). 
Since the percentage return for shareholders is generally much larger than that for UIAHs, 
it would be appropriate to use the CV to overcome this problem by adjusting for the scale 
of units in the population.  The CV is useful because it allows for meaningful comparison 
between two or more magnitudes of variation, even if they have different means or 
different scales of measurement. 
For example, if we look at KFH-Kuwait’s results and use only the SD to measure the 
dispersion, the result shows that shareholders have more variability than UIAHs, when in 
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fact there is more relative variability in UIAHs’ returns (as measured by the CVs) than in 
shareholders’ returns in KFH-Kuwait from 2003 to 2012 (see table 4-1). CV may suggest that 
there is more relative variability in the two (percentage return to shareholders and 
percentage return to UIAHs), even if SD is much smaller. 
 
Table 4-1: Mean return for KFH-Kuwait 
KFH - Kuwait % Return to Shareholders % Return to UIAHs 
Mean 16.42% 3.53% 
SD 8.62% 1.97% 
CV 52.49% 55.80% 
Source: KFH annual report 2003–2012. CV = coefficient of variation, SD = standard deviation. Calculation of 
SD and CV using ROE and UIAHs’ returns. Observing the SD, we can see more variation in the shareholders’ 
returns, but, calculating the relative variation using the CV, it is clear that the UIAHs have higher variation. 
 
4.6.1 Measuring Risk Using Coefficient of Variation Ratio 
Calculating the relative risk attributed to UIAHs and shareholders as investors by using CV 
allows us to examine whether the rates of return paid to both types of investors in IBs 
accord with their exposure to risk. Our empirical data will be based on secondary data by 
selecting a sample of at least 28 IBs’ annual reports from different jurisdictions (different 
countries) over the past 12 years. We are only considering retail IBs that provide UPSIAs; 
for example, in Kuwait there are five IBs, and we are using four of them, since Warba Bank 
has only recently been established and would not have sufficient data for comparison. 
Therefore, the four IBs represent 100% of listed IBs in the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), 
since Warba Bank was not listed in the KSE until 2013.  
In addition, four Saudi banks in Appendix A of chapter 4 are examined separately due to the 
fact that Saudi banks use a type of restricted investment account instead of unrestricted 
accounts and therefore need to be separated, even though in practice both types of 
accounts involve the same profit sharing, albeit without commingling of funds for risk. The 
different countries examined include most GCC countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE 
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and Saudi Arabia in a separate section,54 as well as Malaysia. Our data will be unbalanced 
since some of the IBs do not have 12 years of annual reports: some are relatively new. 
However, choosing a period of 12 years will be beneficial in averaging out the effects of 
good and bad years’ performances and obtaining valid observations in order to conduct a 
meaningful hypothesis test. 
4.6.2 Return on Equity and UIAHs’ Returns 
The comparison of the differences between the shareholders’ return on equity (ROE) and 
the UIAHs’ rates of return on investment is necessary to get a view of the fairness of returns. 
For example, testing the relationship between percentage returns to shareholders and to 
UIAHs in terms of risk, using profits attributable to shareholders and returns to UIAHs from 
the sample bank’s annual reports, will give a good indication of the difference in rates of 
return (dividends to shareholders and cash payouts to UIAHs will be considered in chapter 
7). In the case of shareholders, the ROE (see Equation 4-3) is a commonly used measure of 
profitability for shareholders, where the amount of net income is calculated as a percentage 
of shareholders’ book equity, which can be compared with UIAHs’ rates of return. Returns 
to UIAHs are ultimately (notwithstanding ‘smoothing’) based on the performance of 
management in managing its funds, and therefore the evaluation of IBs’ performance is also 
important to the UIAHs. Measuring management performance by analysing ROE55 would 
give a rational measurement of IBs’ performance and management efficiency from the 
shareholders’ point of view. A higher ROE would indicate a higher level of managerial 
efficiency. 
 
                                                     
 
54 Oman is also one of the GCC countries; however, it is not included because Oman has only just adopted 
Islamic banking and will not have sufficient data for comparison. 
55 A more objective measure of management performance would be return on assets, which will be tested in 
the next chapter. 
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𝑹𝑶𝑬 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
 Equation 4-3 
In banks, ROE measures the efficiency of making profits from every unit of shareholders’ 
equity/bank capital (Gul et al., 2011). The relative riskiness of percentage rates of return to 
shareholders and UIAHs, i.e. the standard deviations, will also be measured, testing 
whether there is a relationship between the standard deviations and the means (or the CVs) 
of the percentage rates of return. In principle, one would expect higher percentage returns 
paid to the shareholders to be accompanied by higher volatilities of the shareholders’ rates 
of return. 
There are different ways of measuring the shareholders’ returns: 
1. Stock market return. In any stock market, the total shareholder returns are 
calculated using ending share price minus opening share price plus dividends 
over the beginning of the share price (the return that investors get for holding 
the share). However, when companies are not listed in the stock market or are 
listed on an inefficient stock market, using the share price change as an indicator 
of the shareholder returns is very questionable. In a thin or inefficient market, 
there is a great deal of noise in the market (this is typical for the IBs), and looking 
at the shareholders’ rates of return in these conditions would not be 
informative. It is also worth mentioning that, in our sample, not all IBs are listed 
on the stock market and some have just recently converted to Islamic banking. 
Even if the bank is listed, it may not have a long history of paid dividends. 
Therefore, we will use the accounting measure of ROE, namely, the profit 
attributable to shareholders divided by shareholders’ equity on the balance 
sheet. 
2. Accounting ROE. In an efficient market, we would expect retained earnings to be 
reflected in the share price.  The retained profits increase shareholders’ equity 
and they normally represent a return to shareholders in terms of an increase in 
the share value. Retained profits increase a bank’s regulatory capital and enable 
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it to expand its balance sheet with additional assets, which in turn would be 
expected to increase its future profits and hence value for shareholders. The 
equity belongs to shareholders but the issue is to what extent retained earnings 
add or create value for shareholders. 
3. Dividend yield. This is the annual dividend divided by the opening share price for 
the year. This is used in chapter 7. 
The interest here is in how UIAHs’ and shareholders’ rates of return vary with respect to 
their level of risk-adjusted rates of return, not only the different levels of the rates of return. 
The easiest way to measure the level of risk adjustment is by using the CV, which is the SD 
divided by the mean. 
4.6.3 The Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the study is based on the argument that, according to the OECD definition 
of CG, the practice of CG should result in mitigating the conflict of interest (namely, that 
between UIAHs and shareholders, with the management privileging the interests of the 
latter) to which UIAHs may be exposed in IBs. Therefore, with respect to the risk exposure, 
we are assuming that if UIAHs are getting reasonable or justifiable rates of return, they 
should be paid according to the risk they are exposed to. Thus, the CV of UIAHs’ rates of 
return should be no higher than that of shareholders’ rates of return. Thus, a low level of 
the rate of return of UIAHs would be compensated for the higher stability of the returns. 
Hence, if UIAHs are getting a lower return on investment, and if they are also getting a more 
stable return on investment compared to shareholders, then the bank is treating UIAHs 
‘fairly’: because shareholders are absorbing a higher proportion of risk, they are getting a 
higher return as well. In another word, if shareholders’ CVs are significantly greater than 
UIAHs’ CVs, then UIAHs are getting a better risk-adjusted return than shareholders (less risk 
in relation to their rates of return, which is fair on a bank-by-bank basis). Therefore, there 
is a sort of justice because the lower return of the UIAHs is being compensated for by lower 
variability. 
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 𝑯𝟎: Coefficients of variation are not significantly different between shareholder 
and UIAHs relating to individual banks, and if there is a difference the CV of UIAH is 
lower. The level of the rate of return is compensated for the relative stability of the 
rate of return. CV UIAHs ≤ CV shareholders; this implies fairness to UIAHs. 
 𝑯𝟏: Coefficients of variation are significantly different between shareholder and 
UIAHs relating to individual banks, and those of UIAH are higher. CV UIAHs > CV 
shareholders: ‘unfairness to UIAHs’. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that underlying profit attributable to UIAHs may be higher 
or more variable than the payout, if UIAHs do not receive the actual profit, which could be 
subject to ‘smoothing’ practices such as transfers to or from PER or IRR accounts. Underlying 
profits attributable to UIAHs may not be disclosed, and in any case they are not accessible 
to the UIAHs. 
Thus, we are examining whether the risk-adjusted rates of return of UIAHs (as measured by 
the CV) are at least equal to or less than the risk-adjusted rates of return of shareholders, 
i.e. CV UIAHs ≤ CV shareholders. In other words, are UIAHs getting the level of risk that is 
compensated for by lower returns (or vice versa)? UIAHs should be paid according to the 
risk to which they are exposed, as the null hypothesis states, as with any normal investment 
where investors are willing to bear higher risk for higher returns. Therefore, if the UIAHs’ 
rates of return are lower than those of shareholders, they should have a lower risk (standard 
deviation) than shareholders, resulting in a CV that is not greater. If the UIAHs were being 
unfairly treated as regards profit sharing, a sign of this would be that they had a greater CV 
of rates of return than shareholders. In addition, we use the statistical test (t-test) on the 
CV of the two investors to determine if there is a significant difference between the risk-
adjusted rates of return on a bank-by-bank basis. 
4.6.4 Test Strategy 
By taking a cross-sectional approach only, we are addressing the variability between banks 
rather than the variability for the same bank over time. Therefore, a cross-sectional 
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approach will not answer our question without time-series analysis. We are interested in a 
time-series analysis of a given bank to find out how much in percentage terms shareholders’ 
and UIAHs’ rates of return vary with respect to their level of risk – for example, whether 
UIAHs are getting rates of return that are compensated by lower risk (or vice versa) 
compared to shareholders. 
In terms of accounting ROE, the non-distributed or retained profit element is worth 
mentioning, and in chapter 7 another calculation will be made using the dividend yield 
(distributed profit as a percentage of market value of shares) in the numerator for the 
shareholders, to make rates of return comparable in cash terms. The dividend stream is 
generally more stable than the income stream; this is true of companies in general, which 
tend to maintain a level dividend payout even if their profit number is going down, trying 
to avoid a negative signal to the market. Since a lower dividend may send such a negative 
signal, the management wants to assure the market that the drop in profit does not signal 
any longer-term loss of profitability.  
As mentioned earlier, using accounting numbers instead of the stock market returns would 
give more reliable results, because the stock markets are not efficient in the GCC (Hassan 
et al., 2003; Jamaani and Roca, 2015), and in any case not all IBs are listed in the stock 
exchange.  Furthermore, some of the listed IBs lack a sufficient history of paid dividends 
that can be used as empirical data. The bulk of these banks’ shares are in the hands of 
wealthy shareholders or another Islamic or conventional bank, which do not usually trade 
them. In addition, some governments hold a big portion of IBs’ shares and rarely if ever 
trade them, such as the case of KFH-Kuwait. The shares of these banks are thus not traded 
often and a large transaction may have a disproportionally large effect on the price. 
Furthermore, UIAHs’ returns are not reported in the stock market, so we need to refer to 
the bank’s notes in its annual report. 
Apart from the fact that the bank is entitled to some remuneration for its work as asset 
manager (Mudarib), the higher returns that shareholders get are justified by their being 
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exposed to greater risks than UIAHs, partly because of ‘smoothing’ or DCR,56 which has the 
effect of transferring variability of returns from UIAHs to shareholders. However, UIAHs are 
not profit maximisers as they are typically people operating savings accounts who are more 
interested in having safe returns than in maximising returns (somewhat like conventional 
deposit accounts). Even though PERs and IRRs mitigate the DCR (in effect, at the expense of 
UIAHs, who in profitable years are denied payouts that they otherwise would have 
received), the use of PERs and IRRs also serve to stabilise UIAHs’ rates of return. On the 
other hand, shareholders are typically wealthy investors who are profit maximisers and are 
willing to take greater risks for higher returns. Therefore, what we are looking at is the 
extent to which these shareholders do in fact take on additional risk relative to their rates 
of return, as measured by the CV, thus justifying substantially higher rates of return. If this 
is not the case, it implies that the lower rates of return received by UIAHs are not a fair 
return in relation to the level of risk, and in fact they may be being exploited.  
4.7 The Coefficient of Variation Test 
The research is conducted based on samples collected from 32 IBs in six different countries 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Of the banks, 28 use UPSIAs 
and four Saudi banks (in Appendix A at end of chapter 4) use a type of restricted profit-
sharing investment accounts (RPSIAs), since RPSIAs57 operate on a different basis with no 
commingling. In total, there are more than 250 observations. We make our own 
computation of the returns by calculating the ROE and the rates of return to UIAHs from 
the banks’ annual reports, unless the UIAHs’ rates of return are given in the annual report. 
Our sample consists of banks in the five GCC countries and Malaysia, which in fact 
represents a significant percentage of the total global Islamic banking institutions, especially 
in the GCC area, which represents about 70% of the Islamic banking industry’s assets (Ernst 
& Young, 2016). Our sample banks consist of the major players in their own countries, these 
                                                     
 
56 For more on DCR, see Archer and Karim (2013a). 
57 RPSIAs are exposed to less risk due to the nature of the account type. 
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being among the first banks to have offered Islamic finance. For example, we include the 
largest IBs, such as KFH-Kuwait, and Al Rajhi, based in Saudi Arabia. The latter is believed to 
be the largest Islamic bank globally, as mentioned by the International Islamic Financial 
Market (IIFM)58 Al Rajhi Bank has maintained its top ranking based on assets of over US$82 
billion, followed by KFH-Kuwait with US$56.8 billion. 
4.7.1 Calculating ROE and UIAHs’ Returns 
To calculate ROE, it is generally considered by analysts to be more appropriate to take the 
average of equity for the year, rather than taking the equity at the beginning or end of the 
year. For example, if we take the shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the year and there 
is a big entry during the year, then we are overestimating the return. On the other hand, if 
we take shareholders’ equity only at the end of the year and there is a big entry during the 
year then we may underestimate the return. Analysts have different ways of calculating the 
return on average equity (ROAE). The best approach to calculating ROAE seems to be to 
take the average of the beginning and the ending balances in the time series. Most of the 
IBs are required by the different accounting standards and the supervisory authority to 
report the beginning and ending balance of the years; therefore, taking the average of the 
beginning and the ending of the corresponding year would be the best way to calculate the 
ROAE of the year. 
 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑬 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
 Equation 4-4 
The tables in Appendix H at the end of this research show the calculations of all the ROAE 
and the UIAHs’ returns for 28 IBs following the CVs for both types of investors, plus four 
Saudi IBs in a separate section at the end of Appendix A to chapter 4. All numbers are taken 
                                                     
 
58Source: International Islamic Financial Market: ‘Al Rajhi remains world’s largest Islamic bank’. Retrieved 06 
March 2016 from https://www.islamicfinance.com/2015/07/al-rajhi-worlds-largest-islamic-bank/ 
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directly from the annual report of the corresponding bank for each year. One needs to bear 
in mind that not all IBs have a history of 12 years and therefore the calculations of the ROE 
and the UIAHs’ returns are based on the availability of the online annual reports by the 
bank. Also, if the UIAHs’ returns are not published in the annual report then the UIAHs’ 
return equation 4-5  is used to calculate the returns. UIAHs’ returns are based on the 
payout, which includes all types of investment accounts plus savings accounts, but not 
current or non-investment accounts. 
 
𝑼𝑰𝑨𝑯 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒59 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝐻 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠′ 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠
 Equation 4-5 
 
 𝑼𝑰𝑨𝑯 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔′ 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 = Customer deposits (less current accounts and 
margin) 
 UIAHs’ returns = profit distributed to depositors (less Sukuk and other irrelevant 
accounts)/the average of depositors’ accounts of UIAHs including other investment 
accounts such as Wakalah, savings accounts (excluding current accounts). 
4.7.2 Estimation Method for Calculating UIAHs’ Returns 
UIAHs’ returns are published in the annual report; however, some banks do not disclose the 
percentage of the return and only have the figure for payouts to UIAHs. For the purpose of 
this and subsequent chapters, it is necessary to have the percentage return to calculate the 
CVs (this chapter) and the differences between the percentage returns of shareholders and 
UIAHs (chapter 5). Different methods are used by IBs to calculate the return to UIAHs. Some 
banks include the payout to Sukuk, and others include the amount of profit transferred to 
the ‘smoothing’ reserves PERs and IRRs. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a standardised 
method to define the percentage return. For example, banks’ accountants have different 
                                                     
 
59 The average of beginning and ending balances for the year. 
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ways to calculate UIAHs’ returns, which are based on payouts that include all types of 
investment accounts plus savings accounts, but not current or non-investment accounts. 
The following method illustrates the methods used by different banks and, for the purposes 
of this research, method 1 (which takes as the UIAHs’ returns the amount of profit available 
to UIAHs for the financial year)60 is used to standardise our dataset to calculate the UIAHs’ 
returns, but only if UIAHs’ percentage returns are not disclosed in the annual report.61 For 
example: Dubai Islamic Bank’s annual report for 2011–2012 does not disclose the 
percentage return to UIAHs (during the time frame in the sample) and only discloses the 
amount available to UIAHs (this is not the actual cash payout, which appears in method 2 
in Appendix B); therefore, the following methods could be used: 
Table 4-2: Customer’ deposit 
Description 2012 2011 
Current accounts 17,831,454 17,784,560 
Saving accounts 11,271,332 10,848,614 
Investment deposits 37,350,634 35,912,221 
Margin accounts 169,007 192,765 
Depositors’ share of profit payable (note 18(d)) – account profit share 113,676 158,522 
Depositors’ investment risk reserve (note 18 (c))-not getting paid out 64,749 33,157 
Total of Customers deposits 66,800,852 64,929,839 
Source: annual report of Dubai Islamic Bank 2012, in AED ’000s. 
 
 
                                                     
 
60 There is another method (method 2), which uses the actual amount paid out during the financial year, which 
typically consists of a second instalment in respect of the previous year’s entitlement plus a first instalment 
of the current year’s entitlement (payouts being made in two instalments).  
61 For the full calculations, including other methods, see Appendix B at the end of chapter 4. 
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Table 4-3: Depositors’ and Sukuk holders’ share of profit 
Description 2012 2011 
Investment and savings deposits from customers (note 18 (d)) 612,542 699,941 
Wakalah and other investment deposits from banks (note 22(a)) 521,624 560,788 
Profit accrued on Sukuk financing instruments (note 22(a)) 182,039 126,079 
Total depositors’ and Sukuk holders share of profit 1,316,205 1,386,808 
Source: annual report of Dubai Islamic Bank 2012, in AED ’000s. For more information, see note 43 in Dubai 
Islamic Bank annual report 2012. 
 
4.7.2.1 UIAHs Method 1 for Dubai Islamic Bank 2012 
Customers’ profit-sharing deposits = total customer deposit – current account – margin – 
any other irrelevant accounts + profit equalisation provision or account 
Profit distributed to UIAHs = total profit distribution – Wakalah and other investment 
deposits from banks – profit accrued on Sukuk financing instruments 
UIAHs’ return = profit to UIAHs/average of beginning and ending balances of customer 
accounts 
Customers’ deposits: (2011): 64,929,839 - 17,784,560 - 192,765 = 46,952,514 
(2012): 66,800,852 - 17,831,454 - 169,007 = 48,800,391 
Profit distributed to UIAHs = 1,316,205 – 521,624 (from Wakalah) – 182,039 (profit from 
Sukuk) = 612,542 
UIAHs’ return = 612,542/47,876,453 (47,876,453 = average of 48,800,391 and 
46,952,514)62 = 1.279% 
Due to the nature of the accounting policy for each bank, and the different methods used 
to calculate the profit of UIAHs in each year (for example, some profit may not be 
distributed but kept until next year as a reserve instead), as stated earlier, method 1 will be 
                                                     
 
62 Average of beginning and ending balances of customer accounts – in this case, 2011 and 2012. 
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used for the UIAHs’ annual profit for the purposes of this research; method 1 includes total 
profit distributed and the amounts appropriated to PERs/IRRs and excludes amounts 
released from these reserves. Shifting between methods will affect the calculation 
adversely and will produce the wrong individual figures for each bank, which will not allow 
standardisation of the UIAHs’ returns.63 
4.7.3 Mean Return Between Shareholders and UIAHs 
It is relevant to know whether the returns of the two classes of stakeholders are significantly 
different or not. By looking solely at the mean returns between the shareholders and UIAHs 
we can observe the vast difference in levels of return, without even considering the risk 
shared between them. For example, if we look at mean returns for 2002–2012 for the entire 
sample, we notice the spread difference in the returns for the shareholders compared to 
UIAHs. The results of a t-test to see whether the difference in the mean returns is 
statistically significant is shown in table 4-4, although the size of the difference is clear from 
visual inspection. 
 
                                                     
 
63 Even though method 1 is the safest and most straightforward method used to calculate UIAHs’ returns, it 
may not produce the amount actually paid out, since some banks do not disclose all the relevant information 
about IRR and PER activities. This may overstate the amount actually paid to UIAHs, because at least we know 
what it is – the UIAHs’ share of profit for the year before transfers to and from PER/IRR. 
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Table 4-4: Shareholders and UIAHs’ returns 2002–2013 
t-Test: unadjusted ROE Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean 0.08 0.03 
Variance 0.01 0.00 
Banks 28 28 
Level of Significance 0.05  
t Stat 2.28  
P-Value 0.03**  
Standard Deviation 0.11 0.01 
Coefficient of Variation 1.39 0.20 
Note: the shareholders’ negative returns (outliers) were not replaced with zeros, which affects the CV 
calculation in the next table. **The p-value is smaller than the significance level of α of 5% and the test statistic 
is high, both of which indicate that there is a significant difference in mean returns between shareholders and 
UIAHs. 
 
However, our interest is in how UIAHs’ and shareholders’ returns vary with respect to their 
level of risk-adjusted rates of return, rather than the differences in the levels of the returns. 
Therefore, we need to look at the CVs to measure the levels on a risk-adjusted basis. It is 
worth mentioning that some IBs have existed for more than 10 years, although they only 
make certain annual reports available online. 
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Table 4-5: Coefficients of variation with unadjusted ROAE 
Bank according to Jurisdiction Coefficient of Variation Observations 
Bahrain Shareholders UIAHs   
Albaraka Islamic Bank -284.36% 33.65% 6 
AlSalam Bank 69.62% 85.02% 8 
Bahrain Islamic Bank -1558.03% 18.71% 12 
Ithmaar Bank 14770.45% 17.95% 10 
Khaleeji Commercial 217.03% 20.74% 9 
KFHB 92.43% 37.56% 12 
Kuwait Shareholders UIAHs   
Ahli United 8.17% 26.46% 4 
Boubyan 13996.42% 56.27% 9 
KFH 52.49% 55.80% 12 
KIB 81.35% 44.27% 8 
Qatar Shareholders UIAHs 
 
Masraf Al Rayan 14.25% 59.44% 7 
Qatar Islamic Bank 36.47% 42.12% 12 
UAE Shareholders UIAHs 
 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 45.54% 77.51% 10 
Dubai Islamic Bank 45.62% 48.01% 12 
Emirates Islamic Bank 165.65% 47.39% 10 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 33.40% 31.88% 9 
Malaysia Shareholders UIAHs 
 
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 33.71% 22.08% 7 
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 56.04% 26.88% 7 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad -468.85% 37.18% 12 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 86.56% 15.98% 12 
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 122.67% 39.75% 9 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 29.16% 18.35% 8 
KFHM -649.62% 44.38% 9 
Maybank Islamic Berhad 41.10% 45.84% 6 
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 74.32% 45.35% 6 
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 36.09% 50.11% 6 
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 33.52% 17.49% 9 
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 53.00% 39.28% 6 
Note that there must be a positive result for CV for a meaningful comparison to be possible; however, there 
are some outliers in the ROE that affect the CV calculation, which need to be adjusted. CV outliers shown in 
red result from negative ROAE, and higher UIAHs’ CVs are shown in green. There are six outliers (red), four 
negative CVs, and two large positive results from a large negative ROAE. Looking at the CVs of UIAHs’ rates of 
return, we can see nine cases where the CV of the UIAHs’ returns is higher than that of shareholders’ CV. In 
this case, UIAHs’ low level of return is not compensated for by the higher stability of the returns. Hence, UIAHs 
are getting a lower return on investment, when in fact they are getting more variability in the return on 
investment compared to shareholders; therefore, they are not being treated fairly by the bank. 
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4.7.4 Rationale of adjusting Outliers 
To be able to calculate the CV of returns for each bank, it is necessary in some cases to 
replace dataset extreme negative values for shareholders’ returns with zeros in the time-
series, following the same methodology as Diaw and Mbow (2011), if the result of these 
extreme values is to make the overall mean for the time series negative or extreme positive 
(outliers). By treating these extreme negative returns as outliers and replacing them with 
zeros, we are not aiming to underestimate the variation of shareholders’ returns compared 
to UIAHs but to gain meaningful results. If we are looking at the income by itself, then we 
do not make any adjustment (as in table 4-4) because we do not want to lose the 
information in the negative return. On the other hand, there is the case of large positive 
outliers, where the extreme negative value for shareholders’ returns in the time series 
result in a very small mean return. Therefore, it is more useful to treat all negative ROEs as 
outliers, not just those that result in negative CVs, for three reasons: 
1. It is better to avoid huge positive CVs that are obtained when negative ROEs result 
in very small mean returns for some banks in the time series. These huge positive 
CVs are outliers that distort the data. 
2. There are no negative returns for UPSIAs when the bank has negative return on 
investment, because even if there are underlying losses these are ‘smoothed’ by the 
use of IRRs. Hence, removing all negative ROEs makes the CVs of shareholders and 
UIAHs more comparable. 
3. Negative CV cannot be interpreted. 
In fact, even after adjusting all outliers, the results did not change the classification. For 
example, Boubyan Bank was adjusted in 2009 only; it has an outlier of negative 59% of ROE 
for the shareholders, due to recording large losses resulting from provisions against 
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delinquent customers and impairment of some portfolio components.64 To have sufficient 
CV, we replaced the ROAE of Boubyan’s negative return for 2009 of -46.51% with zero that 
year only. Yet on the basis of the adjusted numbers, Boubyan’s shareholders still had a 
higher CV than UIAHs’ CV, indicating that on that adjusted basis the shareholders’ returns 
were shown to be more exposed to risk than those of UIAHs (see table 4-6). In Table 4-6, 
CVs of banks for which the ROE for a year was treated as an outlier and replaced with a zero 
are shown in red. CVs of UIAH rates of return for banks that are greater than the CVs of 
shareholders’ ROE are shown in green. 
 
                                                     
 
64 According to the Boubyan Bank 2009 annual report, such precautionary provisions caused the bank to 
record unrealised loss of KD 51.7 million for the year 2009. Provisions made by the bank to address the impact 
of the global financial crisis that started in 2008 amounted to KD 66.9 million, leading to unrealised losses of 
KD 51.7 million. 
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Table 4-6: Adjusted coefficient of variation 
Bank according to Jurisdiction CVs of % returns Observations 
Bahrain Shareholders UIAHs   
Albaraka Islamic Bank 111.65% 33.65% 6 
AlSalam Bank 69.62% 85.02% 8 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 91.64% 18.71% 12 
Ithmaar Bank 142.94% 17.95% 10 
Khaleeji Commercial 114.82% 20.74% 9 
KFHB 92.43% 37.56% 12 
Kuwait Shareholders UIAHs   
Ahli United 8.17% 26.46% 4 
Boubyan 82.49% 56.27% 9 
KFH 52.49% 55.80% 12 
KIB 55.10% 44.27% 8 
Qatar Shareholders UIAHs   
Masraf Al Rayan 14.25% 59.44% 7 
Qatar Islamic Bank 36.47% 42.12% 12 
UAE Shareholders UIAHs   
Abu Dhabi Islamic 45.54% 77.51% 10 
Dubai Islamic Bank 45.62% 48.01% 12 
Emirates Islamic Bank 106.39% 47.39% 10 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 33.40% 31.88% 9 
Malaysia Shareholders UIAHs   
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 33.71% 22.08% 7 
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 56.04% 26.88% 7 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 111.52% 37.18% 12 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 58.37% 15.98% 12 
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 66.33% 39.75% 9 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 29.16% 18.35% 8 
KFHM 104.05% 44.38% 9 
Maybank Islamic Berhad 41.10% 45.84% 6 
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 70.37% 45.35% 6 
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 36.09% 50.11% 6 
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 33.52% 17.49% 9 
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 53.00% 39.28% 6 
Coefficient of variation after adjusting the negative ROAE as outliers. However, there is no change to the 
classification of the CV results in the adjusted banks, as the shareholders still have higher CVs. Only 24 
observations with negative returns were replaced with zero, out of 247 observations. Again, in nine cases the 
UIAHs have CVs higher than shareholders’. This indicates that UIAHs have a lower level of risk-adjusted rate 
of return. Hence, UIAHs are not being treated fairly in these nine cases.  
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Table 4-7: Shareholders’ and UIAHs’ adjusted rates of return 2002–2013 
 t-Test: adjusted Rates of Return Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean 0.11 0.03 
Variance 0.00 0.00 
Banks 28 28 
Level of Significance 0.05  
t Stat 8.34  
P-Value 0.00**  
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.01 
Coefficient of Variation 0.45 0.20 
Note: shareholders’ negative ROEs were replaced with zeros (24 observations out of 247). P-value is smaller 
than the significance level of α of 5% and the test statistic is high, both of which indicate that there is a 
significant difference in mean rates of return between the two classes of stakeholders. We may note that the 
mean rate of return of shareholders on the adjusted basis in this table is 11%, as opposed to 8% without the 
adjustment in table 4-4.  
 
Table 4-8: T-test for the difference in CV by bank 2002–2013 
t-Test  Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean 0.64 0.39 
Variance 0.12 0.03 
Observations 28 28 
Level of Significance 0.05  
t Stat 3.40  
P-Value 0.000  
Standard Deviation 0.34 0.18 
Difference in the coefficient of variation between shareholders and UIAHs for returns 2002–2013 where the 
p-value is smaller than the significance level of α (5%), which indicates significant difference in risk-adjusted 
return. 
 
According to the data calculations from the selected IBs, one third of UIAHs’ returns have 
higher CVs, which indicates that the UIAHs received a bad deal on a risk-adjusted returns 
basis compared to shareholders. This is a noteworthy proportion, which raises some 
important governance issues, even though for two thirds of the banks the opposite was the 
case. However, we need to bear in mind that we are only looking at the volatility of the risk-
adjusted returns and not at the risk of capital impairment (downside risk), since it is difficult 
to get that information. Nevertheless, historically capital impairment cases have been rare 
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in IBs, although the risk is still there. For example, Arcapita Islamic Bank,65 based in Bahrain, 
suffered losses in 2012 (Kary and Sharif, 2012). Even where the CV of the shareholders’ rates 
of return is higher than that of the UIAHs, this does not take account of the UIAHs’ risk of 
capital impairment, so it does not necessarily follow that, all things considered, UIAHs are 
getting a ‘fair deal’ in such cases, and this remains a subject for further research. 
The bank is expected to look after the shareholders’ interests since shareholders are the 
owners of the organisations and are characterised as bearing the residual risk.  Even though 
legally, UIAHs can also be characterised as bearing this equity risk, the status of the UIAHs 
in the event of a bankruptcy is unclear. In the case of bankruptcy, UIAHs may be 
disadvantaged relative to conventional depositors, who are deemed to be creditors of the 
bank (El-Gamal, 2006).  From the Shari’ah point of view, the UIAHs are the owners of the 
assets financed by their funds, and are comparable to secured creditors, in the sense that 
they have a priority claim to those assets financed by their funds.  Therefore, in bankruptcy, 
UIAHs would not be treated as residual claimants like shareholders, but as creditors secured 
by their underlying assets.  However, when it comes to profit sharing on an ongoing basis, 
UIAHs are residual claimants who share any available profit, and have no contractual right 
to any return.  There is no legal or ethical reason why shareholders’ interests should 
override the interests of other stakeholders. Nevertheless, it tends to be the case that 
shareholders have more power (e.g. the right to vote directors off the board), while the 
BOD is formally accountable to shareholders in annual general meetings. 
We have explained above the reasons for using an accounting-based measure of 
shareholders’ rates of return. An alternative, which we adopt in chapter 7, would be to 
calculate the CV of shareholders’ dividends rather than the CV of ROAE. The means of the 
                                                     
 
65 Arcapita Islamic Bank, founded in 1996 as the first Islamic investment bank, is a leading investment bank 
based in Manama, Bahrain that manages Shari’ah-compliant investment. The bank provides global investment 
to institutions as well as individuals, operating mainly in the United States. On March 19 2012, Arcapita and 
several of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States under chapter 11 to protect their assets and 
investment from any legal challenge, which allowed the bank to continue talks with its lenders. 
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dividend yields would normally be lower than the means of the ROEs, and whether or not 
the standard deviation is different would be another matter since dividends tend to be less 
volatile than earnings, and sometimes firms pay dividends despite a loss to avoid sending a 
negative signal to the market. However, most IBs do not have a long history of paid 
dividends, which makes them a problematic basis for comparison. Nevertheless, such a 
comparison is made later in this thesis (in chapter 7) using the available data for a subset of 
20 banks.  
4.8 Findings 
In general, ROE is more volatile in nature than the UIAHs’ rates of return, but about one 
third of all the banks had a higher CV for UIAHs’ rates of return than for shareholders’ ROE, 
which implies that this substantial proportion of UIAHs might have been ‘taken for a ride’ 
as they were exposed to higher relative risk with lower returns.  This indicates that in a 
significant proportion of cases UIAHs are not being properly compensated for the level of 
risk they face. According to the OECD: ‘Corporate governance involves a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined’ (OECD, 2015). This implies that the interests of UIAHs as significant 
stakeholders should be reflected in the way IBs are governed so that UIAHs are 
remunerated according to the risks they are exposed to. Thus, if the UIAHs’ rates of return 
are lower than those of shareholders (subject to the bank’s remuneration for fund 
management), their rates of return should have a correspondingly lower SD and a CV less 
than or equal to that of shareholders’ ROE. However, in our sample there is a substantial 
percentage where UIAHs are not doing well in these terms. For example, at KFH-Kuwait, 
shareholders had a CV of 52.49% while UIAHs had a CV of 55.80%. Also, in some cases the 
shareholders’ CV is slightly higher than the UIAHs’ CV, such as in Sharjah Islamic Bank, CV 
for shareholders is 33.40% and the CV for UIAHs is 31.88%; still, the shareholders get a 
considerably higher rate of return than UIAHs (shareholders’ mean return 7.85% and UIAHs’ 
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3.79%). Therefore, UIAHs are experiencing a higher level of risk in relation to their level of 
return by comparison. Hence we can hardly say that the UIAHs are being treated equitably. 
The higher rates of return that shareholders get would need to be justified by their being 
exposed to a higher level of risk than UIAHs. 
4.8.1 Results for the UIAHs and Shareholders Hypothesis 
According to the calculations for both shareholders’ and UIAHs’ rates of return and the t-
tests in table 4-7 and table 4-8, (p-value of 0.000, which in this case is much smaller than α; 
significance level of 5%), we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the CVs of the UIAHs’ rates of return and those of the shareholders. The 
justification of the lower rates of return of the UIAHs being compensated for by lower 
variability does not exist in a significant number, i.e. one third, of the cases examined. 
Although in two thirds of the cases the CVs of the shareholders’ rates of return are higher, 
the significant proportion of CVs of UIAHs’ rates of return that are higher leads us not 
merely to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the CV level 
between UIAHs and shareholders, but also to conclude that there is an absence of ‘fairness’ 
in balancing risk and return. Normally, one might expect to find that the rates of return to 
shareholders (ROE) would be higher, compared to those of the UIAHs. However, one might 
also expect that this would be balanced by a higher variation of the shareholders’ rates of 
return because of “smoothing” using reserves such as PER and IRR. The UIAHs would thus 
be expected to have a lower risk or a less volatile income stream than shareholders; 
however, what is surprising is that in many cases (about 33%) this does not seem to be true, 
which indicates that those UIAHs are getting a ‘bad deal’. Although the bank’s Mudarib 
share, if not excessive, could justify some difference, it would seem that there is no real 
justification for paying such lower risk-adjusted rates of return to UIAHs.  Consequently, this 
situation means that UIAHs tend to be more like depositors and not, as the banks claim, 
investors. However, conventional depositors’ funds are capital-certain (and they have rights 
as creditors), while UIAHs are exposed to losses. Therefore, we have two classes of investors 
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whose money is commingled together and exposed to the same risk but rewarded 
differently. 
4.9 Concluding Remarks 
Although the Mudarabah contract is in principle a profit-sharing (and loss-bearing) contract, 
the actual return to UIAHs is subject to management discretion since the contractual 
Mudarib share is generally very high and is treated as a maximum, which leaves scope for 
considerable flexibility in allocating the Mudarabah profits; in addition to this, accounting 
techniques (PERs and IRRs) may be used to produce a ‘managed’ return for the UIAHs. Even 
though UIAHs are sharing the risk, the Mudarib share (effectively, the management fees) 
may easily reach 60% or more of the profit, according to the bank’s annual report. For 
example, Al Baraka Bank’s 2012 annual report mentions that the Mudarib share is 70% of 
the profits on equity of investment account holders (funding Mudarabah assets) as per the 
terms of the UIAHs agreements. This situation is considerably different from the standards 
used in the conventional management funds industry. Conventional investment funds do 
not remunerate the fund manager through profit sharing, but charge a flat percentage of 
the funds under management – fees which can sometimes be very high but which are 
known in advance, allowing investors to ‘shop around’. 
In fact, Diaw and Mbow (2011) found that the rate of return to UIAHs is correlated to the 
corresponding conventional interest rate. Their study includes a comparison of UIAHs’ rates 
of return and local interest rates that shows that the means and standard deviations of 
these are similar. The impression is given that IBs are looking at the conventional bank 
interest rate and trying to match to it the rate of payout to the UIAHs, regardless of the 
profit they make. For example, if the bank makes a high profit for the year, it will allocate 
the maximum Mudarib share to its shareholders and possibly transfer part of the profit to 
reserves such as PERs or IRRs so as to match the market (interest) rate of payout. The 
reserves are used at the management’s discretion to increase the UIAHs’ payouts for the 
year with lower profits. This use of reserves will penalise UIAHs, who are denied the return 
they could have been paid in a year of high profits, unless they keep their account until 
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there is a year of poor results, when funds are released from the reserves to increase the 
amount available for UIAHs’ payouts. Such practices, and the lack of transparency 
surrounding them, are problematic from a corporate governance perspective. 
Another consideration is that an Islamic bank, having a very large Mudarib share, which 
could reach 70% while the UIAHs contribute the majority of the commingled fund, can use 
UIAHs’ funds as a form of leverage but without the risk of conventional leverage (in a 
conventional bank, the shareholders take on the risk resulting from leverage). In effect, 
shareholders in IBs may be getting (in accounting terms) three to four times the return 
UIAHs are getting, whereas the underlying assets have the same level of risk. Thus, in a good 
year, management of IBs is able to allocate most if not all of the benefit to the shareholders. 
By using smoothing devices such as PERs and IRRs that are largely (for IRR, wholly) created 
out of the UIAHs’ funds, IBs are not genuinely making the UIAHs’ risk go away. The risk to 
the assets is still there, and the bank, as Mudarib, is not liable for the losses (except in cases 
of demonstrable negligence or malpractice). Therefore, one way of explaining what is 
happening is to say that IBs’ managements are trying to make the UIAHs’ investment (i.e. 
the assets in the commingled fund) appear less risky by using the smoothing techniques but 
are in fact ‘creaming off’ the higher returns associated with the actual level of risk for the 
benefit of shareholders, while giving the UIAHs a return using the benchmark of the returns 
to conventional depositors (Sundararajan, 2011). Given that the Mudarib share is more than 
half of the profit, this gives them plenty of latitude during smoothing. Also, when IBs use 
the smoothing technique, they make the shareholders’ returns more volatile and one would 
therefore expect the rates of return to shareholders to be more volatile than those of 
UIAHs; but, as we have seen, for a substantial proportion of IBs this is not the case.  
Therefore, to answer the questions for the research in respect of the lack of governance 
rights and the absence of control rights, the consequences is that in a significant proportion 
of cases UIAHs are not treated in a fair manner in terms of the rates of return.  Also it is 
clear that IBs attempt to make UIAHs’ rates of return behave similarly to conventional 
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deposits, in terms of stability of returns and protection against losses using the PER and IRR 
devices. 
The practice of ‘smoothing’ the returns to UIAHs and the acceptance of DCR by IBs may 
perhaps be seen as an implicit recognition that the Mudarabah model with a very high 
Mudarib share is less than fair to the UIAHs, and as an attempt to make it fairer. Yet the use 
of reserves such as PERs and IRRs to mitigate DCR works in the opposite sense, as well as 
being at the expense of transparency. In the cases where the CV of the shareholders’ rates 
of return is higher than that of the UIAHs’, it can be argued that UIAHs are getting a ‘fair 
deal’, because, on a risk-adjusted basis, UIAHs are getting a better level of return than 
shareholders. That is why, although the CV of returns is a simplistic measure, it is a powerful 
one as regards fairness in the context of so-called ‘profit sharing’. 
The fact that appears here is that the business model of the Islamic bank is questionable, 
insofar as the Islamic bank is trying to offer a Shari’ah-compliant (as opposed to 
conventional) deposit account, and in doing so, has introduced a product that is deeply 
problematic. For example, Saudi Arabia’s central bank does not allow IBs to deal with 
UPSIAs. Also, in Qatar, the central bank  instructed the IBs not to pass losses to UIAHs, even 
though this is not consistent with the Shari’ah rules of Mudarabah (Archer and Karim, 
2009). This used to be the case in Malaysia; however, the Malaysian parliament passed a 
new act, in accordance with which the central bank changed its position, not merely 
allowing losses to be passed to UIAHs but insisting that UPSIAs should be treated as a pure 
Mudarabah investment account product (Islamic Financial Services Act, 2013). In this case, 
there is a clear risk of capital impairment to UIAHs; whether they have understood it or not 
is another matter. 
One may observe that there are moral hazards involved in a retail finance product such as 
this because the customers do not necessarily understand the product, and even the bank 
staff who are selling the product may not necessarily understand it, and may not explain it 
clearly either, as they may simply want to sell the product. Moral hazard is understandable 
in conventional finance, which is not based on ethical principles, but IBs are holding 
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themselves out as offering ethically principled products. The view is formed that UIAHs do 
not deserve more than the rate on conventional deposits. The whole model used in 
Mudarabah appears to be designed to pay a low return to UIAHs for the benefit of the 
shareholders. 
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 - Restricted Investment Accounts 
(Special Case) 
A.1 Introduction 
Restricted profit-sharing investment accounts (RPSIAs) have certain CG issues, resulting 
from the absence of a separate legal entity to hold their funds. Therefore, this section will 
discuss the CG issues concerning RPSIAs. Since it is just a sub-fund of the bank, there is no 
protection of the type conventional investors in collective investment schemes would 
expect to have. For example, there is no board of trustees to represent RPSIAs, and they 
are at the mercy of the management of the bank. However, there is no commingling of the 
funds, and in a sense it is a less complicated problem for CG than UPSIAs, and a less 
interesting issue in the literature. 
A.2 Restricted Investment Accounts of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is a special case, since they only use restricted investment accounts even 
though they still use Mudarabah to mobilise the funds of the restricted investment account 
holders (RIAHs) and behave more like UIAHs. Therefore, it is more appropriate to separate 
the Saudi Arabian accounts from those of other countries, who use the UPSIAs. Restricted 
investment accounts offer a product that is low risk/low return compared to UPSIAs. While 
it is not mentioned in the annual report, the funds in an RPSIA are not commingled and it 
forms a restricted fund where asset allocation is conservative and defensive. For example, 
the fund is utilised in specific investments such as land, buildings and real estate. Usually, 
the level of funds dedicated to RPSIAs is small compared to the UPSIAs used in various 
countries by IBs. Most of the Saudi bank funds are from the current accounts. For instance, 
according to Al Rajhi Annual Report (2011), 95% of the bank’s total accounts were in the 
form of demand deposits. (See the following table.) 
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Table 4-9: Customer deposits fund at Al Rajhi 
Type of account 2011 2010 
Demand deposits 164,817,558 130,902,994 
Customer time investments 5,726,461 9,527,096 
Other customer accounts 2,885,446 2,633,947 
Total 173,429,465 143,064,037 
Source: Al Rajhi annual report 2011; demand deposits represent a non-interest current account in SAR ‘000s, 
and customer time investment is the restricted investment account. The balance of the other customer 
accounts includes margins on letters of credit and guarantees, cheques under clearance and transfers. 
 
As mentioned in the Al Rajhi Bank annual reports, the bank provides RPSIAs for customer 
deposits, although they still use Mudarabah transactions to mobilise funds on behalf of 
customers. The RPSIA is being treated by the bank as off balance sheet items. Other Saudi 
banks use Musharakah and Wakalah. Therefore, three methods are used in RPSIAs at Saudi 
banks: 
1. Mudarabah: where depositors theoretically absorb all losses except in the case of 
misconduct and negligence, and the bank does not have any money in the product 
but does lose work and time. The bank shares the profit and may reach up to 70% 
of the profit according to some annual reports, which comes very close to a rip-off 
because the bank can get away with paying the minimum to depositors and 
pocketing the rest by using accounting tricks. 
2. Musharakah: more like a conventional partnership, involving a sleeping or inactive 
partner. Both partners have to put money into the product. Therefore, both the 
bank and depositors are exposed to losses. The losses have to be proportional to the 
share of capital. The losses could be pro rata to capital. 
3. Wakalah: a sort of agency, asset management contract where asset managers get a 
fee, which is normally a percentage of the assets, plus possibly a performance 
bonus. In a sense, Wakalah tends to operate like Mudarabah because the agent has 
no money in the product and the way the fee is calculated may take account of the 
profit being generated.  
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A.3 RPSIA Finding 
Al Rajhi Bank offers a low-risk deposit type of product that is a restricted investment 
account and presumably cannot commingle the fund with other types of funds. The asset is 
off a balance sheet, making it more like a managed fund, but asset allocation is designed to 
produce a safe return. However, the returns on the restricted account tend to be more like 
those of UPSIAs in practice. The CV of UIAHs at Saudi banks that use RPSIA is still high 
compared to the shareholders’ and acts in the same way as that of UPSIAs. For example, Al 
Rajhi Bank deals with Mudarabah and its CV for UIAHs is higher than shareholders. Aljazira 
Bank offers Shari’ah-compliant banking products (non-interest based) (Aljazira, 2011), 
which are approved by its Shari’ah supervisory board, such as Murabahah,66 Ijarah,67 
Musharakah and Tawarruq68 and have higher CV for relating to UIAHs than for 
shareholders. The other two banks use Musharakah or Wakalah and their CV for UIAHs is 
lower. 
Table 4-10: CV for Saudi Arabian banks (RPSIA) 
Bank according to Jurisdiction Shareholders’ CV  UIAHs CV Observations 
Albilad Bank 200.73% 94.07% 8 
Alinma Bank 69.44% 18.39% 4 
Aljazira Bank 97.18% 115.37% 6 
Alrajhi Bank 33.10% 43.28% 8 
Higher CVs for RIAHs are shown in green. 50% of RPSIAs have higher CV than shareholders, which indicates 
that the RIAHs received lower risk-adjusted returns compared to shareholders.  This implies that RIAHs are 
exposed to higher relative risk with lower returns and that RIAHs are not well compensated for the degree of 
risk they expose with. This also raises some important governance issues. 
                                                     
 
66 According to Aljazira Bank’s (2011) annual report, Murabahah is an agreement whereby the bank sells to a 
customer a commodity or an asset, which the bank has purchased and acquired based on a promise received 
from the customer to buy. The selling price comprises the cost plus an agreed profit margin (Aljazira, 2011). 
67 Ijarah is an agreement whereby the bank, acting as a lessor, purchases or constructs an asset for lease 
according to the customer’s (lessee’s) request, based on his/her promise to lease the asset for an agreed rent 
and a specific period that could end by transfer of the ownership of the leased asset to the lessee. 
68 Tawarruq is a form of Murabahah transaction where the bank purchases a commodity and sells it to the 
customer. The customer sells the underlying commodity at spot price and uses the proceeds for his financing 
requirements. 
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The type of restricted investment account used by some Saudi banks is intended to be a 
Shari’ah-compliant alternative to a conventional deposit account offering low risk/low 
return. However, the numbers for the Saudi banks seem to work out rather similarly to 
those for UPSIAs. Even though the bank does not mention that there is commingling of the 
fund, theoretically it is possible for the bank to invest in the same fund. For example, a 
couple of the banks mentioned Musharakah, which indicates that the banks have invested 
in the same fund. Also, the fund is supposed to be raised for the purpose of investment and 
to make a profit that would later be shared. In addition, insufficient transparency has been 
noted in Saudi banks; for example, the annual report does not mention the Mudarib share 
and we cannot assume the level of the fees or how they are calculated. 
The finding of the coefficient of variation of the Saudi banks indicates that Aljazira and Al 
Rajhi banks have a higher CV for RIAHs than for shareholders, which again indicates that 
RIAHs are not compensated for the level of risk they are exposed to. Al Rajhi Bank, which is 
a leading bank in Islamic finance, has a CV for RIAHs of 43.28% and CV for the shareholders 
of 33.10%. The depositors in these banks are getting low rates of return compared to the 
higher risk they are faced with, keeping in mind that RPSIA holders can still lose their money 
in the investment by the bank. Consequently, the results for the CV of RPSIAs were not 
distinct from the UIAHs’ results. Both types of products seem to be unfair in paying low 
rates of return to UIAHs, who are exposed to a higher level of risk, which works against the 
theory of risk–return trade-off. 
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 - Methods to Calculate UIAHs’ 
Returns 
 
B.1 Other Methods to Calculate UIAHs Returns for Dubai Islamic Bank 2012 
As mentioned in chapter 4 section 4.7.2 that there are other methods used by IBs to 
calculate UIAHs returns.  Method 2 involves adjusting the payout figure by adding the 
amount that is allocated but not yet distributed for the current year and subtracting the 
amount allocated in the previous year but distributed in the current year. 
UIAHs’ return = 612,542/47,891,453 ( = average of 48,800,391 and 46,982,514) = 1.279% 
Profit distributed to depositors = investment and savings deposits from customers (note 
18(d)) + depositors’ share of profit payable for current year (note 18(d)) - depositors’ 
share of profit payable for previous year (note 18(d)) 
Profit attributable to depositors = 612,542 + 113,676 – 158,522 = 567,778 
UIAHs’ return = 567,778/47,891,453 = 1.186% 
B.2 UIAHs Method 3 for Dubai Islamic Bank 2012 
This method involves using the amount of profit actually paid out after transfers to the IRR, 
which may not be very accurate, however for the illustration purposes we thought to 
include it. 
Profit distributed to depositors = profit paid during the year - Wakalah and other 
investment deposits from banks and customers - profit accrued on Sukuk financing 
instruments 
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Table B-1: Movement of depositors’ share of profit 
Description 2012 2011 
Depositors’ share of profit for the year (note 43) 612,542 699,941 
Net transfer to depositors’ investment risk reserve IRR (note 18 (C)) (33,305) (33,647) 
Sub total 579,237 666,294 
Less: Amount paid during the year (465,561) (507,772) 
Balance at 31 December (note 18 (a)) 113,676 158,522 
Movement of depositors’ share of profit payable during the years ending 31 December 2012 and 2011. 
 
Profit distributed to depositors = 465,561 + 113,676 – 158,522 = 42,0715 
UIAHs’ return = 420,715/average 48,800,391 + 46,982,514 = 0.879% 
B.3 Concerns with other Calculation Methods 
If we take the profit paid during the year only, such as in method 3, and deduct the Wakalah 
and Sukuk amounts that contain the year’s undistributed profit for Wakalah and Sukuk only, 
this will not give an accurate profit. See table below: 
Table B-2: Another movement of depositors’ share of profit 
Description 2010 2009 
Share for the year 1,435,631 1,739,197 
Less: Pertaining to depositors' profit equalization provision (note 53) (511) (II ,636) 
Transfer from depositors' profit equalization provision PER (note 53) 42,000 195,500 
Total 1,477,120 1,923,061 
Less: Paid during the year (1,147,192) (1,558,921) 
Depositors' share of profit payable (note 25) 329,928 364,140 
Investment and savings deposits from customers 996,491 1,176,329 
Wakalah and other investment deposits from banks and customers 409,884 529,138 
Profit accrued on Sukuk financing instrument 29,256 33,730 
Total 1,435,631 1,739,197 
Source: annual report of Dubai Islamic Bank 2012, in AED ’000s. For more information, see note 43 in Dubai 
Islamic Bank’s 2012 annual report. 
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Profit distributed to depositors 2010 = 1,147,192 - 409,884 – 29,256 = 708,052 
UIAHs’ return = 708,052/average of 48,800,391 and 46,982,514 = 1.443% 
 Compared to 2010, UIAHs’ return in method 1 of 2.03% includes only the individual 
customers and contains undistributed profit to individual UIAHs only. 
On the other hand, if we take the profit payout for investment and savings deposits from 
customers plus depositors’ share of profit payable for current year less depositors’ share of 
profit payable for previous year,69 this, again, will not give an accurate profit figure, since 
the depositors’ share of the profit payable is already included in the denominator. (See table 
4-2, customers’ deposits.) 
Customers’ deposits: 66,800,852 - 17,831,454 - 169,007 = 48,800,391 
                                                     
 
69 The numbers for payout are adjusted to take account of the part of this year’s profit that is distributed next 
year, minus the part of last year’s profit that is distributed this year. 
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Chapter Five: The Impact of CG on Return 
Difference 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the extent to which some CG and financial variables explain the 
difference in rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs, using panel data analysis. 
The benefit of using the panel data regression is that it has the dimension of both time-
series and cross-sectional data, which increases the sample size considerably, with less 
collinearity among variables, while increasing the degrees of freedom (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Time-series data is collected over time on one or more variables; cross-sectional data 
involves one or more variables collected at a single point in time (Brooks, 2008). Therefore, 
the use of panel data would increase the number of observations that fit the model. For 
example, if we use time-series data, we have only 12 observations, which would be 
insufficient and would not allow sufficient degrees of freedom to run a regression. On the 
other hand, if we use cross-sectional data we only have 28 observations; this is because, to 
calculate for each bank the coefficient of variation (CV), which is standard deviation (SD) 
over the mean, we need to calculate each year’s average return and its corresponding SD. 
Therefore, neither time series nor cross section would provide results that might fit a model. 
Through using panel data, we will obtain about 250 observations;70 however, in order to do 
that we need a proxy for the CV. As indicated below, the difference in the rates of return 
between shareholders and UIAHs would be a good proxy since there is a strong correlation 
between the CV and the difference in the rates of return; in addition, the denominator of 
the CV is the average return of the entire period for each bank.  
                                                     
 
70 Only cover retail banks that deal with UPSIAs, not including any investment banks, Islamic windows, or non-
retail banks in GCC and Malaysia. For example, Kuwait has about 18 IFIs, and among them are only five Islamic 
banks that deal with UPSIAs (one just recently emerged). We use all the retail banks except the most recent 
since it does not have data for comparison. 
Chapter 5        The Impact of CG in Return Difference 
 108 
Furthermore, panel data regression has the benefit of taking heterogeneity into account 
(since panel regression relates to individuals over time) by explicitly allowing individual 
specific variables (Gujarati, 2012). It is more effective to measure the effects between 
variables and enrich empirical analysis, which cannot usually be done using time series or 
cross-sectional analysis by themselves. Another good reason to use panel data regression 
(especially in Islamic finance, where most IBs are relatively new or recently converted to 
Islamic banking) is that such banks may not have sufficient data for comparison, and 
therefore it would be advisable to use the panel data approach to reduce the effect of the 
small number of observations. Since not all banks in our sample have existed for 12 years, 
our data will be unbalanced.71 Using panel data regressions will be a better estimator with 
the type of data observed than just time series or cross-sectional analysis as a single 
regression, to compare the difference in rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs 
as a dependent variable. For example, using a fixed effects model in the panel regressions 
would differentiate the intercept associated with each bank (such as bank jurisdiction or 
management policy), providing a better estimator of the returns in different IBs. Similarly, 
rates of return may depend on the profitability of the bank in different geographical 
markets and on the CG practices used in each bank, which also could be included in the 
panel data model as independent variables that may affect the dependent variable, namely, 
the difference in the rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs. 
5.2  Specific Research Aims and Objectives of this Chapter 
Investors usually invest some of their wealth for expected return in the future, bearing the 
risk associated with investments. Even though there is a difference between the expected 
return and the actual return received, the higher risk assets typically offer higher expected 
return (Bodie et al., 2011). Finance theory (risk–return trade-off) suggests an increase in risk 
is usually accompanied by an increase in returns, i.e. a positive risk–return relationship. 
                                                     
 
71 Because we do not have the same number of time-series observations (number of years observed) for each 
cross-sectional element (number of banks), there are fewer observations for some banks than for others. 
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Therefore, by examining this trade-off to compare the return to both shareholders and 
UIAHs (since they both share the same risk in the commingled funds) we can examine the 
risk-adjusted returns in our model.  Therefore, the aim here is to conduct an empirical study 
applying a panel data model to test certain relevant CG variables which could have 
influenced the difference in rates of return that was tested in chapter 4. 
By applying panel data, we can ascertain if any control variables influence the proxy 
measures for spread in CVs. What we are seeking here via the proxies is explanations of 
why the CV of the UIAHs is greater than the CV of shareholders in a number of cases, since 
this is an issue for CG. If we take the CV of return to equity holders and deduct the CV of 
the return to UIAHs, we would expect to find a difference that is positive or zero. Since the 
denominator of the CV is the mean return, we use as proxy measures the differences in the 
rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs. 
One issue is that if we look at the mean percentage payouts to UIAHs, they are all very low. 
For example, if we look at the way the CV is calculated (SD/mean) and if the bank is paying 
a return of only 2% to UIAHs, which is a low mean, then it does not take much SD to produce 
a big CV. Thus, what drives the higher CV for UIAHs is the much lower payout to UIAHs, and 
the shareholders receive substantially bigger payouts that can absorb more variability, in 
the sense that, as the payout is bigger, the denominator can absorb a bigger SD. Given the 
role of the low rates of return to UIAHs in driving a higher CV for UIAHs, this raises the 
question of why the rates of return are low. To answer this question, it is perhaps better to 
compare the rates of return on conventional deposits offered by the conventional banks in 
various countries with the rates of return for the UIAHs. In fact, according to a study by 
Diaw and Mbow (2011), some of the IBs match what the conventional banks are paying, 
which might be considered normal from a competitive standpoint. However, considering 
the difference in the level of risk taken by the depositors in both type of banks, we would 
expect that IBs would pay significantly higher returns to UIAHs on average, although there 
would be variation in returns between years. 
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Since we are testing the actual payout to UIAHs then we have to consider the negative 
returns (outliers) to shareholders because the minimum payout to UIAHs cannot be less 
than zero (although an underlying loss might have occurred).72 This may lead to the 
question of whether the real variability of returns is actually greater. This may be the case 
but, if so, what exactly happened to the UIAHs’ returns? There could be losses which reduce 
UIAHs’ capital but these losses are not disclosed because of the way returns to UIAHs are 
calculated and the use of smoothing techniques (including IRRs and PERs) by IBs. We cannot 
actually see if there have been any losses since it is not visible information to the public. For 
example, the 2009 annual report of Al Baraka Bank, based in Bahrain, showed a loss of 
US$26,463,032; however, the bank still paid out a 5.62% share of profit to UIAHs after its 
Mudarib fee and transfer from reserves. Therefore, although a loss may occur at a particular 
bank in a specific year, because of the pooling effect, which entails a loss for the 
shareholders but not for UIAHs, at Al Baraka bank, the UIAHs showed a positive result 
because of smoothing. 
Even if we keep the negative returns in ROE, there would be differences in returns, and 
shareholders would mostly have higher returns (see table 4-4, p. 87). On average, 
shareholders would have 8% and UIAHs would have 3%, but for comparability we will 
substitute the negative outliers of ROE (for shareholders) with zero as we did for the 
calculation of the CVs (see chapter 4), in order to be consistent and gain a meaningful result, 
as explained in more depth later.73 On this basis, the average rate of return to shareholders 
is 11%. Thus, the key question is: 
1. To what extent would CG and non-CG variables explain the differences in rates of 
return between shareholders and UIAHs? 
                                                     
 
72 See methods to calculate ROE in Appendix C to chapter 5. 
73 It is true that UIAHs’ actual payout cannot be negative (although there may be a loss) but for shareholders 
there can be a negative ROE. Likewise, stock market returns can be negative. 
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For example, country could be a non-CG factor because regulators (central banks) in 
different countries may have different policies. Country as an external factor would be 
imposed rather than being chosen. Bahrain, for instance, does have a special law for Islamic 
finance. However, Saudi Arabia does not yet have one, and the UAE only recently issued a 
law dedicated to IBs. On the other hand, anything that deals with the BOD contains an 
element of choice. For example, in the sample countries, as per central bank regulations 
and IFSB-3 (2006) recommendations, there is the question of whether the BOD sets up a 
governance committee attached to itself, which could be addressed by analysing the annual 
report. Another characteristic of the BOD is the proportion of the non-executive directors, 
board size and CEO-chair duality as elements of independent variable. In contrast, Shari’ah 
boards of IBs deal with the Shari’ah compliance of products (KFH-Bahrain, 2011); these 
activities of the IBs are mentioned in their annual reports.74 
Since the BOD has the fiduciary responsibility and is expected (with the senior management 
which is answerable to it) to create value for shareholders, as well as protecting the 
interests and rights of other stakeholders such as UIAHs (IFSB-3, 2006), this research focuses 
on some CG vehicles such as leadership structure (CEO-chair duality and proportion of non-
executive directors). In terms of Islamic banking, one reason why central banks’ regulations 
exist is because regulatory and supervisory authorities are responsible for making sure an 
adequate CG framework is in place to protect the interests of other stakeholders, such as 
the rights of UIAHs. Therefore, the regressions may show whether the control variables 
                                                     
 
74 KFH-Bahrain mentioned in their 2011 annual report that ‘The Shari’ah Fatwa & Supervisory Board is 
responsible for ensuring that all the products, services, investments and related policies and agreements of 
the Bank are in compliance with Shari’ah rules and principles (including AAOIFI standards). Before launching 
any new products or services, the related policies and agreements shall be verified by the Shari’ah Fatwa & 
Supervisory Board in coordination with the senior management. It is the responsibility of the Shari’ah Fatwa 
& Supervisory Board to provide guidelines, formulate policies and conduct annual Shari’ah audits in order to 
ensure the Bank’s compliance with all Shari’ah principles. Brief responsibilities of the Shari’ah Fatwa & 
Supervisory Board are outlined in the Articles of Association’. 
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have any explanatory power for the differences in the rates of return75. IBs have a fiduciary 
duty towards UIAHs no less than to shareholders, as mentioned in IFSB-3 and other IFSB 
standards (IFSB-3, 2006).  
 
5.3 Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
The correlation coefficient can show that there is a relationship between two variables, and 
the value of the correlation coefficient lies in the range -1 ≤ r ≤ +1 (Mann, 2011), measuring 
the degree of linear association between the two variables (Brooks, 2008). As noted above, 
the difference in mean levels of return between the banks is a main driver of the differences 
in CVs. Thus, we show in Figure 5-1 on page 118 that there is a high correlation (nearly 60%) 
between the two variables, which allows us to use the difference in returns as a proxy to 
capture the variability in CV and see whether any CG variables help to explain a high level 
of CV in the UIAHs.76  
5.3.1 Rationale for Adjusting ROE Outliers 
The results of the CV calculations remain the same as in the previous chapter, as in a few 
cases a negative ROE return for shareholders was replaced with zero (adjusting the losses 
to zero), for two reasons. First, if we end up with a mean result of less than zero for a bank 
for the time series, then we cannot calculate a meaningful CV of the returns for that bank, 
since a negative CV cannot be interpreted. Hence, we have to adjust some large losses 
                                                     
 
75 The differences of the level of returns were used as a proxy for the differences in CVs, because of the way 
CV is calculated, which gives one CV for each bank in the entire period. While neither time series nor cross 
section would provide results that might fit a model, by applying panel data, we get about 250 observations. 
The difference in the returns between shareholders and UIAHs would be a good proxy while there is a strong 
correlation between the CV and the difference in the return.  
76 Correlation between the difference in returns and the difference in CV, as shown in the tables at the end of 
chapter 5 in Appendix D, where the results of the correlation coefficient between column 8 (difference in CV 
between shareholders and UIAHs) and column 9 (difference in returns between shareholders and UIAHs) 
equal -59.2%, representing a relatively strong negative relationship. For example, when the difference in 
UIAHs’ CV tends toward negative, the difference in returns tends toward positive. 
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(outliers) to avoid having a negative CV or huge positive CV. Second, the way that UIAHs’ 
return is calculated eliminates any negative results, because even if there are losses 
(impairment of capital) these are not visible as we simply look at the actual payout rather 
than the impact on the UIAHs’ capital. For example, when the bank uses PERs, IRRs and all 
the smoothing devices, any losses would not be recognised or disclosed, even though the 
IFSB has recommended the disclosure of the smoothing techniques used by IBs (IFSB-GN3, 
2010). In other words, the time-series returns to UIAHs are to a significant degree the results 
of management decisions on accounting treatment, by virtue of which no negative returns 
are reported. Therefore, to achieve comparability it is preferable to do the same thing to 
the time series of accounting returns to shareholders. In addition, both the CV mean and 
returns mean for shareholders were adjusted (where a loss is converted to a zero result), 
which makes the data in this chapter consistent with each other77 and with those in chapter 
4. 
5.3.2 Treatment of ROE Outliers 
A total of 24 losses out of 247 ROE observations are adjusted,78 where all shareholders’ 
losses are converted to zero. It might be argued that the semi-adjusted ROE (removing 
losses only if they are outliers and producing negative CV) would be more appropriate, as 
removing all the losses, including the normal losses, may take information out of the data. 
However, when there is a loss to the bank, given the argument about the profit sharing, 
there should also be a loss to the UIAHs; yet this loss is covered up by the use of reserves. 
As the losses to the UIAHs are being covered up, then arguably it is reasonable to remove 
                                                     
 
77 The results of the unadjusted ROE would be in chapter 5’s Appendix C, Table 5-14, where ROA is still the 
main player, and 𝑅2 = 85%, even with a high number of outliers in the negative ROE. For example, in 2006, 
the bank Islam Malaysia Berhad had a negative ROE for more than %573 to shareholders, which produced a 
big outlier. Therefore, for better comparability to UIAHs, we prefer to use adjusted accounting ROE due to the 
reasons already mentioned. Also if there is no profit to shareholders then there will be no profit to UIAHs 
either, but because of smoothing devices such as PERs and IRRs. 
78 See Appendix C at the end of chapter 5 for more detailed calculations. 
 
Chapter 5        The Impact of CG in Return Difference 
 114 
the losses to shareholders (negative ROEs) to increase the comparability. A more valid 
comparison, if available, would be actual losses to the UIAHs, but these cannot be accessed 
due to the lack of transparency of the UIAHs’ data and due to losses having been covered 
up by the use of reserves. 
In addition, if we do not fully adjust the ROE for losses and simply remove the negative 
outliers, we still get some outliers in the CVs, because some banks would have a positive CV 
with a very small mean return, which produces an enormous positive CV.79 For example, 
Boubyan Bank had a negative ROE in 2009 of -49%, and if we calculate the mean ROE and 
the CV by including the 2009 ROE, it would give a CV of 13996.42%, which is again an outlier 
but on the positive side. Therefore, this is a further reason for using fully adjusted ROE 
rather than semi-adjusted ROE and, for a reasonable comparison to UIAHs’ CV, these 
outliers should also be adjusted to avoid extreme positive ROEs. 
On the other hand, some might argue that adjusted ROE does not give a true picture when 
we look at the shareholders’ rates of return, as this understates the variability of the 
shareholders’ returns by taking out all the losses. We have two different situations: the 
comparison with rates of payout to UIAHs, since it is the only information available from 
the annual report, and the comparison with accounting rates of return, which are not the 
same thing as the rates of payout. Thus, as noted above, since the UIAHs’ returns that are 
reported exclude any losses (using the IRR where necessary), for the sake of comparability 
it is logical to likewise adjust the shareholders’ returns to exclude losses. Thus, the ROE of 
the shareholders and the return to the UIAHs are both accounting returns, although the 
accounting for the UIAHs is subject to smoothing and corresponds to actual payouts. 
                                                     
 
79 See Table 5-15, Appendix C. 
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However, the other approaches (unadjusted and semi-adjusted ROE test) appear in 
Appendix C to chapter 5. The objective is to show both methods of treating ROE and the 
results of using each method. These do not affect the conclusions. 
 
Table 5-1: Adjusted accounting returns to shareholders as percentages 
Bank 2002 2003 2004 2005 200
6 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Bank ROE Ave 
Mean BARK NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.014 0.000 0.031 0.011 0.000 0.006 1.04% 
SALM NA NA NA NA 0.1
20 
0.156 0.154 0.075 0.036 0.002 0.051 0.056 8.13% 
BAHN 0.058 0.063 0.080 0.118 0.1
78 
0.191 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 7.47% 
ITHM NA NA 0.160 0.158 0.3
34 
0.111 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.86% 
KHAJ NA NA NA 0.121 0.2
09 
0.235 0.200 0.023 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.000 8.88% 
KFHB 0.068 0.087 0.238 0.261 0.2
67 
0.258 0.150 0.009 0.021 0.019 0.026 0.015 11.81% 
AHLI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.120 0.124 0.141 0.139 13.10% 
BOU NA NA NA 0.064 0.0
91 
0.145 0.014 0.000 0.038 0.033 0.040 0.051 5.30% 
KFH 0.208 0.213 0.244 0.256 0.2
49 
0.288 0.128 0.096 0.084 0.062 0.067 0.076 16.42% 
KIB NA NA NA NA 0.0
67 
0.120 0.123 0.000 0.091 0.054 0.062 0.060 7.19% 
MASF NA NA NA NA NA 0.231 0.169 0.151 0.185 0.180 0.166 0.177 18.00% 
QATR 0.239 0.301 0.288 0.285 0.3
19 
0.283 0.279 0.164 0.147 0.134 0.109 0.114 22.19% 
DHABI NA NA 0.082 0.196 0.2
39 
0.188 0.154 0.014 0.154 0.139 0.113 0.113 13.92% 
DUBAI 0.102 0.143 0.197 0.317 0.2
55 
0.264 0.162 0.136 0.060 0.109 0.123 0.135 16.69% 
EMIT NA NA 0.024 0.061 0.1
29 
0.208 0.275 0.060 0.022 0.000 0.032 0.041 8.51% 
SHAJ NA NA NA 0.088 0.0
95 
0.139 0.073 0.062 0.062 0.057 0.061 0.068 7.85% 
AFFN NA NA NA NA NA 0.182 0.112 0.099 0.063 0.109 0.130 0.087 11.19% 
ALLN NA NA NA NA NA 0.046 0.046 0.223 0.127 0.143 0.098 0.090 11.04% 
ISLM 0.033 0.073 0.066 0.000 0.0
00 
0.631 0.331 0.114 0.204 0.141 0.146 0.153 15.76% 
MUAT 0.028 0.010 0.000 0.063 0.1
17 
0.066 0.044 0.082 0.074 0.100 0.060 0.060 5.88% 
CIMB NA NA NA 0.000 0.0
17 
0.102 0.103 0.153 0.273 0.206 0.188 0.146 13.19% 
HONG NA NA NA NA 0.0
80 
0.100 0.101 0.106 0.108 0.079 0.110 0.180 10.79% 
KFHM NA NA NA 0.001 0.0
20 
0.047 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.063 2.41% 
MAY NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.069 0.168 0.096 0.100 0.205 0.191 13.83% 
OCBC NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.000 0.085 0.094 0.065 0.117 0.202 9.38% 
PUBC NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.085 0.278 0.238 0.232 0.187 0.146 19.45% 
RHB NA NA NA 0.073 0.1
42 
0.170 0.109 0.073 0.072 0.084 0.103 0.089 10.17% 
STAD NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.015 0.050 0.125 0.120 0.132 0.092 8.89% 
Note: for a suitable comparison to UIAHs’ rates of return, we prefer to substitute all the negative ROEs with 
zero as described above (24 observations out of 247). However, the unadjusted and semi-adjusted calculation 
results are presented in Appendix C to chapter 5. The table shows the percentage return on equity for the 
shareholders in each tested bank. 
 
Table 5-1 above shows the annual rates of return to shareholders (ROE) for each bank, 
which are used to calculate the mean rates of return to shareholders, for comparison with 
the UIAHs’ returns in table 5-2. Correspondingly, in table 5-2, below, when UIAHs have a 
higher CV (UIAHs are not ‘treated well’ in returns), the difference in CV between 
shareholders and UIAHs is negative. Also, when the CV difference is negative, the difference 
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in rates of return would be high, meaning shareholders enjoy a larger rate of return 
compared to a lower rate of return to UIAHs; this will result in a strong negative relationship 
between CV and returns. Therefore, a high CV for UIAHs also accompanies a low rate of 
return to them. As already noted, a low rate of return produces a small denominator for the 
CV, which cannot absorb much variance without producing a large CV. 
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Table 5-2: Rates of return and coefficients of variation for shareholders and UIAHs 
2002-2013 Shareholders UIAHs Differences (shareholders – UIAH) 
IBs Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean diff CV diff 
BARK 1.04% 1.16% 111.65% 3.18% 1.07% 33.65% -2.14% 78.00% 
SALM 8.13% 5.66% 69.62% 2.19% 1.87% 85.02% 5.94% -15.40% 
BAHN 7.47% 6.84% 91.64% 3.18% 0.59% 18.71% 4.29% 72.93% 
ITHM 7.86% 11.23% 142.94% 4.15% 0.75% 17.95% 3.70% 124.99% 
KHAJ 8.88% 10.92% 114.82% 4.53% 0.94% 20.74% 4.34% 94.08% 
KFHB 11.81% 10.92% 92.43% 3.48% 1.31% 37.56% 8.33% 54.87% 
AHLI 13.10% 1.07% 8.17% 2.19% 0.58% 26.46% 10.91% -18.29% 
BOU 5.30% 4.37% 82.49% 2.83% 1.59% 56.27% 2.46% 26.21% 
KFH 16.42% 8.62% 52.49% 3.53% 1.97% 55.80% 12.89% -3.31% 
KIB 7.19% 3.96% 81.35% 2.79% 1.23% 44.27% 4.41% 37.08% 
MASF 18.00% 2.52% 13.98% 3.24% 1.93% 59.44% 14.75% -45.46% 
QATR 22.19% 8.09% 36.47% 3.99% 1.68% 42.12% 18.20% -5.66% 
DHABI 13.92% 6.34% 45.54% 3.17% 2.46% 77.51% 10.75% -31.97% 
DUBAI 16.69% 7.61% 45.62% 2.60% 1.25% 48.01% 14.09% -2.38% 
EMIT 8.51% 9.06% 106.39% 2.32% 1.10% 47.39% 6.19% 59.01% 
SHAJ 7.85% 2.62% 33.40% 3.79% 1.21% 31.88% 4.05% 1.52% 
AFFN 11.19% 3.77% 33.71% 2.86% 0.63% 22.08% 8.32% 11.63% 
ALLN 11.04% 6.19% 56.04% 3.06% 0.82% 26.88% 7.99% 29.16% 
ISLM 15.76% 17.57% 111.52% 2.48% 0.92% 37.18% 13.27% 74.35% 
MUAT 5.88% 3.43% 58.37% 2.71% 0.43% 15.98% 3.17% 42.39% 
CIMB 13.19% 8.75% 66.33% 3.22% 1.28% 39.75% 9.97% 26.58% 
HONG 10.79% 3.15% 29.16% 3.19% 0.59% 18.35% 7.60% 10.81% 
KFHM 2.41% 2.50% 104.05% 2.28% 1.01% 44.38% 0.12% 59.67% 
MAY 13.83% 5.68% 41.10% 2.66% 1.22% 45.84% 11.17% -4.74% 
OCBC 9.38% 6.60% 70.37% 3.26% 1.48% 45.35% 6.12% 25.02% 
PUBC 19.45% 7.02% 36.09% 2.16% 1.08% 50.11% 17.29% -14.02% 
RHB 10.17% 3.41% 33.52% 3.35% 0.59% 17.49% 6.82% 16.03% 
STAD 8.89% 4.71% 53.00% 3.87% 1.52% 39.28% 5.02% 13.72% 
Note: CV = standard deviation over the mean rate of return as a statistical tool to measure risk-adjusted rates 
of return. There are nine negative (in red) differences between shareholders’ and UIAHs’ CVs, which indicates 
that UIAHs are not treated fairly in rates of return. Shareholders ROE are adjusted to be comparable with 
UIAHs’ rates of return (shareholders’ negative annual returns adjusted to zero). 
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Figure 5-1: Correlation between the differences in CV and the differences in returns 
 
The graph shows the correlation between the differences in the coefficient of variation (shareholders’ CV – 
UIAHs’ CV), and differences in rates of return (shareholders’ rates of return – UIAHs’ rates of return). The 
dataset is scattered where relationship across time and across banks is indirect. The slope of the line is 
negative, indicating a fairly strong linear correlation where (r) is -59.2%. The point here is to show that the 
dependent variable ‘Return difference’ is a good proxy for the CV difference. 
 
According to the rule of thumb used by statisticians such as Mann (2011), the strength of 
relationship is considered high if it is more than 50%, since in the real world we do not 
usually encounter perfect positive or perfect negative correlation. In our case we have 
nearly -60%, which indicates that we have a relatively strong negative relationship between 
differences in rates of return as proxy and the differences in CVs that we want to test. A 
smaller difference in CVs (such that the CV of UIAHs is close to, or even greater than, the CV 
of shareholders) is associated with a higher rate of return difference. Thus, when UIAHs 
have a higher CV they will also tend to have a lower rate of return compared to 
shareholders. 
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5.3.3 The Differences in Returns for Both Stakeholders 
The t-test can show that there is a significant difference in the rates of return between 
shareholders and UIAHs. This difference in rates of return can be used as a proxy to examine 
the differences in the CV between shareholders and UIAHs, using panel data analysis, since 
there is a fairly strong correlation between them, as mentioned earlier. For example, table 
5-3 shows time-series observations, the average yearly rates of return for each individual 
bank observation (28 banks) and the means averaged across the 12 years from 2002 to 
2013.  
Table 5-3: T-test for the difference in returns by bank sample 2002–2013 
Difference between shareholders and UIAHs returns for the entire sample 
Time series mean returns by bank 
      Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean   0.11 0. 03 
Variance   0.0025 0.0000 
Observations   28 28 
Significance level   5%  
t-statistic   8.3353  
One-tail   0.0000  
t-critical one-tail   1.7011  
Two-tail   0.0000 ** 
t-critical two-tail   2.0484  
Standard deviation   0.0495 0.0062 
Coefficient of variation     0.4525  0.2026 
**The p-value is much smaller than α at the level of 5%, which indicates that there is a significant difference 
between shareholders’ and UIAHs’ returns for the entire sample of banks. It can be seen that there is a large 
difference between shareholders’ mean returns of nearly 11% versus UIAHs’ mean returns of 3%.  
The interesting part of the result is that the shareholders’ rates of return are significantly 
higher compared to UIAHs’ rates of return, even though the risk is similar in many aspects 
(Diaw and Mbow, 2011). Also, as can be seen from table 5-4 below, the larger the difference 
between shareholders’ ROE and UIAHs’ rate of return, the more likely it is that UIAHs’ CV 
will exceed the CV for shareholders. With the exception of two banks, ISLM and SALM, all 
the banks with the larger differences between the ROE and the UIAH rate of return also 
have the UIAHs’ CV exceeding that of the shareholders. 
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Table 5-4: CV and return differences 
Islamic 
banks 
Shareholders 
CV 
UIAHs 
CV 
CV 
differences 
Shareholders 
return 
UIAHs 
return 
Return 
differences 
PUBC 36.09% 50.11% -14.02% 19.45% 2.16% 17.29% 
QATR 36.47% 42.12% -5.66% 20.38% 3.82% 16.56% 
MASF 13.98% 59.44% -45.46% 18.00% 3.24% 14.75% 
DUBAI 45.62% 48.01% -2.38% 16.69% 2.60% 14.09% 
ISLM 111.52% 37.18% 74.35% 15.76% 2.48% 13.27% 
KFH 52.49% 55.80% -3.31% 16.42% 3.53% 12.89% 
MAY 41.10% 45.84% -4.74% 13.83% 2.66% 11.17% 
AHLI 8.17% 26.46% -18.29% 13.10% 2.19% 10.91% 
DHABI 45.54% 77.51% -31.97% 13.92% 3.17% 10.75% 
CIMB 66.33% 39.75% 26.58% 13.19% 3.22% 9.97% 
KFHB 92.43% 37.56% 54.87% 11.81% 3.48% 8.33% 
AFFN 33.71% 22.08% 11.63% 11.19% 2.86% 8.32% 
ALLN 56.04% 26.88% 29.16% 11.04% 3.06% 7.99% 
HONG 29.16% 18.35% 10.81% 10.79% 3.19% 7.60% 
RHB 33.52% 17.49% 16.03% 10.17% 3.35% 6.82% 
EMIT 106.39% 47.39% 59.01% 8.51% 2.32% 6.19% 
OCBC 70.37% 45.35% 25.02% 9.38% 3.26% 6.12% 
SALM 69.62% 85.02% -15.40% 8.13% 2.19% 5.94% 
STAD 53.00% 39.28% 13.72% 8.89% 3.87% 5.02% 
KIB 81.35% 44.27% 37.08% 7.19% 2.79% 4.41% 
KHAJ 114.82% 20.74% 94.08% 8.88% 4.53% 4.34% 
BAHN 91.64% 18.71% 72.93% 7.47% 3.18% 4.29% 
SHAJ 33.40% 31.88% 1.52% 7.62% 3.79% 3.82% 
ITHM 142.94% 17.95% 124.99% 7.86% 4.15% 3.70% 
MUAT 58.37% 15.98% 42.39% 5.88% 2.71% 3.17% 
BOU 82.49% 56.27% 26.21% 5.30% 2.83% 2.46% 
KFHM 104.05% 44.38% 59.67% 2.41% 2.28% 0.12% 
BARK 111.65% 33.65% 78.00% 1.04% 3.18% -2.14% 
Note: Islamic banks are sorted according to the largest difference in return. Higher return difference between 
shareholders and UIAHs tends to widen the difference in CV.  
5.4 Methodology 
Panel data analysis with a fixed effects approach is used in preference to a random effects 
model (see Appendix E to Chapter 5 for more details), to estimate a model to evaluate the 
spread in the rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs in a sample of IBs.80 As 
previously noted, funds from both types of stakeholders typically get commingled in an 
asset pool by an Islamic bank, which means that both stakeholders face the same risk. 
                                                     
 
80 Testing whether or not some of the control variables may influence the return spread between the two 
categories of stakeholders, taking account of the riskiness of the returns. 
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However, the rates of return are rather different, to say the least, although we are primarily 
interested in the differences in the rates of return as proxy measures for differences in CVs. 
As shown in the results of the preceding chapter, in one third of the sample banks, UIAHs 
were not receiving fair returns in terms of profit and risk sharing, the CVs of their rates of 
return being higher than those of the shareholders. 
The sample in the panel data regression model includes 28 IBs,81 representing different 
geographical markets such as the GCC and Malaysia over the past 12 years (2002–2013). 
However, our dataset will be unbalanced since not all the banks have 12 years of 
observations; some IBs are relatively new or have just converted to being an Islamic bank, 
and there is a minimum of four years and a maximum of 12 years per bank. Furthermore, 
the selection of this 12-year period allows us to include both good and bad years, the latter 
including the bad years following the 2008 global economic crisis, which may have a strong 
impact on the sample banks’ overall mean rates of return, and to obtain a sufficient number 
of observations to be able to conduct a meaningful regression analysis. 
In addition, we use ratios such as return on average assets (ROAA) and others such as total 
equity to total assets from the Bankscope and Bloomberg databases for the observed IBs, 
in order to be able to compare the banks’ performance and profitability and to see if these 
had any effect on the spread of rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs. The model 
would be a short panel, where N = 28 cross-section identifiers, and T = 12 years. Fixed 
effects models were employed to allow the intercept in the regression model to differ 
across sections but not over time – for example, different α values for each bank and the 
same slope over time. The panel data model would be  
 
                                                     
 
81 As mentioned in chapter 4, we are only considering retail Islamic banks that provide UPSIAs, and covering 
GCC and Malaysia, through which we cover the majority of the market; see concluding remarks in chapter 8 
for EY statistics. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Equation 5-1 
where the 𝑦𝑖𝑡, the dependent variable, is the difference in the annual rates of return 
between shareholders and UIAHs. 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the slope for each of the independent variables 
that have fixed or non-stochastic values in the repeated sample, including corporate 
governance and non-CG variables that can explain the movement or the variations of 𝑦. 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
an error term (random disturbance term), is divided into (𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡). Error term 𝑢𝑖  captures 
individual specific effects and would affect the dependent variable cross-sectionally but not 
over time – for example, bank sector, or country where the bank is located (Brooks, 2008). 
Error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the remainder disturbance that varies over time and captures the rest of 
what is unexplained about 𝑦𝑖𝑡 for the bank-specific coefficient.
82 The model would have two 
classes of stakeholders’ rates of return to compare.83 First are shareholders, using 
accounting return, i.e. ROE (for the reasons given in chapter 4). The second category of 
stakeholder is investment account holders, using the published annual returns from the 
banks’ annual reports.84 
Another model would be estimated by dividing the sample banks into two groups 
using the dummy variables; least squares dummy variables (LSDV) approach by adding the 
country dummy. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢1𝐷1𝑖 +  𝑢2𝐷2𝑖 + … + 𝑢𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Equation 5-2 
 
We expect that country would have an effect on the difference in rates of return, since 
Bahrain and Malaysia are better-regulated countries with more competition, and it would 
appear that UIAHs are treated better there than in other countries. The same independent 
                                                     
 
82 GLS weight would also be imposed to treat heteroscedasticity in the error term. 
83 UIAHs are considered stakeholders because they are investors, as well as being depositors considered as 
investors. 
84 Returns to UIAHs are not published in the stock market. 
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variables would be examined again to see their effect on the difference in returns 
(dependent variable) by controlling country variable, such as the proportion of non-
executive directors in the BOD, structure of the BOD, board size, CG committee, ROA, TETA, 
and TDTA as a mix of CG and non-CG variables to ascertain their explanatory power, if any. 
Group A would include Bahrain and Malaysia as a reference category, with the other 
countries being in group B. Also removed from the model in equation 5-2 is 𝛼 (the 
intercept), to avoid multicollinearity between the dummy variables, which refers to the 
‘dummy variable trap’.85 
5.4.1 Model 1: Panel Data – Fixed Effects Models 
Individual fixed effects panel data regression will be conducted, assuming that there is a 
correlation between some features of each bank in the sample and the other explanatory 
variables. The benefit of using a fixed effects model for the spread of the returns is that it 
allows the heterogeneity among individual banks to be reflected in the intercept for each 
bank value (𝛼𝑖) across sectional fixed effects (Gujarati, 2012). Hence, to differentiate 
between individual banks, since it is not common to have the same 𝛼 (intercept) for all 
banks, for example, each bank has a different strategy on investment, a different policy for 
returns, a different level of competition among banks, a different set of regulations in each 
country, or even a different management style. Applying (𝛼𝑖) suggests that banks may be 
different because of the special attributes of each individual bank and also captures the 
unobserved heterogeneity across individual banks that is correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Therefore, to avoid bias in the least squares estimation, it would be better to 
include the omitted or the unobserved variables, whereas the fixed effects approach is used 
to make up for those omitted variables using the dummy variable technique (Startz, 2015).  
 
                                                     
 
85 The dummy variable trap, as described by Gujarati (2012), is the situation of perfect collinearity or perfect 
multicollinearity, if there is more than one exact relationship among the variables. 
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 𝛼𝑖  =  𝛼 +  𝛾𝓏𝑖 
Equation 5-3 
 
where 𝓏 would be the unobserved variable across banks but not through time, and 
therefore we can replace 𝛼𝑖 in the original equation 5-1. 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Equation 5-4 
 
Also, it is assumed that the slope coefficient of the independent variables does not vary 
across banks or time. Applying an individual fixed effects model will show which variables 
influence the difference in rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs.  
 
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒊𝒕  (
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠’ rate of 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝐻 rate of 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
)  =  𝛼𝑖
+ 𝛽1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑂𝐷
+ 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽4 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽7 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Equation 5-5 
 
5.4.2 Research Variables 
The panel data model has been used before by different researchers, including 
Sundararajan (2011), who implemented panel data analysis for 14 IBs in 12 countries 
between (2003-2004) 3 years period, testing IAHs’ returns (dependant) variable on 
Mudarabah profit in a regression equation, to estimate the implicit weight “w” attached to 
market rates by bank management.  His research found that market rates receive a major 
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weight in the decisions on rates to be paid to IAH.  As he realized that the estimation of “w” 
could proceed a good approximation to the appropriate α needed for capital adequacy 
calculations. Also in his previous research  Sundararajan (2007), examined 14 IBs in 8 
countries, for 2 time periods (28 observations), testing the relationship of the return on IAH 
and all return on ROA, ROE and the level of risks, using multiple regression analysis on return 
to IAH. He found that IAH return have a significant positive relation to market return on 
deposit. In addition, Sundararajan found that when ROA is high the IAH return is low, and 
with ROA is low return to IAH has increase, because of smoothing technics used by IBs. ROA 
is positively correlated with ROE as well and the reserves (PER and IRR) are contributing 
factors why returns on Mudarabah always lower than equity.  
Rosly and Zaini (2008), tested 6 IBs in Malaysia and found that ROE is higher than return to 
Mudarabah, using the difference in return only (ROE – IAH return) for 2005 only.  They 
found that IAHs returns are compatible with the rate in the conventional fixed deposit.  
(Diaw and Mbow, 2011), compared the ROE and IAH return for 9 IBs in 7 countries between 
the period (2005-2009). They confirm a gap between ROE and IAH returns, despite 
similarities between ROE and IAH in terms of risk. Their test considered the mean variance 
between ROE and return to IAH, using SD to measure risk.  Diaw and Mbow also examined 
factors that may have explained the difference in return through the use of regression 
analysis for KFH case study, such as ROA to measure bank performance, TDTA and TETA for 
leverage effect. They have found that Mudarabah contract and equity share same profile in 
terms of risk but are different on how they are rewarded, for example, ROE tend to be at 
least 2 times higher than return to IAH. Also higher ROA affect ROE more than IAH, and IBs 
used local interest rate as the benchmark to determine the return rate. 
As mentioned in the literature review, one of the research interests is to look at different 
CG elements as independent variables to test whether they have explanatory power for the 
rates of return differences between shareholders and UIAHs (the dependent variable). For 
example, we examine the structure of the board of directors (BOD), including CEO-chair 
duality, non-executive directors, board size and the existence of a CG committee. From an 
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agency theory perspective, one might expect duality to have adverse effects on firm 
performance. According to Core et al. (1999) duality would increase the level of control by 
top executives over determining of the amount and structure of managerial compensation.  
Their empirical test found that duality has a negative relationship with no significant effect 
to enhance corporate performance, reporting that firms with duality have a weaker form of 
CG which lowers the value and performance of firms.  Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) found 
duality is significantly negatively associated with firm performance. Also Sanda et al. (2005) 
found a positive relationship between separating the function of leadership structure (CEO-
Chair) and the corporate performance. However sometimes in the literature duality has 
been found to have positive effects. Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that for their sample 
ROE tended to be higher when there is duality.   
Normally board size and the independent directors would have positive impact on firm 
performance but in fact some literature found a negative relationship or it does not seem 
to have any effect on performance.  For example, Abdullah and Page (2009) found a 
negative relationship between ROA and board size.  Also Kiel and Nicholson (2003) found 
that there is no relationship between corporate performance and the ratio of outside 
directors. 
In addition, we consider other financial variables such as return on assets (ROA) which is a 
common measure of corporate performance widely used in the literature.  Several studies 
show that there is a link between ROA and corporate performance, such as Adams and 
Mehran (2005); Coles et al. (2012) show that ROA as a significant accounting indicator for 
financial performance, in addition to corporate governance mechanisms.  Similarly, total 
equity to total assets (TETA) as a leverage effect measurement, and total deposits to total 
assets (TDTA) as a Mudarabah ratio86, are examined. Clearly, considering the earlier 
calculation of CV in the preceding chapter, we see that UIAHs in Bahrain and Malaysia are 
                                                     
 
86 TDTA is analogous to the TDTA ratio in conventional banks. 
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doing better on this basis than in any other country, and in these countries UIAHs stand to 
benefit from a better-behaved (more competitive and better-regulated) market. Therefore, 
in the panel data analysis Bahrain and Malaysia will be used as a country dummy reference 
variable (group A). 
 
Dependent Variable 
The difference in rates of return between the shareholders and UIAHs is a variable of 
interest in its own right and also as a proxy for the difference between the CVs. 
Return 
Spread 
Represents the dependent variable that is random or stochastic and has a 
normal probability distribution, which is the rate of return difference 
between shareholders and UIAHs in different IBs for the past 12 years. 
 
Independent Variables 
𝑁𝑂𝑁_𝐸𝑋_𝐷 Ratio of non-executive directors in the BOD. Proportion of non-executive 
members in the BOD; the data was collected from the banks’ annual 
reports, by dividing the number of non-executive directors by the total 
number of BOD members. 
LS Leadership structure; a dummy variable that takes a value of one in each 
sample bank refer to the absence of a duality role, that has a separate CEO 
and chair, and zero otherwise (duality: same chair and CEO held 
simultaneously for the bank). 
B Size The size of the BOD; total number of members on the board. 
CG COMM Existence of a CG committee. As a central banks requirement, to adopt 
best practices in the area of CG, and to have CG committee attached to the 
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BOD, as a dummy variable. It takes a value of one in the model when the 
bank has a governance committee, and zero otherwise. 
ROA Return on assets (net income/total asset) to measure the performance of 
the bank, which shows the profit earned per dollar of assets, reflecting the 
management’s ability to make profits by utilising the bank’s assets to 
achieve a good return. The data on ROA was taken from the Bankscope 
database. 
TETA Equity ratio, which is ratio of total equity to total assets, to measure the 
leverage effect. The data was acquired from the banks’ annual reports by 
dividing total equity by total assets. 
TDTA Ratio of total deposits to total assets or the Mudarabah deposit ratio 
(UPSIA/total assets). If the bank is financed largely by profit-sharing 
deposits, we expect that this might generate a big difference in return. The 
bank may use this leverage to boost the return to shareholders at the 
expense of depositors. Even when the bank gets more depositors and pays 
more returns to them, shareholders still receive a better return. 
Group B Country dummy variable, which takes a value of one for banks located in 
Bahrain and Malaysia, and zero otherwise. Having Bahrain and Malaysia as 
reference countries since both countries have the CG regulations in place 
(such as CG code) compare to the rest of the GCC countries, would 
supposedly cover all the aspect of around CG practice including CG code.  
The effect of the CG code is combine with the more competition and more 
regulation generally.  
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5.4.3 Model 2: Panel Data With Country Dummy 
Model 2 includes a country dummy to see the effect of the jurisdiction on the difference in 
return. Bahrain and Malaysia would be the reference country in group A, assuming that they 
have better-regulated markets and more competition than the other countries in the 
sample, such as Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE in group B. One would expect a country to have 
influence in the model because of differences in regulatory environment and level of 
competition, as seen in the CV results between the two groups. 
 
 
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒊𝒕 (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠’ rate 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝐻 rate of 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠)
= 𝛽1   𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑂𝐷
+ 𝛽2 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽4 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽7  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝛽5 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Equation 5-6 
 
Since heteroscedasticity is common in the panel data approach, and it is assumed that the 
error variance is heteroscedastic, generalised least squares (GLS) cross-sectional weights 
will be used to maintain the fourth assumption where the variance of the error term should 
be constant (homoscedasticity). Even though heteroscedasticity does not result in biased 
parameter estimates, the fact is that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are no longer 
the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) (Brooks, 2008). Therefore, OLS does not measure 
the smallest variance and the significance tests could be too low or too high. As noted by 
Arellano (1987), ‘the reason OLS is not optimal when heteroscedasticity is present is that it 
gives equal weight to all observations when, in fact, observations with larger disturbance 
variance contain less information than observations with smaller disturbance variance’. 
5.4.4 Hypothesis Testing 
If certain CG criteria have been met, the UIAHs might receive better treatment. For 
example, the existence of central bank regulations resulting in the presence of a governance 
committee of the BOD should be to the benefit of the UIAHs; as mentioned in IFSB-3 (2006), 
Chapter 5        The Impact of CG in Return Difference 
 130 
IBs should form such a committee to stand up for UIAHs’ rights in the BOD. The following 
table presents the hypothesis testing. 
Table 5-5: Table of hypotheses 
Variables 𝑯𝟎 𝑯𝟏 
1. Non-executive 
Directors’ Ratio 
Majority of non-executive 
members on the BOD does not 
influence the rate of return spread 
between shareholders and UIAHs 
in Islamic banks 
Majority of non-executive 
members on the BOD does 
influence the rate of return 
spread between shareholders and 
UIAHs in Islamic banks 
2. Leadership 
Structure (LS) 
Separate leadership structure is 
not associated with the rate of 
return spread 
Separate leadership structure is 
associated with the rate of return 
spread 
3. Board Size Board size does not have impact 
on the rate of return spread 
Board size does have impact on 
the rate of return spread 
4. Existing 
Central Bank 
Regulations 
Central bank regulations do not 
influence rate of return spread 
Central bank regulations do 
influence return spread on 
investment 
 Other non-governance issues 
5. ROA ROA does not have impact on the 
rate of return spread 
ROA does have impact on the rate 
of return spread 
6. TETA TETA does not have impact on the 
rate of return spread 
TETA does have impact on the 
rate of return spread 
7. TDTA TDTA does not have impact on the 
rate of return spread 
TDTA does have impact on the 
rate of return spread 
These variables are the normal CG variables apart from the last three, as non-governance variables, which 
may also have an effect on the rate of return between shareholders and UIAHs. 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
The following table shows the correlation among the explanatory variables that have been 
used in the regression model:  
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Table 5-6: Correlation between variables 
Variables NON_EX_D LS B_SIZE CG_COMM ROA TETA TDTA 
NON_EX_D 1       
LS 0.171054 1      
B_SIZE 0.010969 -0.119087 1     
CG_COMM -0.209365 0.063258 0.044993 1    
ROA 0.159385 -0.062645 0.026271 -0.072871 1   
TETA 0.014800 0.015874 0.007102 0.036326 0.555581 1  
TDTA 0.123522 0.053330 0.088444 -0.099471 -0.345796 -0.662399 1 
The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between the explanatory variables. Note that TETA and 
TDTA are somewhat correlated since both denominators are the total assets. 
Table 5-7: Simple statistics 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD 
NON_EX_D 0.8919 0.8889 1.0000 0.3333 0.1200 
LS 0.9433 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2317 
B_SIZE 8.2794 9.0000 13.0000 4.0000 1.6475 
CG_COMM 0.1660 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3728 
ROA 0.0143 0.0104 0.1139 -0.1192 0.0251 
TETA 0.1660 0.1205 0.9992 -0.0190 0.1468 
TDTA 0.6442 0.6811 1.1837 0.0000 0.2021 
Descriptive statistics for regression variables. 
The result tables below show that some variables have explanatory power on the difference 
in rates of return between the two classes of stakeholders. What is interesting in the CG 
variables is that LS and board size have different signs. On one hand, LS has a negative sign 
when there is a separate chair and CEO: the UIAHs appear to do better (i.e. the difference 
is smaller) than if the bank has CEO-chair duality (same person as CEO and chair). However, 
if we look at the historical payouts by KFH-Kuwait when they had the same chair-CEO, we 
see that the bank used to give higher rates of return to UIAHs (the bank had higher profit 
as well, and shareholders also received high ROE). But, rather than the actual rate of return 
to UIAHs, we are considering the rate of return to shareholders minus the rate of return to 
UIAHs, and the negative coefficient in LS, meaning the difference is smaller when there is a 
separate chair and CEO. This finding is in opposition to the theory of stewardship discussed 
earlier and the empirical study by Donaldson and Davis (1991), which shows that a single 
CEO-chair tends to be better, although in our case it is better for UIAHs to have separate 
CEO/chair; however, UIAHs cannot do anything to reward the management. In fact, as we 
discover later, it is mainly the ROA that is driving the results. 
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Table 5-8: Regression estimates using individual fixed effects 
Panel (A): Individual fixed effects 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Prob. 
 
Non-exe-Dirc. 0.0240 0.0333 0.4728 
 
LS -0.0412* 0.0104 0.0001 
 
Board Size 0.0061* 0.0025 0.0158 
 
CG Comm -0.0124** 0.0067 0.0649 
 
ROA 2.5539* 0.1333 0.0000 
 
TETA -0.1994* 0.0328 0.0000 
 
TDTA 0.0885* 0.0202 0.0000 
 
R-squared 83% 
   
Adjusted R-squared 80% 
   
F-statistic 29.7835 
   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
   
Mean dependent variable 
S.D. dependent variable 
0.1149 
0.1349 
   
Note: *denotes significance at the 5% level, and **denotes significance at the 10%, using GLS weights to 
control for heteroscedasticity. The table shows the panel regression for difference in returns, the dependent 
variable (shareholders’ returns minus UIAHs’ return) where all losses in ROE are converted to zero to be 
comparable with UIAHs’ time series of no loss reported.87 Sample period between 2002 and 2013; cross-
sections include 28 banks with a total panel (unbalanced) of about 250 observations.  
                                                     
 
87 See unadjusted results in the appendix C to chapter 5. 
Chapter 5        The Impact of CG in Return Difference 
 133 
Table 5-9: Regression estimates using individual fixed effects with country effect 
Panel (B): Country Dummy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
Non-exe-Dirc. 0.0398* 0.0199 0.0467 
LS -0.0356* 0.0094 0.0002 
Board Size -0.0011 0.0016 0.5071 
CG Comm -0.0149* 0.0065 0.0225 
ROA 2.8485* 0.1443 0.0000 
TETA -0.3033* 0.0346 0.0000 
TDTA 0.0441* 0.0196 0.0256 
GroupB 0.0173* 0.0057 0.0026 
R-squared 71% 
  
Adjusted R-squared 70% 
  
F-statistic 72.7514 
  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
  
Mean dependent variable 
S.D. dependent variable  
0.1085 
0.1144 
  
Note: *denotes significance at the 5% level, using GLS weights to control for heteroscedasticity. Group B 
contains Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. 
 
Table 5-8 and table 5-9 show the empirical findings of the panel data regression. Panel A 
shows the fixed effects approach of several independent variables on the difference in rates 
of return between the two stakeholders (dependent variable). The model has 𝑅2 of 83%, 
and panel A has LS, board size, ROA, TETA and a TDTA p-value of less than 5% in the model, 
all of which are significant, with CG committee significant at 10%. 
With the introduction of a country dummy in panel B, where the country dummy tends to 
capture the unobserved heterogeneity such as degree of competition and market 
efficiency, the model has a lower 𝑅2 of 71%. Individual bank fixed effects were removed 
and only group country dummy (A and B) was used for reference. For example, group B, as 
a country dummy variable, has a value of zero for countries located outside Bahrain and 
Malaysia (these two countries form group A, where the UIAHs receive a ‘better deal’ than 
in other countries), and the expectation is that country would have an effect on the 
difference in returns. In fact, group B is significant and with a positive coefficient, as 
expected, compared to group A, which implies that the countries in group B will have an 
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increased difference in rates of return; that is a bad market for UIAHs’ returns, and 
represents the impact of the country in influencing the difference in returns. The following 
table 5-10 shows the summary of the regression results: 
Table 5-10: Summary of the panel data regression 
Panel Data Variable Significant @ 5% Sign Description 
Panel A 
Panel B 
Non-Executive-D 
Not Significant 
Significant 
+ 
+ 
non-executive directors protect 
shareholders’ interest. Increase the 
difference in return 
Panel A 
Panel B 
Leadership Structure 
Separate CEO-Chair 
Significant 
- 
- 
CEO duality tends to increase the 
difference in return 
Panel A 
Panel B 
Board size 
Significant 
Not significant 
+ 
- 
More board size, increases the 
difference in return 
Panel A 
Panel B 
CG Committee 
Significant** 
Significant 
- 
- 
Existence of CG comm. reduces the 
difference in return 
Panel A 
Panel B 
ROA Significant 
+ 
+ 
the higher the ROA, the bigger the 
difference in % return between 
shareholders and IAH 
Panel A 
Panel B 
TETA Significant 
- 
- 
More TETA reduce the difference. 
The smaller the amount of equity paid 
in by shareholders, the higher the % 
return they receive 
Panel A 
Panel B 
TDTA Significant 
+ 
+ 
Higher proportion of UPSIA leads to 
a bigger Mudarib share which 
increases the difference in returns 
Panel B Country Significant + 
Group B tends to increase the 
difference in return 
** significant at 10%, GLS weights were applied in cross section to control for heteroscedasticity. The positive 
sign (+) means that the difference in rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs is more, and the (-) sign 
means that the difference is less.   
Also, the bigger the TETA, the smaller the proportion of UIAHs in the capital structure. 
Therefore, having a negative sign would be understood as indicating inverse proportionality 
of shareholders’ equity and UIAHs, and we would expect this to drive the difference in rates 
of return as a form of leverage. Similarly, TDTA is significant and positive, which is in line 
with TETA; the more deposits the UIAHs put in, the more shareholders benefit, because 
they receive a bigger Mudarib share. 
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5.6 Economic Interpretations of the Independent Variables 
The regression results for the sample of IBs show a significant ROA, (the size of the 
difference in rates of return is mainly driven by ROA with a positive sign), indicating that 
shareholders get a much higher rate of return when a bank has better performance. In other 
words, shareholders get the benefit of a higher ROA more than UIAHs do; the higher the 
ROA in the model, the bigger the difference in rates of return between shareholders and 
UIAHs, which is more beneficial for shareholders than for UIAHs. For example, if the ROA 
increases by one unit then the difference in the rates of return between shareholders and 
UIAHs increases by 2.55%, as in panel A, and 2.85%, as in panel B. This indicates that when 
ROA is high, the shareholders tend to ‘pocket’ the extra profit, simply paying the UIAHs 
more or less the rate of return associated with conventional deposit accounts. Of course, 
this might mean that the variability of rates of return for UIAHs would tend to be very low. 
In addition, the mean rate of return to UIAHs is low, which is why we see that the CV of the 
UIAHs in one third of the cases is higher than the CV of the shareholders, though not 
because the UIAHs’ rates of return are more volatile (in fact, they are less volatile). The 
difference is that UIAHs’ returns are very small, and that is what tends to drive the 
magnitude of the CV. 
This result is consistent with the general observation that a higher rate of return on assets 
benefits shareholders more than UIAHs, even though it is supposed to be a profit-sharing 
contract and both parties are supposed to be compensated accordingly and proportionally. 
Yet what could explain the case when ROA is high and the difference in rates of return gets 
bigger is the fact that the Mudarib share specified in the Mudarabah contact can be very 
high. However, when the bank performance results in a lower return on investment, the 
bank can lower this Mudarib share to avoid giving UIAHs a reason to withdraw their money. 
On the other hand, when the bank performs well the shareholders will receive a full 
Mudarib share, which could reach 70%, (Albarak annual report, 2012). Therefore, when the 
shareholders put in about 10% of the profit-sharing capital and receive 70% of the UIAHs’ 
return, this gives a powerful leverage effect. For example, if the UIAHs who contribute 60% 
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of the entire commingled fund are receiving 30% (100% - 70% Mudarib share) of the profit 
on the assets that they put in, and if the return on assets is 5% of the entire pool of funds, 
UIAHs will receive only 1.5%, which is low. On the other hand, shareholders will get 26% 
(without including the current account returns to the bank as the 30% bank share), when in 
fact shareholders contributed only 10% to the entire commingled fund and the remaining 
percentage came from the Mudarib share. The funds are usually invested in different 
projects for profit at the management’s discretion. However, in all our sample banks (see 
table 5-3 on page 119), the average percentage return to shareholders was about 11%, 
whereas the percentage return average to UIAHs was 3%, despite the fact that risk to both 
types of stakeholder is similar in many respects.  
Table 5-11 below shows the leverage effect in the hypothetical pool of funds used by some 
IBs, when the Mudarib share is 70% of profit, assuming the commingled fund is £10,000. 
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Table 5-11: The effect of commingled fund leverage at Islamic banks 
Hypothetical Pool of 
funds Proportion of fund Share Descriptions 
Current accounts as 
bank share 
30% £3000 
Share of bank and no return to 
current account depositors, 
secured capital 
UPSIA 60% £6000 
Contributed by unrestricted profit 
sharing investment account, 
unsecured capital 
Shareholders' Funds 10% £1000  
Total of commingled 
fund 
100 £10,000  
Mudarib share 70%  As stated in Mudarabah contract 
If bank achieved 5% as 
investment return out of 
a total asset of £10,000 
5% as ROA 
5% x £10,000 
£500 
For theoretical purpose, we are 
assuming the 5% return. 
UIAHs share of 5% ROA 5% x 30% x 60% 0.9% Less than 1% 
UPSIA ROI (£10,000) 0.9%*(£10,000) £90 
£500 - £90 = £410 goes to the 
bank, i.e.   the shareholders 
% return to UIAHs £90/£6000 1.5% 
Return goes to UIAHs as return 
when in fact UIAHs have 
contributed 60% of the total 
pooled fund. 
Bank's share on current 
accounts 
30% x £500 £150 
1.5% as bank share from the 5% 
ROI on current account.  UIAHs 
do not receive any return from 
this account. 
Shareholder ROI share 10% x £500 £50 
Shareholders take 0.5% plus the 
bank share of ROI 
Bank from Mudarib 
share 
70% x 60% x £500 £210 
2.10% out of the 5% goes to the 
bank as Mudarib share 
Shareholders share from 
5% 
0.5%+2.1% 2.6% 
4.1% of the 5% ROI goes to the 
shareholders or the bank 
Shareholders share of 
ROI after Mudarib share 
£50 + £210 £260 
£410 out of the £500 ROI when in 
fact shareholders contributed 
only 10% of the entire pool of 
fund 
Total return that goes to 
the 10% of Shareholders 
share 
£260/1000 26% 
Return to Shareholders = 21% 
from Mudarabah and 5% from 
current accounts 
Effect of leverage when the Mudarib share is 70% of profits, such as in Al Baraka Bank in 2011.  If the return 
on investment is £500, then UIAHs get £90, and shareholders get (£50 + bank share on current account £150 
+ bank share from Mudarib share £210 = £410). 
The above table shows the leverage effect of commingled pool funds used by IBs, where 
UIAHs contribute 60% of the entire pool and receive a rate of return of 1.5%, in other words 
the UIAHs put £6000 into the bank and only get a small rate of return as a Rabb Almaal 
share. Shareholders contribute 10% and their share of Mudarabah profits gives them a rate 
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of return of 21% on their £1,000 investment. In addition, they receive another 5% from the 
£150 return of out £500 contributed by the bank’s current accounts, from which UIAHs do 
not receive any return. As the shareholders take the risk for the current accounts and the 
UIAHs do not, it is not controversial that UIAHs are getting no return from current accounts 
in the pooled funds. However, what is controversial is that the bank takes a very high 
Mudarib share, as much as 70%, receiving a rate of return of 21% from the Mudarabah as 
against 1.5% for the UIAH, i.e. 14 times the rate, and this is called “profit sharing”. Profit 
sharing would lead us to expect that Rabb Almaal (UIAHs) would get a share of around 50%. 
As shown in Table 5-12 below, with a Mudarib share of 40% the bank would receive a rate 
of return from the Mudarabah that is 4 times that received by the UIAH (12% as against 
3%). Of course, the bank as Mudarib has no funds invested in the Mudarabah, which is why 
the use of Mudarabah by IBs has a powerful leverage effect. On the other hand, when the 
profit for the year is low, IBs use a reserve or lower the Mudarib share to smooth the return 
to UIAHs. Table 5-12 below shows the outcome when the Mudarib share is reduced from 
70% to 40%. 
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Table 5-12: The effect of commingled fund leverage at IBs when Mudarib share is 
reduced 
Hypothetical Pool of funds Proportion of fund Share Descriptions 
Current accounts as bank share 30% £3000 Share of bank and no return to current 
account depositors, secured capital 
UPSIA 60% £6000 Contributed by unrestricted profit sharing 
investment account, unsecured capital 
Shareholders' Funds 10% £1000 
 
Total of commingled fund 100 £10,000 
 
Mudarib share 40% 
 
Assuming Mudarib share have been 
reduced 
If bank achieved 5% as 
investment return out of a total 
asset of £10,000 
5% as ROA 
5% x £10,000 
£500 For theoretical purpose, we are assuming 
the 5% return. 
UIAHs share of 5% ROA 5% x 60% x 60% 1.8% Nearly 2% out of the 5% ROA goes to UIAHs 
as return 
UPSIA ROI (£10,000) 1.8%*(£10,000) £180 £500 - £180 = £320 goes to the bank, i.e.   
the shareholders 
% return to UIAHs £180/£6000 3% return to UIAHs 
Bank's share on current account 30% x £500 £150 1.5% as bank share from the 5% ROI 
Shareholder ROI share 10% x £500 £50 Shareholders take 0.5% plus the bank share 
of ROI 
Bank from Mudarib share 40% x 60% x £500 £120 1.20% out of the 5% goes to the bank as 
Mudarib share 
Shareholders share from 5% 0.5%+1.2% 1.7% 1.7% of the 5% ROI goes to the 
shareholders 
Shareholders share of ROI after 
Mudarib share 
£50 + £120 £170 £170 out of the £500 ROI when in fact 
shareholders contributed only 10% of the 
entire pool of fund 
Total return that goes to the 
10% of Shareholders share 
£170/1000 17% Return to Shareholders = 12% from 
Mudarabah + 5% from current account 
funds  
It is common to see the Mudarib share reduced in Islamic banks, especially with the historically low global 
interest rate. 
 
In reality, we see banks reduce their Mudarib share (such as in the table 5-12, which 
represents the effect of the reduction in the Mudarib share from 70% to 40%), in order to 
pay a more representative return to the UIAHs. However, where 3% is paid to UIAHs in a 
low-interest-rate environment, UIAHs face the risk of losing their capital (which is not a 
capital-certain account such as a conventional savings account). Shareholders, on the other 
hand, get 17%, which is still pretty high given the market’s low-interest-rate return record. 
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In other words, this illustrates how an IB may use techniques so that the rate of return to 
UIAHs more or less corresponds to what customers get from conventional deposits. 
At the same time, the coefficient on TETA is also significantly different from zero when the 
p-value is less than 5%, which indicates that the smaller the proportion of equity capital 
contributed by shareholders, the higher the return they receive from the bank.  When the 
shareholders’ equity is small, the bank uses other sources of funds such as UIAHs’ funds to 
finance its assets, which produces a leverage effect. At the same time, a high TDTA means 
that the bank has a bigger Mudarabah fund from which to receive a Mudarib share, and 
therefore the difference in returns between the result for the shareholders and the result 
for the UIAHs would be greater, because of the Mudarib share. The ‘ideal’ bank (from the 
perspective of maximising the ROE) would run with the lowest proportion of shareholders’ 
equity.88 Therefore, TDTA should be significant with a positive sign, because the higher the 
TDTA, the higher the profit from the Mudarib share that leads to bigger shareholders’ 
returns compared to UIAHs’ returns. 
Together with the non-CG variables, some CG variables give significant results in the panel 
data test, such as leadership structure (CEO-chair duality) and board size at 5%, and CG 
committee at 10%. However, when the country dummy was introduced in panel B, the CG 
committee variable became significant at the 5% level, but board size was no longer 
significant at this level. Also in panel B, the non-executive directors became significant. 
Therefore, when we impose the country dummy we are looking at the returns difference 
between countries and it is evident that there are some differences in the rates of return 
between shareholders and UIAHs that are affected by various explanatory variables. This 
indicates that there are differences between the two country groups that might be due to 
greater competition or a better-regulated market in certain countries. 
                                                     
 
88 This explains why there are regulatory requirements for banks’ capital adequacy and (in Basel III) a 
requirement of a minimum of 3% of equity to total exposures (the leverage ratio).  
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5.6.1 Hypothesis Testing Result 
According to the findings (see table 5-8 and table 5-9) and to the variables that have some 
impact on the difference in returns (the dependent variable), we would reject the null 
hypothesis in panel A (assuming the tested variables have no impact on the rate of return 
spread) for LS, board size, ROA, TETA and TDTA, as well as rejecting it for the CG committee 
at 10%. The board size hypothesis would only be rejected in panel A with individual fixed 
effects; however, when the country dummy is imposed in panel B, the board size becomes 
insignificant. Then, in panel B, we would reject the null hypothesis for non-executive 
directors, LS, CG committee, ROA, TETA and TDTA. For example, we reject the null 
hypothesis on ROA in both panel A and B, since ROA has a significant effect on the rates of 
return spread. 
Table 5-13: Hypothesis testing result: rejecting the null hypothesis 
Variable Panel A Panel B 
Non-exe. 
Dir. 
Not reject Reject 
LS Reject Reject 
Board 
Size 
Reject Not reject 
CG 
Committee 
Reject** Reject 
ROA Reject Reject 
TETA Reject Reject 
TDTA Reject Reject 
Note: **rejected at the 10% level of significance; the rest is at 5%. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to examine the CG issue with UPSIAs and the practice used in IBs, 
comparing the rates of return paid to shareholders with those paid to UIAH. It looks at the 
implications of the CG effect on the differences in rates of return between shareholders and 
UIAHs, and, hence, by proxy, the effect of the CG on the CV spread, by including different 
CG variables and non-CG variables together that impact differently on the difference in 
return. Moreover, the model uses dummy variables, examining the effect of the country 
dummy (for example, in panel B regression) Bahrain follows the AAIOFI financial reporting 
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standards as part of a better regulated market, to compare the IBs according to their 
jurisdiction as a well-regulated and more transparent market group as (group A), where the 
UIAHs have a better deal according to the CV results, with the less-regulated market (group 
B) where the UIAHs are not doing so well. The dummies as a group are significant and affect 
the significance pattern of other variables. For example, the presence of the country 
dummy makes CG committee variable become significant at the 5% level, which may 
indicate that countries’ regulatory bodies have an effect on IBs in their jurisdiction; as 
mentioned in several IFSB standards, IBs should develop CG committees to represent UIAHs 
(IFSB-3, 2006) and be transparent to UIAHs with respect to smoothing practices (IFSB-GN3, 
2010). The coefficient of the CG committee is negative and significant at the 5% level, which 
implies that having CG committees at IBs affects the difference in returns. Also, the 
expected negative sign makes the difference in return smaller, whereby the UIAHs get a 
return closer to that of shareholders, because [ROE returns - UIAHs’ returns = difference in 
returns], which means that the presence of a CG committee improves the treatment of 
UIAHs. 
The results concur with the IFSB’s proposal to have a CG committee attached to the BOD to 
represent UIAHs. Moreover, with country dummies the non-executive director coefficient 
has the opposite sign to that of the CG committee, as it is positive and statistically 
significant. Indeed, this is a normal, expected result, since non-executive directors 
traditionally protect shareholders’ interest rather than the interests of other stakeholders. 
The finding of this results is also in line with previous studies including Sundararajan (2007), 
Rosly and Zaini (2008), Diaw and Mbow (2011), Sundararajan (2011), but is in contradiction 
with the capital market theory of risk and return (i.e. higher risk is associated with higher 
expected return), which raises a serious issue about the fairness of the profit distribution 
policies. 
The significance of the finding is that there is evidence that, when the banks achieve good 
results, this tends to benefit the shareholders where profit-sharing practice is a matter of 
contractual form rather than economic substance. The results show that profit sharing, as 
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normally understood, is not being practised because good results lead to a higher ROE to 
the shareholders with less benefit to UIAH. In an efficient market this would be reflected 
either in an increased dividend or an increase in the value of the share. In virtually no cases 
are good results passed through to the UIAHs. In a third of cases, the phenomena are 
extreme; it is not only the case that good results are not being passed to UIAHs – the 
variability of the rates of return is actually greater, as the CV for the UIAHs is greater than 
for shareholders. So there is no sense in which the lower return to the UIAHs reflects the 
lower riskiness of the returns or the lower degree of variability. This is simply a more 
extreme form of the practices of those banks, because wherever there is a higher profit 
flow (of course, we are using accounting returns) the higher reported accounting profits do 
not result in significantly higher payouts to UIAHs. One of the reasons why UIAHs’ returns 
do not vary is that they are not being giving the benefit of higher profit.  This again shows 
the implications that UIAHs’ lack of information for monitoring the management would 
result in unfair of return treatment toward UIAHs. 
However, for the other two thirds of UIAHs, whose CV is lower than shareholders’, rates of 
payout to UIAH are less variable than the ROE to shareholders. One reason for this is that 
the higher returns are going to the shareholders and not to the UIAHs, so it is not simply 
because the profit is being smoothed in poorer years; it is being smoothed down back to 
PERs and IRRs in better years. 
The implication for IBs in our finding is not so flattering. One third of IBs have a CV for UIAHs 
that is higher than the CV for shareholders, which makes them unfair towards UIAHs. It 
seems that IBs are taking on deposits that are exposed to losses and giving no reward for 
said exposure to losses; however, they are skimming off the excess returns when the banks 
have good years of profit, giving little or none of the benefit to UIAHs. Therefore, this 
dubious behaviour towards UIAHs means that profit sharing exists only in name in these 
banks. Even in some other banks where the CV for UIAHs is lower than the CV for 
shareholders, the treatment of UIAHs is also questionable, since the CVs are very close; for 
example, in the Sharjah Islamic Bank, the CV for shareholders is 33.40% and UIAHs’ CV is 
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31.88%. From an economic point of view, IBs try to create a product that behaves like a 
conventional deposit account, but in legal (i.e. contractual) terms the Shari’ah-compliant 
deposit (UPSIA) can still incur losses, yet the depositors receive no reward for this downside 
risk. The use of the Mudarabah contract protects IBs from the risk to which the depositors 
are exposed, but given the way that so-called ‘profit sharing’ is practised the latter are not 
compensated for this. From a more general CG perspective, we can see from table 5-8 and 
table 5-9 that some ‘conventional’ CG variables are shown to have an influence on the 
banks’ treatment of UIAHs. Nevertheless, the regression results are largely driven by 
financial variables: ROA, TETA and TDTA, which are associated with the banks’ use of UPSIA 
to leverage their returns on equity.  
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 – Treatment of ROE Outliers 
 
C.1 Methods Used to Adjust Return on Equity 
Two methods may be used to adjust the ROE outliers (accounting returns for shareholders). 
Method 1 can be used to calculate the CV and only extreme outliers would be adjusted; this 
is the semi-adjusted method. Method 2 can be used to calculate the differences in the 
payout returns between shareholders and UIAHs and all losses would be removed since a 
loss in net profit to a bank that results in a negative payout in ROE should also be a loss to 
UIAHs. Method 2 can also be used as a proxy for differences in the CV. It is not the ROEs as 
such that matter for this research, but the comparison of variability in the payout returns. 
C.2 Calculating Coefficient of Variation 
The return on equity (ROE) is needed in order to calculate the coefficient of variation (CV - 
standard deviation over the mean return) for shareholders to compare it with the UIAHs’ 
CV. However, CV must be positive in order to be valid for comparison (Abdi, 2010). CV must 
always be positive or null, and it takes a value between zero and √𝑁 − 1, and 𝑁 is a non-
negative number with a real zero (Abdi, 2010). Hence, when the mean ROE for a bank over 
the time period is negative, it must be treated as an outlier and adjusted in order to 
compare the shareholders’ and UIAHs’ returns, since it is not possible to calculate the CV 
where the denominator (overall ROE mean) is negative. The following tables show the 
accounting return for shareholders (ROEs) for the sample size that covers 28 banks from 
different countries. The dataset was obtained from the banks’ annual reports and the 
Bankscope database for the period 2002 to 2013. The dataset contains 247 total 
observations of ROEs, since not all banks have 12 years of observations. 
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Table 5-14: Unadjusted ROEs as a percentage 
IB 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean ROE 
BARK NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.01 -0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -2.39% 
SALM NA NA NA NA 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 8.13% 
BAHN 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.13 -0.13 -0.33 -0.17 -0.42 0.08 -1.27% 
ITHM NA NA 0.16 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.02 -0.30 -0.22 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 0.13% 
KHAJ NA NA NA 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.18 6.34% 
KFHB 0.07 0.09 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 11.81% 
AHLI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 13.10% 
BOU NA NA NA 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.01 -0.47 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.13% 
KFH 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 16.42% 
KIB NA NA NA NA 0.07 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 6.58% 
MASF NA NA NA NA NA 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 18.00% 
QATR 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11 22.19% 
DHABI NA NA 0.08 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.11 13.92% 
DUBAI 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.13 16.69% 
EMIT NA NA 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.06 0.02 -0.15 0.03 0.04 6.99% 
SHAJ NA NA NA 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 7.62% 
AFFN NA NA NA NA NA 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.09 11.19% 
ALLN NA NA NA NA NA 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.09 11.04% 
ISLM 0.03 0.07 0.07 -0.54 -5.73 0.63 0.33 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.15 -36.49% 
MUAT 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 5.37% 
CIMB NA NA NA -0.19 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.15 11.03% 
HONG NA NA NA NA 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.18 10.79% 
KFHM NA NA NA 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.34 0.04 0.06 -1.93% 
MAY NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.19 13.83% 
OCBC NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.20 9.23% 
PUBC NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.09 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.15 19.45% 
RHB NA NA NA 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 10.17% 
STAD NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 8.89% 
The black box shows the extreme negative ROEs, which would give negative CV and which must be adjusted 
by replacing them with zero, usually the highest loss for that particular bank. 
Note: the ROEs in red are also for the banks that have negative mean ROEs for a specific 
year of the time series. However, some banks would have a positive but very small mean 
ROE, which results in a huge positive CV (i.e. a positive outlier). For example, Boubyan Bank 
has an ROE in 2009 of -49%; calculating the mean ROE and the CV by including the 2009 
ROE would give a CV of 13996.42%, which is again an outlier but on the positive side.89 
Therefore, for a reasonable comparison between shareholders’ and UIAHs’ CVs, these 
outliers should also be adjusted to avoid extreme positive ROEs. 
                                                     
 
89 See Table 5-15, p. 139.  
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C.3 Method 1 Adjusting Extreme Outliers (Semi-adjusting ROE) 
The adjustment methods consist of replacing the extreme values (outliers) in the dataset 
with zeros in order to calculate the CV; additionally, we are comparing the shareholders’ 
ROEs to the UIAHs’ returns in the form of payouts. We do not wish to underestimate the 
variation between shareholders and UIAHs by removing those extreme outliers or the 
negative ROE returns; however, adjustments are needed in order to gain meaningful 
results. If we were looking at the shareholders’ ROEs by themselves, then we would not 
make these adjustments because we would not want to lose the information in the negative 
returns. However, it is not the ROE itself that interests us, but the variation as measured by 
the CV. For instance, in method 1 (semi-adjusting ROE we only adjust an outlier if the ROE 
is causing the entire mean return to be negative over the 12-years period. However, a 
negative ROE for a bank in a time series for which the mean was positive would not be 
adjusted except in the case of extreme positive outliers such as in the cases of Boubyan and 
Ithmaar banks, as explained above. For example, Khaleeji Commercial Bank had a negative 
ROE of -5.34% in 2010 and -18% in 2013, but these negative returns were not replaced with 
zeros since the overall mean ROE was positive. Hence, only four banks (see table below) 
had negative returns that were adjusted to be able to calculate a meaningful CV, plus there 
are two huge positive outliers. In fact, even adjusting the negative and the positive outliers 
did not change the classification of banks into those with a CV of shareholders’ ROEs higher 
than the CV of UIAHs’ returns, and those for which the CV of shareholders’ ROEs is lower. 
Table 5-15: Banks whose ROEs would be adjusted in method 1 
These ROEs would be replaced with zero; the first four are the banks that have negative ROEs, and the last 
two banks are those with extreme positive outliers. 
Bank Country Year of adjusting ROEs Original ROE Adjusted ROE 
Albaraka Islamic Bank Bahrain 2009 -15.46% 0.00 
Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain 2012 -42.31% 0.00 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Malaysia 2006 -573.37% 0.00 
KFH-Bahrain Malaysia 2011 -33.84% 0.00 
Boubyan Kuwait 2009 -46.51% 0.00 
Ithmaar Bahrain 2009 -30.26% 0.00 
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Table 5-16: CV of shareholders and UIAHs 
Islamic Bank Unadjusted ROEs Semi-adjusted ROEs  
SH_CV UIAHs_CV SH_CV UIAHs_CV 
BARK -284.36% 33.65% 2821.22% 33.65% 
SALM 69.62% 85.02% 69.62% 85.02% 
BAHN -1558.03% 18.71% 699.63% 18.71% 
ITHM 14770.45% 17.95% 517.10% 17.95% 
KHAJ 217.03% 20.74% 217.03% 20.74% 
KFHB 92.43% 37.56% 92.43% 37.56% 
AHLI 8.17% 26.46% 8.17% 26.46% 
BOU 13996.42% 56.27% 82.49% 56.27% 
KFH 52.49% 55.80% 52.49% 55.80% 
KIB 81.35% 44.27% 81.35% 44.27% 
MASF 13.98% 59.44% 13.98% 59.44% 
QATR 36.47% 42.12% 36.47% 42.12% 
DHABI 45.54% 77.51% 45.54% 77.51% 
DUBAI 45.62% 48.01% 45.62% 48.01% 
EMIT 165.65% 47.39% 165.65% 47.39% 
SHAJ 33.40% 31.88% 33.40% 31.88% 
AFFN 33.71% 22.08% 33.71% 22.08% 
ALLN 56.04% 26.88% 56.04% 26.88% 
ISLM -468.85% 37.18% 234.78% 37.18% 
MUAT 86.56% 15.98% 86.56% 15.98% 
CIMB 122.67% 39.75% 122.67% 39.75% 
HONG 29.16% 18.35% 29.16% 18.35% 
KFHM -649.62% 44.38% 176.97% 44.38% 
MAY 41.10% 45.84% 41.10% 45.84% 
OCBC 74.32% 45.35% 74.32% 45.35% 
PUBC 36.09% 50.11% 36.09% 50.11% 
RHB 33.52% 17.49% 33.02% 17.74% 
STAD 53.00% 39.28% 53.00% 39.28% 
The result of unadjusted ROE and semi-adjusted ROE. Still with semi-adjusted ROE, there is considerable 
variation due to the other outliers that have not been adjusted. The black box shows the extreme negative 
ROEs from Table 5-14. 
The CVs are calculated using semi-adjusted ROEs: a total of six observations out of 247. Four 
banks with extreme negative ROEs are indicated in the black boxes, and two other banks 
with very large CVs are considered outliers and have to be adjusted to retain fair 
comparability between the two payout returns. 
C.4 Method 2 Adjusting All Negative ROEs 
To avoid the problem of very large CVs for banks with very low mean ROEs, method 2 
adjusts all negative ROEs for banks to zero. The ROEs are not the focus of this research, but 
are required for the comparison of variability. It should be noted that the UIAHs’ returns 
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cannot be negative as they are based on payouts. If there are losses (impairment of UIAHs’ 
capital), these are not observable, as IBs use reserves (such as IRRs) to cover such losses. 
Hence, we can simply observe the actual payouts rather than the underlying result. In fact, 
the time series of returns to UIAHs are the results of management decisions on accounting 
treatment, by virtue of which no negative returns are reported. For example, in the 2009 
annual report of Al Baraka Bank, based in Bahrain, the bank sustained a loss of 
US$26,463,032 but still paid out a 5.62% share of profit to UIAHs after Mudarib fees and 
transfer from reserves. Therefore, to achieve comparability, it is preferable to eliminate 
losses from the time series of accounting returns to shareholders. An alternative might have 
been to use the dividend payouts to shareholders, which also cannot be negative, but this 
would not be a fair comparison to UIAHs’ returns since there are no ‘retained earnings’ for 
UIAHs (reserves such as IRRs are used only for ‘smoothing’ payouts). 
Therefore, under method 2 all the negative ROEs would be adjusted to zero, changing a 
total of 24 observations out of 247, following the same procedure as Diaw and Mbow 
(2011), who replace all negative accounting profits to shareholders (ROE) with zero. In 
addition, as shown above, if we only adjust negative ROEs for those four banks with a 
negative mean ROE, the presence of the outliers in the ROEs results in a much lower 
correlation between the CV differences and the return differences, because of the extreme 
outliers’ effect. Additionally, what is most important is that using adjusted ROEs does not 
give significantly different results or change the outcome; the same results are obtained in 
the panel regression of semi-adjusted or unadjusted returns where the independent 
variables have the same results but different coefficients. For example, the ROA sign is 
positive and significant (see regression tables below). In fact, R-squared in unadjusted ROE 
is the highest of all; however, for a better comparison with UIAHs’ return, we would rather 
use adjusted ROE to be more consistent with UIAHs’ time series and for the reason 
explained above. 
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Table 5-17: Percentage of adjustment 
Method Semi adjusted ROEs Adjusting all negative ROEs 
No. of Obs. to be adjusted 6 24 
No. of banks 6 12 
Total number of Obs. In the sample 247 247 
Ratio of changes in sample 2.40% 9.70% 
Twelve banks’ negative ROEs will be replaced with zero for comparison with the UIAHs’ payout returns, since 
minimum payouts would not be less than zero (24 observations out of 247). This would give a percentage 
change in the sample dataset of 9.7% (24/247). 
Table 5-18: Correlations % of the Difference in Returns 
Correlations of the Difference in Returns Correlation % 
Correlation of the difference of unadjusted ROE – UIAHs’ return -17% 
Correlation of the difference of semi adjusted ROE – UIAHs’ return -20% 
Correlation of the difference of adjusted ROE – UIAHs’ return -59% 
 
C.5 Panel Regression Results 
The regression tests were conducted on three different ROEs as follows: 
Panel Regression test 
Panel A Unadjusted ROE using fixed effects with GLS weights 
Panel B Unadjusted ROE for group country dummy using GLS 
Panel C Semi adjusted ROE using fixed effects with GLS 
Panel D Semi adjusted ROE for group country dummy with GLS 
Panel E Adjusted ROE using fixed effects with GLS 
Panel F Adjusted ROE for group country dummy with GLS 
Group A country dummy includes Bahrain and Malaysia 
Group B country dummy includes Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE 
C.6 Summary Statistics of Unadjusted, Semi-adjusted and Adjusted ROE 
The following tables contain the results of the unadjusted ROE, semi-adjusted ROE, and 
adjusted ROE correspondingly, where negative returns in unadjusted ROE remain constant, 
including all the outliers. The sample consists of 28 IBs, and covers the 12 years from 2002 
to 2013. The dependent variable is the difference in the rate of return between 
shareholders (ROE) minus the return to UIAHs, and the independent variables are the same 
as the above model.  
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Table 5-19: Unadjusted ROEs regression 
Panel A: Unadjusted ROE fixed effects  Panel B: Unadjusted ROEs group country dummy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
ROA 7.0208* 0.3256 0.0000  ROA 6.6771* 0.2509 0.0000 
Non-exe-Dirc. -0.1626* 0.0689 0.0191  Non-exe-Dirc. -0.0599* 0.0256 0.0201 
TETA -0.5020* 0.0686 0.0000  TETA -0.6098* 0.0487 0.0000 
LS 0.0065 0.0203 0.7480  LS 0.0177* 0.0087 0.0434 
Board Size 0.0180* 0.0036 0.0000  Board Size -0.0023 0.0018 0.2124 
CG Comm 0.0372* 0.0147 0.0121  CG Comm 0.0018 0.0052 0.7318 
TDTA -0.0403** 0.0240 0.0952  TDTA -0.0029 0.0153 0.8519 
R-squared 85%    GroupB 0.0137* 0.0051 0.0082 
Adjusted R-squared 83%    R-squared 78%   
F-statistic 34.8701    Adjusted R-squared 77%   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    F-statistic 105.6036   
     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
The table shows the panel regression for unadjusted ROEs used in difference in returns of the dependent 
variable (shareholders’ returns minus UIAHs’ return), using GLS weights to take care of heteroscedasticity. 
Note: *denotes significance at the 5% level, and **indicates significance at the 10% level. 
The dependent variable is the difference in returns between shareholders and UIAHs, for a period of 12 years 
(2002–2013). Cross-sections include 28 total panel (unbalanced) observations out of 247. 
 
 
Table 5-20: Semi adjusted ROEs regression 
Panel C: Semi_Adj_ROE fixed effects  Panel D: Semi_Adj_ROEs Country Dummy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
ROA 3.2687 0.1485 0.0000  ROA 3.6971 0.1897 0.0000 
Non-exe-Dirc. -0.0362 0.0322 0.2612  Non-exe-Dirc. 0.0087 0.0204 0.6687 
TETA -0.2337 0.0319 0.0000  TETA -0.3847 0.0392 0.0000 
LS -0.0411 0.0106 0.0001  LS -0.0258 0.0088 0.0039 
Board Size 0.0162 0.0033 0.0000  Board Size -0.0004 0.0018 0.8346 
CG Comm -0.0065 0.0074 0.3806  CG Comm -0.0126 0.0066 0.0562 
TDTA 0.0685 0.0239 0.0046  TDTA 0.0489 0.0219 0.0263 
R-squared 84%    GroupB 0.0203 0.0060 0.0008 
Adjusted R-squared 81%    R-squared 71%   
F-statistic 32.1135    Adjusted R-squared 70%   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    F-statistic 73.8420   
     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Only banks with extreme outliers where losses were converted to zero. Note: *denotes significance at the 5% 
level, and **denotes significance at 10%, using GLS cross-sectional weights, to estimate a feasible GLS 
specification, assuming the presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity. 
***Only extreme outliers of ROE are adjusted to zero. 
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Table 5-21: Adjusted ROEs regression 
Panel E: Adjusted ROE fixed effects  Panel F: Adjusted ROEs group country dummy 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
ROA 2.5539 0.1333 0.0000  ROA 2.8485 0.1443 0.0000 
Non-exe-Dirc. 0.0240 0.0333 0.4728  Non-exe-Dirc. 0.0398 0.0199 0.0467 
TETA -0.1994 0.0328 0.0000  TETA -0.3033 0.0346 0.0000 
LS -0.0412 0.0104 0.0001  LS -0.0356 0.0094 0.0002 
Board Size 0.0061 0.0025 0.0158  Board Size -0.0011 0.0016 0.5071 
CG Comm -0.0124 0.0067 0.0649  CG Comm -0.0149 0.0065 0.0225 
TDTA 0.0885 0.0202 0.0000  TDTA 0.0441 0.0196 0.0256 
R-squared 83%    GroupB 0.0173 0.0057 0.0026 
Adjusted R-squared 80%    R-squared 71%   
F-statistic 29.7835    Adjusted R-squared 70%   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    F-statistic 72.7514   
     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
All losses in ROE were converted to zero, for better comparison with UIAHs’ return where all time series are 
positive and negative returns in the UIAHs’ data are not observable due to smoothing techniques used by 
Islamic banks. 
C.7 Final Remarks 
For the reasons mentioned above, where the negative ROEs result in very small mean ROEs, 
leading to these banks being outliers for their CVs, method 2 would be implemented (all 
negative ROEs would be replaced with zero; a total of 24 observations out of 247). It is 
important to note that it is not the ROEs as such that matter for this research, but the 
comparison of the return variability between shareholders and UIAHs. Furthermore, the 
negative returns in the UIAHs’ data are not observable (IBs use reserves such as IRRs to 
cover losses), and since we are using the difference in return as proxy to test the CV, it 
would be more applicable to use method 2, in order to obtain a valid comparison. In fact, 
to have a valid correlation it would be more relevant to treat both returns (ROE and UIAHs’ 
return) equally, because it is a comparison between the two payout returns, where the 
correct return cannot be less than zero. In addition, the use of the GLS cross-sectional 
weights would be applied to run the panel regression test to attain heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation problems. Therefore, method 2 would be more appropriate in this case. 
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 - Correlation between the difference in 
returns and the difference in CV  
D.1 Correlation 
The correlation in table 5-22 is between column 8 (differences in mean returns for 
shareholders and UIAHs) and column 9 (differences in CV for shareholders and UIAHs). Nine 
IBs have higher CV for UIAHs. Whereas, the negative CV indicates that UIAHs have a higher 
CV and it is closely associated with higher difference in returns between shareholders and 
UIAHs, indicating a strong negative relationship. As the difference in CV for UIAHs gets 
bigger and more negative, their difference in returns gets bigger and more positive. 
Table 5-22: Correlation between difference in the CV and the rate of return spread 
2002-2013 Shareholders UIAHs Differences 
Islamic banks Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean diff CV diff 
MASF 18.00% 2.52% 13.98% 3.24% 1.93% 59.44% 14.75% -45.46% 
DHABI 13.92% 6.34% 45.54% 3.17% 2.46% 77.51% 10.75% -31.97% 
AHLI 13.10% 1.07% 8.17% 2.19% 0.58% 26.46% 10.91% -18.29% 
SALM 8.13% 5.66% 69.62% 2.19% 1.87% 85.02% 5.94% -15.40% 
PUBC 19.45% 7.02% 36.09% 2.16% 1.08% 50.11% 17.29% -14.02% 
QATR 22.19% 8.09% 36.47% 3.99% 1.68% 42.12% 18.20% -5.66% 
MAY 13.83% 5.68% 41.10% 2.66% 1.22% 45.84% 11.17% -4.74% 
KFH 16.42% 8.62% 52.49% 3.53% 1.97% 55.80% 12.89% -3.31% 
DUBAI 16.69% 7.61% 45.62% 2.60% 1.25% 48.01% 14.09% -2.38% 
SHAJ 7.85% 2.62% 33.40% 3.79% 1.21% 31.88% 4.05% 1.52% 
HONG 10.79% 3.15% 29.16% 3.19% 0.59% 18.35% 7.60% 10.81% 
AFFN 11.19% 3.77% 33.71% 2.86% 0.63% 22.08% 8.32% 11.63% 
STAD 8.89% 4.71% 53.00% 3.87% 1.52% 39.28% 5.02% 13.72% 
RHB 10.17% 3.41% 33.52% 3.35% 0.59% 17.49% 6.82% 16.03% 
OCBC 9.38% 6.60% 70.37% 3.26% 1.48% 45.35% 6.12% 25.02% 
BOU 5.30% 4.37% 82.49% 2.83% 1.59% 56.27% 2.46% 26.21% 
CIMB 13.19% 8.75% 66.33% 3.22% 1.28% 39.75% 9.97% 26.58% 
ALLN 11.04% 6.19% 56.04% 3.06% 0.82% 26.88% 7.99% 29.16% 
KIB 7.19% 3.96% 81.35% 2.79% 1.23% 44.27% 4.41% 37.08% 
MUAT 5.88% 3.43% 58.37% 2.71% 0.43% 15.98% 3.17% 42.39% 
KFHB 11.81% 10.92% 92.43% 3.48% 1.31% 37.56% 8.33% 54.87% 
EMIT 8.51% 9.06% 106.39% 2.32% 1.10% 47.39% 6.19% 59.01% 
KFHM 2.41% 2.50% 104.05% 2.28% 1.01% 44.38% 0.12% 59.67% 
BAHN 7.47% 6.84% 91.64% 3.18% 0.59% 18.71% 4.29% 72.93% 
ISLM 15.76% 17.57% 111.52% 2.48% 0.92% 37.18% 13.27% 74.35% 
BARK 1.04% 1.16% 111.65% 3.18% 1.07% 33.65% -2.14% 78.00% 
KHAJ 8.88% 10.92% 114.82% 4.53% 0.94% 20.74% 4.34% 94.08% 
ITHM 7.86% 11.23% 142.94% 4.15% 0.75% 17.95% 3.70% 124.99% 
Higher UIAHs CVs indicates that the UIAHs received unfair deal on risk-adjusted returns basis compared to shareholders. 
The more negative CV which indicates higher UIAHs CV the more difference in the mean return between shareholders 
and UIAHs. 
Chapter 5 – Appendix D  
 154 
Figure 5-2: Average for shareholders and UIAHs CV for each bank 2002–2013 
 
The graph shows that in some Islamic banks UIAHs have higher CV, which indicates that the UIAHs are not 
doing well in proportion to the risk that they are exposed to compared to shareholders. 
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Figure 5-3: Average of returns for shareholders and UIAHs 
 
Average of returns for shareholders and UIAHs between 2002 and 2013 for each bank as a percentage return 
to each of the two classes of stakeholders. UIAHs’ return seems steady across the Islamic banks, whereas 
shareholders’ returns vary across the sample of Islamic banks; however, shareholders receive much higher 
returns. 
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Table 5-23 Return to shareholders 2002–2013 
Bank 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Bank Mean OBS 
BARK NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.01 -0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -2.47% 6 
SALM NA NA NA NA 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 8.13% 8 
BAHN 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.13 -0.13 -0.33 -0.17 -0.42 0.08 -1.30% 12 
ITHM NA NA 0.16 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.02 -0.30 -0.22 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 0.13% 10 
KHAJ NA NA NA 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.18 6.34% 9 
KFHB 0.07 0.09 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 11.81% 12 
AHLI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 13.10% 4 
BOU NA NA NA 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.01 -0.47 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.13% 9 
KFH 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 16.42% 12 
KIB NA NA NA NA 0.07 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 6.58% 8 
MASF NA NA NA NA NA 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 18.00% 7 
QATR 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11 22.19% 12 
DHABI NA NA 0.08 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.11 13.92% 10 
DUBAI 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.13 16.69% 12 
EMIT NA NA 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.06 0.02 -0.15 0.03 0.04 6.99% 10 
SHAJ NA NA NA 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 7.62% 9 
AFFN NA NA NA NA NA 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.09 11.19% 7 
ALLN NA NA NA NA NA 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.09 11.04% 7 
ISLM 0.03 0.07 0.07 -0.54 -5.73 0.63 0.33 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.15 -36.49% 12 
MUAT 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 5.37% 12 
CIMB NA NA NA -0.19 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.15 11.03% 9 
HONG NA NA NA NA 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.18 10.79% 8 
KFHM NA NA NA 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.34 0.04 0.06 -1.91% 9 
MAY NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.19 13.83% 6 
OCBC NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.20 9.23% 6 
PUBC NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.09 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.15 19.45% 6 
RHB NA NA NA 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 10.17% 9 
STAD NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 8.89% 6 
Year Mean % 10.51 12.7 13.1 8.32 -14.79 18.8 11.5 4.10 6.73 5.69 7.08 8.27 7.75% 7.67% 
SD % 8.52 10.0 11.15 20.77 135.6 12.3 8.54 15.58 12.24 12.01 11.69 8.57 10.79% 22.2% 
CV % 81.01 78.9 84.75 249.6 -916.7 65.6 74.3 380.2 181.8 210.9 165.2 103.6 139.25% 290% 
Return to shareholders (return on equity) for each bank between 2002–2013, calculated from bank annual 
reports as net profit attributable to equity holders of the bank/average stockholder's equity attributable to 
the equity holders of the bank. 
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Table 5-24: Return to UIAHs 2002–2013 
Bank 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Bank Mean OBS 
BARK NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 3.18% 6 
SALM NA NA NA NA 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.19% 8 
BAHN 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 3.18% 12 
ITHM NA NA 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 4.15% 10 
KHAJ NA NA NA 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 4.53% 9 
KFHB 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 3.48% 12 
AHLI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.19% 4 
BOU NA NA NA 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.83% 9 
KFH 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 3.53% 12 
KIB NA NA NA NA 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.79% 8 
MASF NA NA NA NA NA 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 3.24% 7 
QATR 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 3.99% 9 
DHABI NA NA 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 3.17% 10 
DUBAI 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.60% 12 
EMIT NA NA 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.32% 10 
SHAJ NA NA NA 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 3.79% 9 
AFFN NA NA NA NA NA 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 2.86% 7 
ALLN NA NA NA NA NA 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 3.06% 7 
ISLM 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 2.48% 12 
MUAT 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 2.71% 12 
CIMB NA NA NA 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 3.22% 9 
HONG NA NA NA NA 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 3.19% 8 
KFHM NA NA NA 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 2.28% 9 
MAY NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 2.66% 6 
OCBC NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 3.26% 6 
PUBC NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 2.16% 6 
RHB NA NA NA 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 3.35% 9 
STAD NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 3.87% 6 
Yrs. Mean % 3.15 2.72 3.04 3.31 4.00 4.24 3.49 3.01 2.87 2.78 2.66 2.39 3.08% 3.14% 
SD % 0.82 1.23 1.32 1.84 1.57 1.17 1.52 1.29 0.95 1.04 1.15 1.23 0.62% 1.26% 
CV % 26.11 45.14 43.37 55.37 39.26 27.56 43.46 42.76 32.98 37.31 43.16 51.30 20.26% 40.11% 
Return to UIAHs between 2002–2013 for each bank, which is either taken directly from the annual report or 
calculated as shown in method 1 (profit distributed to depositors/average of UIAHs depositors’ account). 
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 - Hausman Test 
 
It is interesting to see whether a fixed effects or a random effects model is more significant 
or more appropriate to use, and better for our data. A Hausman specification test could be 
performed to compare between the two models, to examines if the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with other regressors in the model (Park, 2011).  For example, if individual 
effects are correlated with other regressor, that is random effects would violate a Gauss-
Markov assumption and the model is no longer BLUE.  
E.1 Hypothesis Test 
Null hypothesis: Random-effects model is appropriate. 
Alternative hypothesis: fixed effects model is appropriate.  
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis or fixed effects model 
would be preferred over random effects model. 
Table 5-25: Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Equation: RANDOM   
Test cross-section random effects 
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 13.342346 7 0.0442** 
     
     **The p-value for the Hausman test is less than 5% which indicate that random effects is not appropriate and 
the fixed effects could be better test.  
 
Therefore, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis and the use of fixed effects model 
would be favoured to explain the difference in the rates of return between shareholders 
and investment account holders over the use of random effects model. 
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Chapter Six: Difference in Returns (Case Study 
of Kuwait Finance House) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the differences in rates of returns of three banks 
within the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) group, as a case study.  It was noted in chapter 5 
that differences in rates of return exist within this banking group itself, i.e. the parent and 
two subsidiaries.  This chapter will place its emphasis on the regulations of the countries 
with respect to the CG structure of the banks, such as those relating to the board structure, 
since the subsidiaries are separate companies with their own BODs.  Therefore, the board 
structures will be examined to determine if these have any influence on the UIAHs rates of 
return and the fairness in receiving a decent return, or, alternatively, if the returns are 
influenced only by management decisions.   
It is necessary to extend the previous findings with case-based research in which some 
primary data can be gathered that may help to answer some of the questions that cannot 
be answered solely by reference to secondary data.  Using a mixed methods approach, an 
interview was conducted to clarify some of the implications on rates of return that the panel 
data regression had previously indicated.  For example, the analysis in chapter 5 showed 
that the main driver is the ROA, and when a bank’s profit is good, most of the benefit goes 
to shareholders, and only a small amount goes to UIAHs, which is arguably a strange way of 
practicing profit-sharing. Therefore, it is necessary to further investigate the issue of UIAHs’ 
fair treatment by using a mixed methods approach, which involves a two phase project and 
a procedure known as an explanatory sequential design, where quantitative data is 
followed by qualitative analysis to help explain the quantitative results (Creswell, 2013).  
KFH is a suitable case study example, because there is evidence that the UIAH in the parent 
bank in Kuwait were treated less equitably than those of its two subsidiaries in Bahrain and 
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Malaysia90.  In addition, KFH as a group has better data than its peers and all of its financial 
reports are available publicly online, making it possible to undertake this type of analysis. 
By examining the parent and subsidiary banks’ behaviour toward UIAHs as reflective of the 
market and regulatory environment, it might be possible to understand why the risk 
adjusted rates of return to UIAHs at the subsidiaries is higher than at the parent bank (as 
indication of better treatment, the CV to UIAHs is lower there than the shareholder CV).  
More specifically, KFH’s CG structure must be examined since the KFH board’s governance 
structures were established to regulate the ethics of the organization, according to KFH-
Kuwait (2014).  According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), the foundation of IBs’ business is 
closely related to the Islamic religion, which gives them a unique ethical identity.   For 
example, Shari’ah is concerned with justice and welfare throughout society.  
Despite the fact that the two subsidiaries in Bahrain and Malaysia operate in markets with 
far more competitor IBs than the parent bank in Kuwait, and also a more developed 
regulatory environment, and that different factors influence the difference in rates of 
return, the findings show that the main influence on the rate of return difference between 
the KFH parent and its subsidiaries is the ROA.  For that reason, it is necessary to compare 
KFH in Kuwait with its competitors, using the Kuwaiti Islamic banking peers as a control to 
compare them against one another.  It would be interesting to determine how other banks 
in Kuwait are treating UIAHs compared to KFH Kuwait in the same market. 
6.2 Specific CG issue in Kuwait 
With regard to wider regulatory issues and the development of CG in an emerging market 
economy, the example of Kuwait is worth noting. In 2004, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) reported that the Kuwaiti Securities Exchange Market, where the shares of Islamic 
                                                     
 
90 KFH Turkey is not included in the sample, since the focus only in the GCC area and Malaysia, and KFH group 
has owned 62% of KFH Turkey since 1989.  KFH Saudi Arabia also is not included in the sample because the 
country does not offer UPSIA. 
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financial institutions are traded, is regulated by more than one agency and, consequently, 
uses many sets of laws and regulations to govern the market (IMF, 2004a). However, these 
laws and regulations fail to form a comprehensive legal framework, particularly in relation 
to uniform financial reporting and the protection of minority shareholders and investors 
such as UPSIA. The Financial System Stability Assessment, based on a detailed assessment 
of securities supervision by the IMF, recommends that Kuwait should create a single and 
independent regulatory agency for securities supervision (IMF, 2004b), which should have 
a mandate to control the entire capital market in Kuwait, including Islamic financial 
institutions, and the ability to address the risks associated with inadequately regulated 
market activities, which will ultimately protect shareholders (especially minority 
shareholders) and UIAHs from any faulty actions or irregular behaviour by listed companies. 
The IMF also called for the adoption of a new Capital Markets Law to provide these 
recommendations with legal force and to guarantee the powers and independence of the 
proposed new supervisory agency for Kuwait’s capital markets. It recommended that the 
regulator should set rules governing the protection of minority shareholders including 
UIAHs, and that it should force listed companies to implement CG principles.  The Financial 
System Stability Assessment also noted that the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange is not operationally 
independent from either public or private sector interference in exercising its functions with 
respect to regulation and supervision (eStandards Forum Financial Standards Foundation, 
2009).   
These recommendations have recently been implemented in Kuwait, where the Kuwait 
Capital Market Authority has been established to oversee the entire capital market in the 
country, including IBs whose shares are traded on the stock exchange.  Time and close 
oversight are now needed to gauge the impact of the new Capital Market Authority and 
assess its role and ability to regulate the Kuwaiti capital market.  However, the IFSB shares 
the opinion of the OECD and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that there is no 
“single model” of CG which will work well in every country.  Each country or organization 
should develop its own model of CG in order to fit its own specific needs and objectives 
(IFSB–3). 
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A 2008 survey by the International Finance Corporation and the Hawkamah Institute for CG 
(Hawkamah and IFC, 2008) found that Kuwait had 164 listed companies and 6 listed banks 
at that time.  At the time of writing this thesis in 2016, Kuwait has more than 220 listed 
companies and 11 listed banks (not including Kuwait Industrial Bank and Saving Credit Bank, 
or international banks located in Kuwait); five of these 11 banks are IBs.  The Kuwaiti 
government first introduced Islamic banking and an Islamic financial system in 1977 with 
the initial intention of introducing Islamic finance gradually in a dual-system approach, 
which would allow both conventional and Islamic financial systems to operate 
simultaneously.  It was also designed to attract Muslim customers who had previously 
avoided the conventional interest-based financial system into the financial market.  In the 
International Financial Law Review (IFLR) Little and Cunha (2009) noted that: “[t]here are 
no specific protections available to minority shareholders especially in a target company in 
the case where its majority shareholders wish to sell their shares”.   
In April 2007, Kuwait adopted a law regarding the protection of competition (Competition 
Law), which required the prior approval of the Competition Protection Body in the event 
that a proposed acquisition results in increased control over the market.  Furthermore, 
Kuwait has recently introduced a new corporation law, the Companies Law of 2012, which 
sets out new concepts and principles to shape the way companies operate in Kuwait.  The 
new law encourages investment and aims to provide comfort to investors and organizations 
looking to expand their operations.  It also improves the way companies are structured, 
with particular regard to the separation of the board of directors from the executive 
management.  Most importantly, the new law requires companies to adopt a more 
stringent adherence to best practice concerning CG.  For example, it stipulates a new 
cumulative voting system for the election of board members, as well as introducing new 
corporate regulations for the IFI regarding Sukuk. 
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6.3 KFH Kuwait background 
KFH, which was established in March 1977, has been the dominant Islamic bank in Kuwait 
for many years, and was the only Islamic bank in Kuwait until 2005, when Boubyan Islamic 
Bank was established.  KFH has developed a good relationship with its customers over many 
years, and the bank is still able to attract depositors without providing them with an 
attractive deal above the benchmark of the Kuwaiti market.  For example, looking at the 
amount of UPSIA in the KFH annual report in recent years, it has been observed that the 
amount of these deposits has increased; for example, total deposits increased in 2014 to 
KWD14.3bln compared to KWD 12.5bln in 2013, an increase of 14.4%.  On the other hand, 
KFH market capitalisation has also increased.  According to financial news by KFH on 
08/02/2015, KFH has gained a market share which will allow the bank to maintain its 
leadership position locally and globally in the Islamic banking industry. 
According to the KFH-Kuwait (2014) annual report, the bank has different types of 
investment accounts for depositors in order to provide a wide range of investment91.  For 
example, it offers the Al-Mustamera investment deposit92, Al-Sedra, Al-Kawthar, 
AlKhumasiya, Dimah, Al-Nuwair93, and foreign currency deposit accounts; these names are 
given to different investment accounts with different contractual terms.  These types of 
investment deposits are available to individuals, small companies, and corporate 
customers.  In addition, KFH provides several types of savings accounts to customers with 
                                                     
 
91 KFH offers various types of investment deposit accounts that differ based on investment term, profit 
distribution mechanism and currency type. 
92 The bank uses Arabic names for different investment account deposits, for example, Mustamera is an Arabic 
term implying continuity, where the money is kept in the account after the maturity date unless the customer 
requests to withdraw it or ends the contract.  Al-Sedra is a type of tree, Al-Kawthar means “a lot” in Arabic 
and in Islam it means a river in heaven, while Alkhumasiya is a five-year investment.  As different customers 
have different investment needs, KFH has different investment accounts, such as offering a choice of different 
contract lengths (longer terms have higher percentage returns), and terms of contract (some accounts can 
withdraw cash with ATM card). 
93 At some point, the names given to UIAHs accounts are used as marketing names rather than a description 
of the account.  KFH have various different investment accounts that are branded differently; and the longer 
the period of investment, the higher the return UIAHs receive.   
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different specifications in Kuwaiti Dinars, as well as in foreign currency.  For example, it has 
the Mumtaz investment savings account in KD, the Baiti savings account for children, and 
the premier investment savings account in foreign currency.  KFH also has several 
investment accounts for other purposes, including education and retirement plans.  The 
investment and savings accounts deposits can be withdrawn in whole or in part at any time 
according to KFH-Kuwait (2014).  The investment account receives an annual profit based 
on the lowest monthly balance.  The bank also provides ATM cards to its customers to 
facilitate deposits and withdrawals.  Funds in all the investment and savings accounts it 
offers are invested on a Mudarabah or Wakalah contract basis as agreed, and with profit 
sharing ratios.  Under a Wakalah contract, the fund manager receives a fee rather than a 
share of profit as in Mudarabah.  However, in some Wakalah arrangements, in addition to 
the fixed fee, there is an incentive-based fee by means of which the bank may reach an 
outcome not dissimilar to a Mudarabah contract.  However, the difference is that under 
Wakalah, the bank will always receive its minimum fee even if there is no profit because it 
is a straight management fee rather than a profit share.  In some Wakalah agreements, the 
Wakeel is also entitled to a performance-related fee, which may make Wakalah more 
interesting for the bank because even if the profit is low, the bank will always get its fee as 
Wakeel.   
According to the auditors’ report (2014), KFH complies with the international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
as adopted for use by the state of Kuwait.  KFH established a CG committee in 2011 and, 
according to their annual report, the bank works according to the rules and guidelines of 
the Kuwait central bank. The CG committee is responsible for assisting the BOD in 
supervising the compliance department in monitoring the implementation of the bank’s CG 
policies.  The annual report for KFH stated that the BOD is responsible for overseeing KFH’s 
operations, ensuring a sound financial position, and protecting the interests of its 
shareholders, depositors, creditors, employees and other stakeholders; nevertheless, the 
CG committee’s primary task is to protect the shareholders. According to the IFSB-3, the CG 
committee should protect the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders and 
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manage conflicts of interest between shareholders and UIAHs, especially where the funds 
are commingled (IFSB-3, 2006).   Furthermore, KFH has adopted the Code of Conduct and 
Ethics of the Kuwaiti central bank for its BOD and all staff.  The bank has also implemented 
a disclosure policy covering all qualitative, quantitative, and material information in 
accordance with the requirements of the central bank and other bodies, such as the Capital 
Markets Authority. 
 
6.4 Research Aims and Objectives of this Chapter 
The focus of the research reported in this chapter is placed on the KFH group in order to 
determine the respective effects of the CG structure, competition, and the regulatory 
environment, which may help to explain why the bank’s subsidiaries behave differently 
from the parent bank.  There are a variety of internal and external environmental factors, 
which may affect the difference in returns between UIAHs and shareholders at KFH.  Hence, 
it is essential to look at the differences in the market conditions to establish whether or not 
these have had any impact on the way UIAHs and shareholders are treated.  KFH has 
subsidiaries that operate in arguably more competitive markets than the Kuwaiti market 
itself, and the dataset shows that UIAHs are receiving better risk adjusted rates of return in 
Bahrain and Malaysia than in Kuwait.   
The change in leadership style at KFH parent appears to be associated with the level of 
UIAHs rate of return; up until 2008 when the KFH parent had a single CEO Chairman, UIAHs 
received a higher percentage return than in later years, but also a higher CV than 
shareholders.  This meant that UIAHs faced a higher risk compared to the return they 
received.  Therefore, it is important to look at the profit trend, to discover whether or not 
the difference in risk adjusted rates of return between shareholders and UIAHs increased 
after 2008.  In other words, are the shareholders taking a higher share of the profit (as they 
do when the bank profit is high), or is the bank less profitable, which is why the UIAHs are 
not achieving as high a profit pay-out as they did prior to 2008?  KFH suffered in the post-
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crisis period, and it is important to compare the profit and difference in returns before and 
after the crisis.  In fact, financial institutions worldwide have suffered in the global economic 
decline following the crisis, so this could be a factor influencing KFH’s profits. 
Looking at the level of profit, the shareholders’ ROE for KFH Kuwait dropped in 2008 from 
29% to 13%, and has since continued downward.  Hence, part of the research needed here 
is to examine the actual bank profit and compare the difference in the CVs and rates of 
return, rather than simply observing what happens to the rates of return between the 
shareholders and UIAHs when the bank’s profit fluctuates. 
Since the effects of the economic recession have had an effect on KFH and on other banks 
in the region, it will also be wise to look at the other IBs in Kuwait and compare them, as 
some banks in Kuwait have treated UIAHs “fairly”94 (as indicated in chapter 4).  By inspecting 
the CG structures of the other IBs95, on the one hand, any differences between the two 
banks which are treating the UIAHs well (a fair UIAHs return), and on the other, the two 
banks where UIAHs are poorly treated, can be noted. It may also be asked how the KFH 
parent got away with treating its UIAHs less favourably.  Why do its customers not simply 
migrate to another bank that offers a better deal?  Therefore, the objective of this chapter 
is to focus on the KFH group in line with the findings of chapter 4 and 5, while also providing 
more detail about the case of the parent and the subsidiaries, and analysing why the CV or 
risk adjusted return of the subsidiaries are lower than those of the parent bank96. Is this 
disparity caused by the bank’s decisions, or by a lack of governance regulation? 
                                                     
 
94 In chapter 4, we noticed that 2 out of 4 Islamic banks in Kuwait have a lower UIAHs CV than shareholder CV, 
which indicates that the risk adjusted return that the UIAHs received is not a bad deal compared to the 
volatility UIAHs and shareholders are faced with. 
95 There are 5 Islamic banks in Kuwait; however, Warba Islamic Bank was only recently established and has 
made insufficient data available for comparison. 
96 Lower CV is a better risk adjusted return for UIAHs. 
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6.5 Methodology 
The results in chapter 5 provided solid evidence of differences between rates of return for 
shareholders and for UIAHs that are applicable to the KFH group.  For example, the panel 
data results showed that the larger the board size, the wider the rate of return difference 
between shareholders and UIAHs.  Also, the existence of a CG committee reduces the 
difference in rates of return at a significance level of 10%.  However, when a country dummy 
was introduced in panel B (see table 5-9 p. 133), the CG committee variable became more 
significant, with a level of significance at 5%, but board size became insignificant, an 
observation which receives further investigation below.  A deeper and more comprehensive 
view of the above issues can be established using the explanatory sequential mixed method. 
The intention of this method is to use the qualitative data to help to explain the initial 
quantitative results.  For example, typical survey data gathered in the first phase would be 
followed by qualitative interviews to further illuminate the meaning of the survey 
responses.  Therefore, with the KFH case study, some of the issues raised by the quantitative 
analysis can be examined which could not be explained solely by looking at quantitative 
data, and which require a qualitative interview to follow up. 
Yin (2013) points out that the case study method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon with more intensity, and that it can be more appropriate to 
explain a specific problem by using questions to investigate a subject.  The investigation can 
be conducted in the form of an interview.  Furthermore, it allows a researcher to investigate 
main topics which would not easily be covered by other methods.  There are different types 
of case study designs; however, the present study uses an embedded case study design with 
different sub-units including quantitative analyses to represent the CV difference situation 
for KFH group (between the parent bank and its subsidiaries), also using the Kuwaiti Islamic 
banking peers as a control to compare them with KFH-Kuwait.  Along with the quantitative 
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data that will be analysed, an interview with the KFH management will follow, which aims 
to answer the following questions97:  
1. Why do KFH subsidiaries pay higher rates of return to UIAHs than the KFH parent? 
2. Even though UIAHs of KFH parent have higher risk adjusted rates of return in the 
pre-crisis period than they did subsequently, why was it nevertheless significantly 
lower than the shareholders’ rate of return98? 
6.6 KFH governance over time 
The data in table 6-1 shows that from a certain perspective, the current management of the 
KFH parent treats UIAHs more equitably than the former management had done.  The time 
series of the KFH parent are divided into two periods (before and after the world financial 
crisis), where up to 2007 the KFH parent had CEO duality (a single CEO and Chairman) and 
UIAHs received a higher percentage return compared to prior to 2007.  Then again, UIAHs 
also had a higher CV of rates of return than shareholders.  Yet as a whole sample, it was 
found in the previous chapter that banks with separate chairs and CEOs treated UIAHs more 
equitably (i.e. that there was less of a difference in rates of return compared to 
shareholders) than banks which have duality, supporting the separation of leadership, 
though this could be a coincidence as it might be influenced by some other variable.   
                                                     
 
97 See the full questionnaire, which is provided in Appendix F at the end of chapter 6. 
98 When the ROA was high, the shareholders got more than 28% and UIAHs got about 7% in return, see Table 
6-1, which is a higher profit share return, though still far lower than shareholders.  In other words, the 
difference between what the shareholders get when profits are low and what they get when profits are high 
is much greater than the corresponding difference for the UIAHs.  
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Table 6-1: KFH Kuwait return 
KFH-Kuwait ROE UIAHs Difference 
2002 20.85% 3.35%  
2003 21.28% 2.95%  
2004 24.38% 3.91%  
2005 25.63% 5.55%  
2006 24.87% 6.89%  
2007 28.79% 7.03%  
2008 12.81% 3.50%  
2009 9.57% 2.27%  
2010 8.37% 1.94%  
2011 6.22% 1.54%  
2012 6.69% 1.72%  
2013 7.58% 1.74%  
Return for entire period 16.42% 3.53% 12.89% 
SD for entire period 8.62% 1.97%  
Return up to 2007 24.30% 4.95% 19.35% 
Return after 2007 8.54% 2.12% 6.42% 
SD up to 2007 2.94% 1.79%  
SD after 2007 2.41% 0.72%  
CV up to 2007 12.10% 36.27% -24.17% 
CV after 2007 28.22% 34.14% -5.93% 
CV for entire period 52.49% 55.80% -3.31% 
A comparison between shareholders and UIAHs for the KFH parent, where the difference in return is much 
smaller when KFH Kuwait had a separate leadership after 2007. Up to 2007, the difference in return was 
19.35%, when KFH had same person as both chairman and CEO (duality). However, after 2007, with KFH 
having non-duality in their CG structure, the difference in rates of return was only 6.42%, and the difference 
in CVs becomes less, which indicates more equitable treatment.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the significant change in the economic environment in more 
recent years may have had an effect on profits for the bank and therefore also on the 
returns.  As a result, it is not clear that the structure of management or the change in the 
economy alone resulted in the UIAHs achieving lower returns, and it would be very difficult 
to judge whether the change in the management or the change in the economy resulted in 
a fairer deal for UIAHs, in the form of a lower UIAHs’ CV than that for shareholders.  In fact, 
looking at the overall profitability of KFH Kuwait in more recent years to ascertain if they 
Chapter 6: Case Study       Kuwait Finance House 
 170 
are struggling for profit may also help to explain why the UIAHs have obtained a less bad 
deal compared to the shareholders99.   
However, it has also been noticed that KFH’s subsidiary banks are behaving more fairly 
towards their UIAHs than is the parent bank based in Kuwait, which may suggest that the 
market and regulatory environment have a strong influence on this behaviour. In addition, 
Bahrain and Malaysia have more IBs in their markets than Kuwait, which means that 
competition is likely to be stronger, and that IBs are therefore under more pressure to offer 
better returns to UIAH to attract depositors.  The KFH subsidiaries are fully-fledged banks 
in their markets and it is clear in the case of Bahrain and Malaysia that they have their own 
policies.  Both are separate companies with their own BOD, and most importantly, it would 
seem that they respond to their local environment in their treatment of UIAHs.  For 
example, by looking at the differences in the CV between the parent bank and the 
subsidiaries, as shown later in table 6-14 on page 185, it is evident that the subsidiaries 
deliver better and fairer treatment to their UIAHs than does the parent bank, suggesting 
that the market and regulatory environment have a strong influence on this behaviour. This 
could be due to one or a combination of the following factors: 
1. More intense competition in Bahrain and Malaysia. 
2. People (in the central bank of the country in which the KFH subsidiaries operate) 
being more knowledgeable about KFH actual returns; or more transparency and/or 
more informative financial reporting.   
                                                     
 
99 When the ROA is high, the shareholders got much more benefit, and when the ROA is lower, the 
shareholders’ share fell more than the UIAHs share did.  For example, when the profit is lower, everyone is 
gets a poorer deal, but compared to the shareholders the UIAHs are getting a less poor deal.  When the profit 
is low the bank may transfer some of the profit from the shareholders to the UIAHs to keep the UIAHs happy; 
therefore, when the bank is struggling to make a profit, the UIAHs seem to do better than the shareholders 
since the bank feels they have to pay the UIAHs some profit to keep the UIAHs in-house, discouraging the 
UIAHs from shopping for a new bank.  Conversely, when the bank is doing well, most of the profit goes to the 
shareholders and the UIAHs do less well in comparison. 
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3. IBs in Bahrain follow AAOIFI standards (Ullah, 2013), by which they have to report 
the transactions of the IRR and the PER from/to the UPSIA, while KFH in Kuwait does 
not have to do so.    
 
According to KFH Bahrain’s annual report 2013, the financial statements of KFH Bahrain 
were prepared in accordance with the Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) issued by 
AAOIFI100.  Also, regarding matters that are not covered by FAS, the KFH Bahrain uses the 
relevant International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (KFH-Bahrain, 2013).   
It seems that the subsidiary is acting in one way (as it has a separate chairman and CEO), 
and the parent is acting in another way because its regulatory environment has a different 
structure, the difference in CG structure suggesting a difference in the ethical views of the 
respective boards.  Hence, the difference in returns is more of a policy issue and the 
subsidiaries are acting differently from the parent bank; it could be concluded that this 
variance in behaviour toward the banks’ UIAHs is influenced by their differences in 
governance.  However, it could also be influenced by differences in competition, market 
conditions, or the supervisory environment, and in fact, these differences may even be 
more influential.  For example, by using country dummies in the preceding chapter, an 
attempt was made to measure the potential effects of competition, the market conditions, 
and the supervisory environment, but when the results in table 5-8 of the previous chapter 
were examined, it seemed that the country dummy makes the non-executive director more 
                                                     
 
100 Their Shari’ah rules and principles are determined by the Shari’ah Supervisory Board of the Bank, the 
Bahrain Commercial Companies Law, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) and Financial Institutions Law, which 
follows the rule of CBB rule book (volume 2 and applicable provisions of volume 6) and CBB directives. Also, 
there is a statement by the bank auditor, Ernst and Young, in the KFH Bahrain 2014 annual report, that KFH 
Bahrain’s consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of 
KFH Bahrain as of 31 December 2014, the results of its operations, its cash flows, changes in equity and 
changes in off-balance sheet equity of investment account holders for the year then ended in accordance with 
the Financial Accounting Standards issued by AAOIFI. 
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significant and removes the significance of board size.  Apart from that, the use of the 
country dummy to reflect the different environment does not actually change the results 
much with regard to the treatment of the UIAHs. 
6.7 Comparative analysis of CG at Kuwait Islamic Banks 
IBs in Kuwait fall under the regulation of the central bank, which means that they already 
have a CG standard in place101. According to Capital Standards Report (2013), the Central 
Bank of Kuwait (CBK) has issued new CG rules which replace the previous regulations of 
May 2004, covering banks operating in Kuwait.  The new CG rules were implemented in 
June 2013.  For example, the new CG regulations support non-duality by prohibiting the 
chairman from being the same person as the CEO.  Similarly, a new Companies Rule (Decree 
Law 25 of 2012) from the Ministry of Commerce, replacing the old company law of 1944, 
also focuses on the CG practices of companies, and was implemented in mid-2013.  
Moreover, the Kuwait Capital Market Authority102 (CMA) issued its CG regulation number 
25 in June 2013, based on the “comply or explain” principle for listed companies on the 
Kuwaiti stock exchange, to take effect on 30 June 2016103.  This rule covers all aspects of a 
corporate entity, including its board structure, the selection criteria for constituent 
members, risk management, and other regulations such as remuneration, audit and 
nomination committees.  It also stipulates the separation of duties of the chairperson and 
the CEO, and regulates the relationships between the shareholders, the BOD, and the 
executive management in listed companies.  The CMA CG regulations recognise new 
guidelines concerning the establishment of clear roles and responsibilities, strengthening 
board composition, recruiting highly qualified candidates for the BOD, safeguarding 
integrity in financial reporting, promoting ethical standards and responsible conduct, and 
                                                     
 
101 The Central Bank of Kuwait established its CG code in September 2012. 
102 The CMA was established in 2010 as an independent statutory body reporting directly to the office of the 
Prime Minister. 
103 The CMA does not affect decisions made during the period covered in this thesis; however, Kuwait’s Central 
Bank is the supervisor authority for banks which already have CG in place. 
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ensuring timely and high quality disclosure, as well as respecting the rights of shareholders, 
and recognising the legitimate interests of stakeholders and the importance of social 
responsibility.  The CMA regulations were enhanced in 2014, and among the most 
prominent changes to the CG code were the enhancement of shareholder protection and 
provisions relating to transparency and competition.  Furthermore, the CG code improves 
the protection of other stakeholders’ rights.   
Therefore, it is important to compare the CG structure of the KFH parent with those of 
similar IBs in Kuwait. The tables below show the board structure at Kuwaiti Islamic banks, 
and analyse their leadership structures and other CG components over 12 years.  The 
sampled banks are analysed in terms of having duality or separate CEO-chairman, their ratio 
of non-executive members in the BOD, board size, the existence of a CG committee 
attached to the BOD, and the number of members of the Shari’ah board.  Then, the board 
structure is examined to find any association with the rate of return spread, and to 
determine whether or not leadership structure is one of the CG elements which influences 
the returns for both types of investors.  As shown at the bottom of each bank table below, 
the difference in the rates of returns can be 2 to 3 times (or even more) more for 
shareholders compared to UIAHs, and when risk is factored in and the CV is observed, it is 
clear that UIAHs are not getting a fair deal104. 
6.7.1 Leadership Structures at Kuwait Islamic Banks 
6.7.1.1 Ahli United Bank 
The Ahli United Bank (formerly known as the United Bank of Kuwait and Middle East) was 
established in 1971, having previously been affiliated to a British bank since 1941105.  The 
Ahli United Bank Kuwait converted to become a Shari’ah-compliant bank on April 1, 2010.  
Therefore, it only has 4 sets of data observations to compare with other Kuwaiti IBs.  The 
                                                     
 
104 See the bottom of each bank board structure table. 
105 Ahli United website (http://www.ahliunited.com.kw/en/about/index.html), accessed18/7/2015. 
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Ahli United CV for Shareholders was 8.17%, compared to a UIAHs CV of 26.46%, giving a 
difference in CV of -18.29%, but perhaps as a result of the lack of information these numbers 
are not very representative.  
Table 6-2 Ahli United Bank board structure 
Year Name of Chairman & CEO 
CEO 
duality 
Ratio of non-
executive 
Board 
Size 
CG 
Committee 
No. Of 
Sharia 
board 
2010 Hamad Al-Marzouq Chairman and MD 
Adel A. El-Labban – Group CEO & MD 
No .50 8 0 4 
2011 Hamad Al-Marzouq Chairman and MD 
Adel A. El-Labban – Group CEO & MD 
No .50 8 0 4 
2012 Hamad Al-Marzouq Chairman and MD 
Adel A. El-Labban – Group CEO & MD 
No .50 8 0 4 
2013 Fahad Al-Rajaan – Chairman 
Adel A. El-Labban - Group CEO & MD 
No .82 11 0 4 
   Shareholders UIAHs Difference  
Number of Observations 4 4   
Mean return 13.10% 2.19% 10.91%  
Standard Deviation 1.07% 0.58%   
Coefficient of Variation 8.17% 26.46% -18.29%  
Source: data obtained from Ahli United bank Annual Report (2010-2013).  MD = Managing Director. The 
calculation of CV shows that UIAHs are worse off compared to shareholders, with a difference in rate of return 
of -18.29%.  This indicates that there is volatility in the UIAHs rates of return as a signal that UIAHs face more 
risk, compared to the return they received, implies bad deal in rates of return to UIAHs. 
 
The mean return to shareholders for the 4 years of observations was 13.10%, with a UIAHs 
return of 2.19%, meaning that there was a difference in return of 10.91%.  Even though Ahli 
United has always separated the roles of chair and CEO in its leadership structure, the 
UIAHs’ CV is higher than the shareholders’ CV; this may suggest that, regardless of 
leadership structure, all boards primarily look after their shareholders’ interests.  The bank 
did not have a separate CG committee in their BOD, as suggested by the IFSB.  
 
 
6.7.1.2 Boubyan Bank 
Boubyan Bank (established in 2004, and based in Kuwait) issued its first annual report in 
2005.  The bank reported an unrealised loss of KD 51.7 million for the year 2009 due to 
precautionary provisions that affected their financial results, and to address the impact of 
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the global financial crisis which began in 2008.  As Boubyan’s Annual Report indicated, the 
bank has restructured its board, as can be seen in the following table. 
Table 6-3 Boubyan Board Structure 
Year Name of Chairman & CEO 
CEO 
duality 
Ratio of 
non-
executive Board size 
CG 
Committee 
No. Of 
Sharia 
board 
2005 Yacob AlMuzaini Chairman & MD Yes 0.89 9 0 5 
2006 Yacob AlMuzaini Chairman & MD Yes 0.89 9 0 5 
2007 Yacob AlMuzaini Chairman & MD Yes 0.89 9 0 5 
2008 Mohammed Al-Roumi – Chairman 
Yacob Al-Awadi - Acting, Chief 
Executive Officer 
No 0.89 9 0 5 
2009 Ibrahim Ali Al-Qadhi – Chairman 
Adel Al Majed CEO 
No 0.89 9 0 6 
2010 Ibrahim Ali Al-Qadhi – Chairman 
Adel Al-Majed Vice Chairman & 
MD 
No 0.89 9 0 6 
2011 Ibrahim Ali Al-Qadhi – Chairman 
Adel Al-Majed Vice Chairman & 
MD 
No 0.89 9 0 5 
2012 Adel Al-Majed Chairman & MD Yes 0.89 9 1 4 
2013 Mahmoud Y. Al-Fulaij – Chairman 
Adel Abdul Wahab Al-Majed - 
Vice-Chairman & CEO 
No 0.89 9 1 5 
    Shareholders UIAHs Difference 
Number of Observations 9 9  
Mean return 5.30% 2.83% 2.46% 
Standard Deviation 4.37% 1.59%  
Coefficient of Variation 82.49% 56.27% 26.21% 
Source: Bank Annual Report (2005-2013). The UIAHs risk adjusted return is better than the shareholders’ 
according to the CV; whereas the CV to UIAHs is 56.27%, compared to shareholders’ 82.49%, a difference of 
26.21%. 
 
In 2011, Boubyan Bank established an audit committee to ensure that the CG principles 
published by Kuwait’s Central Bank were in place, and in 2012 the bank formed a CG 
committee attached to the BOD; however, it did not mention its responsibility toward 
UIAHs, as had been suggested by the IFSB.  Also in 2012, only the chairman and the 
managing director were entrusted with executive roles in the bank.  All other board 
members were non-executive directors.  In their 2013 annual report, Boubyan Bank stated 
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the names of their major shareholders and their percentages of ownership. At that time, 
the shares in the bank mostly belonged to the National Bank of Kuwait (NBK), who held 
58.3%.  NBK is the largest conventional bank in Kuwait, and the Public Institution for Social 
Security (a government entity) is a major shareholder of the NBK, but it only holds 5.030% 
of the shares, according to Kuwaiti stock exchange in April 2015. The second largest 
shareholder of Boubyan is the Commercial Bank of Kuwait, which is a conventional bank 
owning 19.9%.  In fact, Boubyan could be run in the interests of the majority shareholders 
of NBK, since NBK owns nearly 60% of shares in Boubyan. 
 
6.7.1.3 Kuwait Finance House - Kuwait 
KFH was established in Kuwait in 1977, and until 2005106 it was the only bank in Kuwait 
offering Shari’ah compliant products. In 1984, the bank was listed on the Kuwaiti stock 
exchange.  The following table shows the ownership disclosure of the major shareholders 
of KFH, most of which are government entities. 
Table 6-4: ownership of KFH 
Name Disclosure Type Percentage Published On 
General Authority for Investment Direct 24.080 2011 
General Authority for Minors Affairs Direct 10.480 2011 
General Secretariat of Awqaf Direct 8.290 2011 
General Organization for Social Insurance Indirect** 6.690 2015 
Source: Kuwait Stock Exchange (2015)107.  **indirect ownership through agencies.  All of the above authorities 
and organisations belong to the Kuwaiti government; therefore, the government ownership share in KFH is 
about 50%. 
                                                     
 
106 Boubyan Bank initial public offering (IPO) was in 2004, but was open to public in the second half of 2005. 
107 http://www.kse.com.kw/EN/Markets/ListedCompanies/Pages/CompanyInfo.aspx?stockcode=108 
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Table 6-5 KFH Board Structure 
Year Name of Chairman & CEO 
CEO 
duality 
Ratio of 
non-
executive 
Board 
Size 
CG 
Committee 
No. Of 
Sharia 
board 
2002 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Jassar D. Al-Jassar - General Manager 
Yes 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2003 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Jassar D. Al-Jassar - General Manager 
Yes 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2004 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Jassar D. Al-Jassar - General Manager 
Yes 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2005 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Mohammed Al-Omar - Deputy GM 
Yes 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2006 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Mohammed Al-Omar - General Manager 
Yes 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2007 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Mohammed Al-Omar - General Manager 
Yes 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2008 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Mohammed Al-Omar – CEO 
No 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2009 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Mohammed Al-Omar – CEO 
No 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2010 
Bader Al-Mukhaizeem Chairman & MD 
Mohammed Al-Omar - CEO 
No 
0.90 
10 
0 6 
2011 
Sameer Al-Nafeesi – Chairman 
Mohammed Al-Omar – CEO 
No 
1.00 
10 
1 5 
2012 
Mohammed Al-Khudairi – Chairman 
Mohammed Al-Omar – CEO 
No 
1.00 
10 
1 5 
2013 
Mohammed Al-Khudairi – Chairman 
Mohammed Al-Omar - CEO 
No 
1.00 
10 
1 5 
 Shareholders UIAHs Difference  
Number of Observations 12 12   
Mean return 16.42% 3.53%** 12.89%  
Standard Deviation 8.62% 1.97%   
Coefficient of Variation 52.49% 55.80% -3.31%  
Source: Bank Annual Report (2002-2013). MD = Managing director. **the mean return to UIAHs is 3.53% for 
the entire period of observations, which is higher than the other Kuwaiti banks. However, if the mean return 
is calculated for the last 4 years compared to the Ahli United bank observations, it would give a return of 
1.73% to the UIAHs, see table 6-9.  The UIAHs’ CV is higher than the shareholders’ CV, indicating that UIAHs 
are worse off than shareholders. 
 
The Governance Committee was established at KFH Kuwait pursuant to a Board of 
Directors’ meeting on 1 August 2011, and initially it was also concerned with BOD 
nominations and remuneration.  However, in a BOD meeting on 11 February 2013, the 
Governance Committee was separated from the Nomination & Remuneration Committee 
in order to carry out its tasks individually, discharging its functions on this basis (KFH Annual 
Report, 2013).  
 
Chapter 6: Case Study       Kuwait Finance House 
 178 
6.7.1.4 Kuwait international Bank 
The Kuwait International Bank was founded in 1973 and became fully Shari’ah-compliant in 
2007 as the third Islamic bank in Kuwait.  Kuwait International Bank (KIB) was originally 
known as Kuwait Real Estate bank. As of December 2015, KIB operated 26 branches, spread 
across Kuwait. 
Table 6-6: Kuwait International Bank leadership structure 
Year 
Name of Chairman of the Board 
of Directors & CEO 
CEO 
duality 
Ratio of 
non-
executive 
Board 
Size CG Committee 
No. Of 
Sharia 
board 
2007 Abdul Wahab Al-Wazzan - 
Chairman 
Adil Ahmad – GM 
No 0.89 9 0 5 
2008 Abdul Wahab Al-Wazzan - 
Chairman 
Hameed Al-Rasheed – MD 
No 0.89 9 0 5 
2009 Abdul Wahab Al-Wazzan - 
Chairman 
Hameed Al-Rasheed – MD 
No 0.89 9 0 5 
2010 Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah – 
Chairman 
Dr. Mahmoud Abdul Eyoun – CEO 
No 0.89 9 0 5 
2011 Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah – 
Chairman 
Loai Maqamis - Acting CEO 
No 0.89 9 0 4 
2012 Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah 
Chairman 
Loai Maqamis - CEO 
No 0.89 9 0 4 
2013 Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah – 
Chairman 
Loai Maqamis - CEO 
No 0.89 9 1 4 
  Shareholders UIAHs Difference  
Number of Observations  7 7   
Mean return  7.10% 2.38% 4.72%  
Standard Deviation  8.24% 1.55% 6.69%  
Coefficient of Variation  116.02% 65.25% 50.77%  
Source: Bank Annual Report (2006-2013).  The mean return to the UIAHs is 2.38%, whereas the mean return 
to shareholders is 7.10%.  Note that the CV for shareholders is 116.02%, compared to the UIAHs CV of 65.25%, 
which indicates that the UIAHs are being fairly treated, according to the risk adjusted returns.  
 
KIB have always supported non-duality in their board composition and kept their board size 
stable in terms of numbers.  However, they did not establish their CG committee until 2013. 
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6.7.2 Return to shareholders and UIAHs (2002-2013) 
The return on equity was calculated by taking the net profit from the banks’ annual reports 
(profit attributable to the equity holders of the Bank), divided by the average stockholder’s 
equity attributable to the equity holders of the bank for the years 2003 to 2013.  The 
percentage returns to the UIAHs were taken from the annual report, or if this return was 
not published as percentage returns, they were calculated as the profit distributed to 
depositors/average of UIAHs depositors’ accounts108.  
Table 6-7 Shareholders’ and UIAHs’ returns at Kuwait Islamic Banks 
Kuwait Islamic Banks Ahli United Bank Boubyan Bank KFH KIB 
Year ROE UIAHs ROE UIAHs ROE UIAHs ROE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA 20.85% 3.35% NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA 21.28% 2.95% NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA 24.38% 3.91% NA NA 
2005 NA NA 6.41% 3.00% 25.63% 5.55% NA NA 
2006 NA NA 9.12% 3.00% 24.87% 6.89% 6.66% 3.24% 
2007 NA NA 14.54% 4.85% 28.79% 7.03% 11.97% 5.19% 
2008 NA NA 1.36% 5.70% 12.81% 3.50% 12.27% 3.31% 
2009 NA NA -46.51% 1.76% 9.57% 2.27% -4.87% 2.22% 
2010 11.96% 3.03% 3.76% 2.70% 8.37% 1.94% 9.07% 2.60% 
2011 12.42% 2.03% 3.33% 2.22% 6.22% 1.54% 5.37% 2.49% 
2012 14.14% 1.72% 4.04% 1.70% 6.69% 1.72% 6.21% 2.41% 
2013 13.87% 1.96% 5.13% 0.56% 7.58% 1.74% 5.99% 0.83% 
Number (N) 4 4 9 9 12 12 8 8 
Mean 13.10% 2.19% 0.13% 2.83% 16.42% 3.53% 6.58% 2.79% 
SD 1.07% 0.58% 17.92% 1.59% 8.62% 1.97% 5.36% 1.23% 
Note: N = number of observation, SD = standard deviation.  The majority of shareholders’ returns are higher 
than the UIAHs’ returns, except in 2009 for Boubyan and KIB as their negative ROE in 2009 was not adjusted 
as in the previous chapter, since here the CV is not being measured. 
 
 
                                                     
 
108 See Appendix H for shareholders and UIAH return calculations 
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Table 6-8: Kuwait Islamic banks CV between the years 2002 – 2013 
CV for Kuwait Banks CV for Shareholders returns (ROE) CV for UIAHs returns 
CV for Ahli United 8.17% 26.46% 
CV for Boubyan 82.49% 56.27% 
CV for KFH 52.49% 55.80% 
CV for KIB 81.35% 44.27% 
The coefficient of variation for shareholders and UIAHs from 2002-2013.  Ahli and KFH had a UIAHs CV higher 
than that for shareholders, which indicates that their risk-adjusted return is not reasonable compared to the 
risk UIAHs are exposed to. 
 
As the above table shows, there is more variability in the UIAHs risk-adjusted returns than 
in the shareholders’ returns in the Ahli United and KFH banks; whereas in the other banks 
(Boubyan and KIB), CV shows more volatility in the shareholders’ risk-adjusted returns than 
for the UIAHs’ returns. 
Table 6-9: Kuwait Islamic banks CV between the years 2010 – 2013 
Kuwait Islamic Banks Ahli United Bank Boubyan Bank KFH KIB 
Year ROE UIAHs ROE UIAHs ROE UIAHs ROE UIAHs 
2010 11.17% 3.03% 3.76% 2.70% 8.37% 1.94% 9.07% 2.60% 
2011 12.42% 2.03% 3.33% 2.22% 6.22% 1.54% 5.37% 2.49% 
2012 14.14% 1.72% 4.04% 1.70% 6.69% 1.72% 6.21% 2.41% 
2013 13.87% 1.96% 5.13% 0.56% 7.58% 1.74% 5.99% 0.83% 
Mean 12.90% 2.19% 4.06% 1.79% 7.22% 1.73% 6.66% 2.08% 
SD 1.38% 0.58% 0.77% 0.92% 0.95% 0.16% 1.65% 0.84% 
CV 10.69% 26.46% 18.90% 51.25% 13.22% 9.48% 24.73% 40.22% 
Since Ahli Bank has only 4 observations, it would also be necessary to compare the last 4 years between this 
bank and their peer Islamic banks in Kuwait.  As a result, KFH has the lowest UIAHs mean return of 1.73% 
even though its UIAHs CV is lower. 
6.7.3 Hypothesis Testing for the Return difference 
Different tests can be used to determine whether or not there is a significant difference 
between the percentage returns to shareholders and to UIAHs; however, a t-test will be 
performed to determine whether or not the two percentage returns are significantly 
different.  The percentage return of shareholders (mean) as ROE (𝜇1) and the percentage 
returns of UIAHs (mean) (𝜇2) are calculated from 2002 to 2013
109.  We are hypothesising 
                                                     
 
109 Some banks have fewer than 12 years of observation since they are new as Islamic banks. 
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that the shareholders and UIAHs should not have significantly different rates of returns 
based on risk exposure to both stakeholders in our sample banks’ annual reports.  If we look 
at the mean for both investors’ returns and identify any significant difference between the 
return for each bank, we will be constructing our test of hypothesis as:  
𝑯𝟎: There is no significant difference between the two means 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 
𝑯𝟏: There is significant difference between the two means return 𝜇1 ≠ 𝜇2 
 
In the following table, both the summary of shareholders’ and UIAHs’ mean returns are 
shown for Kuwait’s IBs from 2002 to 2013, along with the t-statistic for those years. 
 
Table 6-10: Mean return and CV by bank for Kuwait Islamic banks 
2002-2013 Shareholders UIAHs Differences 
Islamic banks Mean SD CV Mean SD CV Mean diff CV diff 
AHLI 13.10% 1.07% 8.17% 2.19% 0.58% 26.46% 10.91% -18.29% 
BOU 5.30% 4.37% 82.49% 2.83% 1.59% 56.27% 2.46% 26.21% 
KFH 16.42% 8.62% 52.49% 3.53% 1.97% 55.80% 12.89% -3.31% 
KIB 7.19% 3.96% 81.35% 2.79% 1.23% 44.27% 4.41% 37.08% 
Note: in 2009, Boubyan’s ROE was -46%, which was replaced by a 0% return.  KFH means that the returns for 
both shareholders and UIAHs are higher than other banks.  However, the UIAHs CV is also higher than the 
shareholders’ CV, which indicates that UIAHs are not being fairly treated in terms of risk adjusted returns. 
Also noted that when UIAHs CV is higher than shareholders’ CV (result to a negative CV difference), the 
difference in rate of return is also higher.  
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Table 6-11: t-statistic of Islamic banks’ rates of return in Kuwait 
Different between shareholders and UIAHs returns for Kuwait Islamic banks 
Time series annual pay-out mean for the period of 2002 - 2013 
      Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean   0.1075 0.0300 
Variance   0.0058 0.0003 
Observations   33 33 
Level of significance   5% 5% 
t-statistic 
  5.7154  
One-tail   0.0000  
t-critical one-tail   1.6896  
Two-tail   0.0000  
t-critical two-tail   2.0301  
Standard deviation   0.0762 0.0159 
Coefficient of variation     0.7094 0.5321 
Data for 4 Kuwaiti Islamic banks returned a t-test with a significant level (α) of 5%, which indicates that there 
is significant difference in returns. 
 
Therefore, by looking at the rate of return differences in the t-test, the null hypothesis, in 
which no difference between the two returns can be rejected, as expected.  By observing 
the annual reports, it has been established that most of the time shareholders receive a 
higher ROE than the UIAHs’ return, and as the t-test shows, there is a significant difference 
between the returns to these two groups. 
6.8 KFH Case Study 
6.8.1 Difference in return of KFH - Kuwait 
By considering KFH-Kuwait individually, the variations between the annual rates of return 
can be determined. The following table shows KFH’s annual rates of return. 
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Table 6-12: KFH ROE and UIAHs’ returns 2002 – 2013 
Year ROE UIAHs 
2002 20.85% 3.35% 
2003 21.28% 2.95% 
2004 24.38% 3.91% 
2005 25.63% 5.55% 
2006 24.87% 6.89% 
2007 28.79% 7.03% 
2008 12.81% 3.50% 
2009 9.57% 2.27% 
2010 8.37% 1.94% 
2011 6.22% 1.54% 
2012 6.69% 1.72% 
2013 7.58% 1.74% 
Number (N) 12 12 
Mean 16.42% 3.53% 
Standard Deviation 8.62% 1.97% 
KFH Kuwait’s mean ROE to shareholders is more than 4 times the mean rate of return to UIAHs. 
 
Again, by looking at the two returns, for shareholders and UIAHs, for KFH Kuwait alone, the 
hypothesis to be tested is constructed as:  
𝑯𝟎: There is no significant difference between the two means 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 
𝑯𝟏: There is significant difference between the two means return 𝜇1 ≠ 𝜇2 
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Table 6-13: KFH Kuwait t-Test for the difference in the rate of return 2002-2013 
Difference between shareholders and UIAHs returns 
Time series of annual pay-out mean return difference between shareholders and UIAHs  2002 - 2013 
      Shareholders UIAHs 
Mean   0.1642 0.0353 
Variance   0.0074 0.0003 
Observations   12 12 
Level of significance   5% 5% 
t-statistic   5.0491  
One-tail   0.0001  
t-critical one-tail   1.7822  
Two-tail   0.0002 ** 
t-critical two-tail   2.1788  
Standard deviation   8.62% 1.97% 
Coefficient of variation     52.49% 55.80% 
Note: ** denotes significance at the 5 per cent level; the p-value is much smaller than the α level of 
5% in KFH’s returns for the period 2002-2013, which indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference between returns for the two classes of equity investors (shareholders and UIAHs).   
 
The annual rate of return for the period 2002-2013 was used to test the significance 
difference between shareholders and UIAHs.  The hypothesis was tested using the 
significance test approach under a two-tailed test with a significance level of α = of 5%.  
Since the p-value is less than α, and the t-test score is 5.0491, which falls in the rejection 
region, the null hypothesis is rejected, and an alternative hypothesis is stated: that there is 
a significant difference between the returns to shareholders and to UIAHs. 
6.9 Discrepancy in UIAHs’ rates of return and smoothing 
6.9.1 KFH parent and its subsidiaries 
Table 6-14 shows a difference in risk-adjusted rates of return between the parent bank and 
its subsidiaries; moreover, when ROA is high, shareholders receive more of the benefits 
than UIAHs.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine the CG of the bank, and also the market 
conditions, in order to clarify why differences in risk adjusted rates of return exist. 
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Table 6-14: returns comparison between KFH and its subsidiaries 
Kuwait Financial House KFH - Kuwait KFH - Bahrain KFH - Malaysia 
Year Shareholders UIAHs Shareholders UIAHs Shareholders UIAHs 
2002 20.85% 3.35% 6.82% 1.75% NA NA 
2003 21.28% 2.95% 8.70% 1.75% NA NA 
2004 24.38% 3.91% 23.77% 3.50% NA NA 
2005 25.63% 5.55% 26.10% 3.51% 0.11% 0.22% 
2006 24.87% 6.89% 26.65% 3.19% 2.03% 0.99% 
2007 28.79% 7.03% 25.77% 5.00% 4.72% 2.29% 
2008 12.81% 3.50% 14.97% 6.00% 4.46% 3.08% 
2009 9.57% 2.27% 0.91% 5.00% 0.00% 2.46% 
2010 8.37% 1.94% 2.08% 2.79% 0.00% 2.56% 
2011 6.22% 1.54% 1.86% 3.75% 0.00% 2.97% 
2012 6.69% 1.72% 2.57% 3.00% 4.07% 3.20% 
2013 7.58% 1.74% 1.52% 2.50% 6.29% 2.77% 
Observation 12 12 12 12 9 9 
Mean 16.42% 3.53% 11.81% 3.48% 2.41% 2.28% 
SD 8.62% 1.97% 10.92% 1.31% 2.50% 1.01% 
CV 52.49% 55.80% 92.43% 37.56% 104.05% 44.38% 
A comparison between the rates of returns of the parent company and of the subsidiaries of Kuwait Finance 
House for shareholders and UIAHs. Note the higher CV, meaning there is more variability in the returns.  KFH 
Malaysia in 2009-2011 had negative ROE (losses) which have been adjusted to a zero return to be more 
comparable with the UIAHs return (see chapter 5 Appendix C for more explanation). KFH Malaysia 
shareholders are not doing well and this could be another factor influencing why UIAHs are getting a better 
deal. 
 
Bank disclosure and transparency in the annual reporting between the parent and its 
subsidiaries may also be useful here.  For example, an examination of the annual report of 
KFH-Bahrain (2013) reveals that the bank gave up part of its Mudarib share to compensate 
UIAHs with a fair return. The bank may also forgo part of its shareholder's profit when 
UIAHs’ return is very low110.  It would therefore be worthwhile to look at the evolution of 
the percentage of UIAHs in the balance sheet and the evolution of the Commodity 
Murabahah Transactions-based term deposits (CMT) for wholesalers and retailers.  Changes 
in the balance sheets of IBs over time should in principle be investigated; however, this is a 
                                                     
 
110 When an Islamic bank give up some or all of its Mudarib share of profits to “smooth” the rate of profit pay-
out to UPSIA, it creates a displaced commercial risk. 
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new trend for IBs and there is as yet insufficient data for a proper comparison.  The point is 
that if UIAHs funds are a relatively small part of the total deposit or capital, it would be 
easier for their return to be smoothed using the share of the shareholders.  However, if 
UIAHs’ share is small, this will also affect the size of the Mudarib share, which can 
sometimes reach up to 70%.  In all cases111, the Mudarib share on the assets goes to the 
shareholders, and if the total return to shareholders is significant (the shareholders’ share 
of the profit plus the Mudarib share), and the return on the assets is poor, then the 
shareholders can still donate some profit to the UIAHs in order to enhance their returns.  
Although the bank may not be able to use shareholders’ retained earnings to compensate 
UIAHs by boosting their returns, they can use PER or IRR to smooth the returns to UIAHs.   
If the bank does not have UPSIAs then the investment funds must come from somewhere 
else112; banks tend not to use much shareholders’ equity.  Usually IBs have two alternatives: 
either CMT-based deposits, or a large volume of current accounts, as Alrajhi does in Saudi 
Arabia.  However, KFH Kuwait consistently has higher total deposits over total assets (TDTA) 
ratio, whereas its subsidiaries have a lower TDTA ratio, which may give the subsidiaries the 
flexibility to forgo some of the Mudarib share (see table 6-15).  For example, in the case of 
KFH Bahrain, it would be easier to pay the UIAHs a higher rate of return than shareholders 
when the ROA is low, since the percentage of TDTA is low113.  The bank can always sacrifice 
some of its Mudarib share to boost the return to UIAHs.  In contrast, if the bank has a high 
proportion of UPSIAs, then this would tend to give the bank a higher Mudarib share, but 
make “smoothing” more costly to the shareholders.  
                                                     
 
111 Except when the bank smooths the UIAHs’ return. 
112 All banks are highly leveraged; the Basel ratio only requires 3% of total exposures to be financed by core 
common equity Tier 1, which is considered the minimum.  Banks generally try to use other people’s funds 
rather than their shareholders’ funds to achieve the leverage effect.  
113 Mudarib is not allowed to use the PER under the terms of contract to pay an amount to the Rabb Almaal 
to make up for a loss, but they could use the IRR.  PER is an account to which the Mudarib has also contributed, 
where the IRR is set up entirely from the profits of UIAHs. 
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Table 6-15: TDTA of KFH and its subsidiaries 
 
KFH-Kuwait KFH-Bahrain KFH-Malaysia 
Year TD TA TDTA TD TA TDTA TD TA TDTA 
2002 6602.21 8530.88 0.77 0.00 94.15 0.00 NA NA NA 
2003 7805.23 10319.31 0.76 82.71 268.35 0.31 NA NA NA 
2004 8697.66 11734.31 0.74 127.39 468.62 0.27 NA NA NA 
2005 10922.26 16031.16 0.68 264.36 693.09 0.38 31.40 133.62 0.24 
2006 12899.98 21836.48 0.59 387.77 1071.81 0.36 292.00 854.54 0.34 
2007 19638.10 32226.74 0.61 1048.94 1955.59 0.54 628.23 1800.89 0.35 
2008 23959.41 38210.18 0.63 739.63 3416.76 0.22 1239.41 2779.19 0.45 
2009 25320.08 39367.85 0.64 627.93 3652.66 0.17 1242.55 3380.44 0.37 
2010 27259.80 44720.24 0.61 647.87 3847.61 0.17 1478.84 3529.92 0.42 
2011 31880.47 48312.28 0.66 969.41 4088.83 0.24 1485.02 3192.41 0.47 
2012 33402.21 52287.70 0.64 764.36 3918.88 0.20 1755.98 2885.33 0.61 
2013 35829.79 52287.70 0.69 1004.79 4162.50 0.24 1628.10 2880.05 0.57 
Source: Bankscope.  TDTA as a percentage, where KFH Kuwait has higher percentage of TDTA than its 
subsidiaries.  Having a high TDTA gives the bank a high Mudarib share; however, a lower TDTA gives flexibility 
to the bank to forego some of the Mudarib share or to smooth the return to UIAHs. 
 
 
6.10 Interview with KFH management 
This section will discuss the interview that took place with a representative of KFH Kuwait’s 
management, and which formed the second part of the explanatory sequential mixed 
methods approach.  The intent of this method is to use the qualitative data to help to 
explain the initial quantitative results.   
The interview (see the interview questionnaire in Appendix F at the end of chapter 6) was 
organized through one of the KFH board members (Mr. Ahmad Al-Omar) and through KFH 
Kuwait’s CEO Office.  A copy of the interview questionnaire was emailed to KFH and to the 
CEO’s office prior to the interview.  The interview was conducted at 12:30pm on September 
9, 2015 at KFH’s headquarters with Dr. Mohamed El-Shebshiry (Report and Research 
Manager of the Strategy and Corporate Affairs Department).  It was agreed that the 
interview would be recorded. I started by explaining the purpose of the research and 
clarified that any question would be omitted on request; however, the interviewee was very 
flexible and had no concerns.  The interview proceeded using a semi-structured path to 
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allow sufficient freedom to explore the findings, outlining the importance of the research 
to ensure coverage of the topic.  The interviewee was happy to answer any questions. The 
discussion was in Arabic, which was later translated into English for the purposes of the 
research, then the interview was transcribed and a copy was sent to Mohamed El-Shebshiry 
on October 5, 2015. It is worth noting that since KFH is based in Kuwait, it was difficult to 
arrange other meetings, as the schedule of top executive directors would not allow for this 
during the time I was in Kuwait. 
 
6.11  Interview Analysis 
Referring to the study undertaken by KFH (see Appendix F, p.204, question 4) the 
interviewee argued that the UIAHs had done as well as the shareholders because the share 
price was 3.5 KWD back in March 2008, and at the time of the interview had fallen to about 
0.580 KWD.  Therefore, it is crucial to further investigate this matter, since it undermines 
the argument of the thesis whereby the shareholders are getting a much better deal than 
the UIAHs.  Even though the KFH argument here is different, the interviewee was referring 
to dividends and changes in the value of shares, rather than accounting profit.  However, it 
is necessary to analyse the real value added to the shareholders, corresponding to the study 
done by KFH and to the period of time used114.  It is worth mentioning that the KFH study 
did not reflect the gain from retained earnings and, hence, the bank growth rate.  It used 
dividends and capital gains for the return to shareholders and ignored the fact that, as table 
6-16 (on the dividend pay-out ratio (DPR)) shows, more than 50% of profits has been kept 
as retained earnings by KFH in most years; it is therefore necessary to examine where the 
other 50% has gone115. 
                                                     
 
114 As KFH was listed on the Kuwait stock exchange in 1984, data is not available for the whole KFH internal 
study period of 1978 to 2014, while Bloomberg historical data goes back to 1999.    
115 A significant amount of value was (arguably) lost in the 2008 global financial crisis, which seems to have 
led to a big fall in the KFH share price; see Table 6-18. 
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Table 6-16: KFH Dividend pay-out ratio 
 
Source: Bankscope.  KFH was first listed on the Kuwait stock exchange in 1984; therefore, data is not available 
for the whole KFH internal study period of 1978 to 2014.  As indicated by the graph, KFH kept more than 50% 
of their profit in most years as retained earnings.  Where dividend pay-out = dividend paid *100 / net Income.  
Dividend paid = common dividends relating to the period.  Net income = net income before profit transfers - 
profit transfers to parent companies. Most KFH shares are owned by the government of Kuwait, which does 
not actively trade in the market. 
 
What is the effect on the value to the shareholders of having more than 50% earnings 
retention?  It does not make sense for a firm to retain more than 50% of the annual profit 
if doing so brings no benefit to the shareholders; otherwise the firm would pay out all the 
profit as dividends116. It should not be forgotten that UIAHs do not benefit from the retained 
earnings.  The other issue is, what happens to the share price if, for example, any new stock 
has been issued, or a stock split or bonus issue has affected the share price117.  Therefore, 
the expected effect on share price given the cost of equity118 must be analysed by examining 
                                                     
 
116 A bank may need to retain some earnings to meet the capital adequacy requirement, in an attempt to meet 
the 12% minimum ratio of all eligible risk weighted assets; however, KFH’s level constantly remains above 16% 
according to their annual report. Also, when a country has a higher income tax rate, people like to buy shares 
in companies which do not pay dividends; however, we are dealing with KFH Kuwait where stockholders do 
not pay income tax. 
117 Of course, UIAHs do not bear the risk of stock price fluctuations, but they do bear the risk of losing their 
entire fund invested with the bank. 
118 Different methods can be used to evaluate companies, including CAPM, which is used to determine the 
cost of capital especially for large firms. Also, in 1961 Modigliani and Miller determined the required rate of 
return on equity where the firm value is equal to the number of shares multiplied by their price, substituting 
for new issues. 
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the dividend pay-out ratio, and the market capitalisation (market cap) to calculate the 
bank’s growth rate over the period of years, which will reflect the value created by retained 
earnings.  The Gordon Growth Model (GGM) concept is used in this research to assess the 
growth rate of the bank, and is described in the next section. 
6.12 Rationale for using Gordon Growth Model 
The focus here is to look at the behaviour of the stock market and the amount of value that 
shareholders could have obtained from the retained earnings as suggested by the Gordon 
growth model. The KFH study did not consider the gain from retained earnings that 
shareholders could have had (KFH only used dividends and capital gains for the return to 
shareholders) and ignored that more than 50% of profits has been kept as retained 
earnings.  Therefore, it would be essential to examine the additional value from retained 
earnings that goes to shareholders, since UIAHs do not benefit from it. 
GGM, also known as the dividend discount model, measures the fundamental value of a 
company stock at today’s prices by calculating the present value of a stock's future 
dividends taking the pay-out ratio into account.  According to Quiry et al. (2009), the model 
is based on the assumption that the value of a company is indicated by the stream of 
dividends the investor expects to receive over a period of time.  In other words, it is 
determined by the expected cash flows investors will receive from holding a stock. 
Constant Dividend Growth Model:  
 
𝑃0 =
𝐷𝑖𝑣0(1 + 𝑔)
𝑟𝐸− 𝑔
=  
𝐷𝑖𝑣1
𝑟𝐸− 𝑔
 Equation 6-1 
Where:  
𝑃0 = value of stock 
𝐷𝑖𝑣0 = dividends at time 0 
𝐷𝑖𝑣1 = expected dividends at time 1 
𝑟𝐸  = required rate of return for equity investors or discount rate 
𝑔 = constant growth rate.   
Note that this is a form of the valuation formula for a growing perpetuity where 𝑟𝐸  = the discount rate and g 
= the rate of growth. 
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Also, as explained by different authors including Sharpe et al. (1999), Gordon’s Growth 
Model is a share valuation model where the market price of a share can be calculated as 
follows, with the dividend being expressed as earnings multiplied by a payout ratio: 
 
 𝑃 =  
𝐸 (1 − 𝑏)
𝑘𝑒 −  𝑏𝑟
 Equation 6-2 
 
Where:  
𝑃 = Market price of equity share  
𝐸 = Earnings per share of the firm 
𝑏 = Retention ratio (1- pay-out ratio) 
𝑟 = Rate of return on investment of the firm on retained earnings 
𝑘𝑒 = Cost of equity share capital 
𝑏𝑟 = Growth rate of the firm 
 
There are two ways of generating cash flows from owning a stock: one is from the dividends 
paid to investors, and the other is via stock price appreciation as capital gains (Berk, 2014).  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) pointed out that when a company receives money from 
operating profits and the issuing of new equity, that money has two particular purposes: 
investment and dividends.  However, when managers pay dividends, they reduce the 
amount of free cash flows available to spend on themselves.  This may raise the incentive 
to increase the retained earnings and reduce the dividend pay-out, which creates an agency 
problem (Easterbrook, 1984).  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) also claimed that a company’s value is determined by its 
earnings and business risk.  Accordingly, KFH has shown stable growth, paid constant 
dividends, and become highly leveraged. Given that it is a bank, it would be suitable to use 
the GGM to estimate the value of the bank and the real benefit to shareholders, as the 
interviewee ignored the value created by the retained earnings.  For example, if the bank 
wanted to expand in one way or another and raised capital by retaining earnings to support 
that expansion which is expected to be profitable, this would be reflected in the value of 
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the bank119. This is included as the growth of DPS (g) in the Gordon Growth Model.  Also, 
the model divides the dividend into earnings and the retained portion, designated by 𝑏, and 
analyses growth as two components, 𝑏 plus the return on 𝑏.  The GGM proposition on the 
value for the shareholders is created if the rate of return on the retained earnings r is 
greater than the cost of capital 𝑘𝑒.  GGM highlights the significance of having a rate of return 
on retentions greater than the cost of capital; otherwise, there is no benefit to shareholders 
from retaining earnings.    
Therefore, taking the idea behind GGM that retained earnings create value for firms, which 
lead to a company growing, as it will be reflected in shareholder value.  In that sense looking 
at KFH’s DPR as shown in table 6-17, it is evident that more than 50% has been retained; 
the other 50% of the profit did not simply disappear, but was used to create some value for 
the shareholders, although this is not reflected in the KFH study calculation which only 
considered the dividend.  This needs to be addressed by KFH, as retained earnings do not 
benefit UIAHs, which does not give a fair comparison or ensure a fair deal between UIAHs 
and shareholders. 
6.13 Capital Adequacy Requirement 
Banks generally retain some of their earnings to help meet their capital adequacy 
requirements.  The capital adequacy ratio refers to eligible capital120, which is essentially 
stockholders’ equity divided by risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2004; IFSB-15, 2013). This is not 
to be confused with the unweighted “exposures” used for the leverage ratio; instead, in 
Basel 2 pillar 1 it is the assets multiplied by the risk weights, which range from 0 (certain 
sovereign exposures as rated AAA to AA-) to 100% or more for normal receivable exposures.  
Banks’ shareholders’ funds on the balance sheet contribute to their capital adequacy; in 
                                                     
 
119 According to the GGM retained earnings would be reflected in the value of the bank, provided r > ke. 
120 According to Basel 2 pillar 1, total eligible capital covering market risks consists of shareholders’ equity and 
retained earnings in Tier 1 capital and supplementary Tier 2 capital as defined in paragraphs 49(i) to 49(xii).  
For IIFS, this is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, IFSB-15 (2013). 
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other words, they can increase the amount of eligible capital compared to the risk-weighted 
assets. Having more capital allows the bank to expand its assets and hence to increase its 
earnings, and if the market believes that the expansion will be profitable, the share price 
should increase. This would be one reason for retaining earnings, but retaining more than 
50% of retained earnings over the period (as shown in table 6-17) considerably builds up 
eligible capital (given the requirement set out in Basel 2), which is hardly necessary unless 
the bank’s assets are being significantly expanded. The bank is, in fact, aggressively 
expanding its assets, generating significant new financing that requires the eligible capital 
to support those assets121. 
Table 6-17: KFH Dividend pay-out ratio 
Year Dividend paid Net Income DPR 
1995 9.00 31.4 28.66 
1996 12.90 34.4 37.50 
1997 17.40 36.9 47.15 
1998 19.30 43.4 44.47 
1999 22.70 45.7 49.67 
2000 25.80 48.9 52.76 
2001 29.30 53.6 54.66 
2002 32.10 56.5 56.81 
2003 35.80 60.8 58.88 
2004 39.10 77.3 50.58 
2005 60.20 129.1 46.63 
2006 69.80 193.2 36.13 
2007 111.50 325.4 34.27 
2008 82.10 174.6 47.02 
2009 56.90 71.8 79.25 
2010 49.30 71.8 68.66 
2011 39.60 37.1 106.74 
2012 28.40 123.3 23.03 
2013 49.00 149.1 32.86 
2014 63.90 160.1 39.91 
Source: Bankscope database, obtained on 27 November 2015; net income is in KWD, and DPR as a 
percentage. In most years, 50% of profit is kept as retained earnings by the KFH BOD.  
                                                     
 
121 Except with the assets that are zero risk weighted such as certain sovereign exposures (AAA rated), which 
is normally not the case here. 
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Table 6-18: KFH financial analysis 
Year 
Market 
Cap 
Share 
outstanding DPS 
Dividend 
Yield (%) P/E 
EPS 
Diluted 
Market/book 
value 
UIAHs 
return 
1996 367.21 2785.14 0.01 3.25 11.67 NA 3.33 5.96% 
1997 434.74 2785.12 0.01 3.72 12.29 0.12 3.38 6.07% 
1998 423.31 2785.12 0.01 4.56 10.68 0.12 2.83 6.13% 
1999 431.67 2785.12 0.01 5.26 10.27 0.06 1.24 5.75% 
2000 460.07 2627.47 0.01 5.60 9.62 0.12 1.20 5.64% 
2001 598.22 2837.67 0.01 4.89 11.64 0.01 1.44 3.69% 
2002 778.33 3007.93 0.01 4.12 14.23 0.06 1.76 3.35% 
2003 1147.02 3007.93 0.01 3.13 19.70 0.06 2.36 2.95% 
2004 1281.51 3007.93 0.01 3.05 17.04 0.26 2.34 3.91% 
2005 2603.64 3936.62 0.02 2.31 19.56 0.40 2.86 5.55% 
2006 2671.03 3936.62 0.02 2.61 16.48 0.06 2.48 6.89% 
2007 4940.21 4223.56 0.03 2.26 17.33 0.08 2.95 7.03% 
2008 2799.44 4223.56 0.02 2.94 17.83 0.03 1.76 3.50% 
2009 2500.62 4223.78 0.01 2.27 21.16 0.03 1.49 2.27% 
2010 2859.62 4223.78 0.01 1.72 26.92 0.02 1.61 1.94% 
2011 2377.37 4223.56 0.01 1.67 29.76 0.02 1.31 1.54% 
2012 2302.77 4223.56 0.01 1.23 26.30 0.02 1.15 1.72% 
2013 3013.40 4765.04 0.01 1.63 27.86 0.03 1.81 1.74% 
2014 3118.93 4765.04 0.01 2.08 24.26 0.03 1.79 1.69% 
Source: Bloomberg.  As can be seen from the table above, the market cap for KFH has increased over the years 
except after 2007 (global economics crisis), which indicates that the bank grew steadily until 2008 in which 
year it fell significantly and did not resume growth until 2012, although the retained earnings are being 
invested.  As a result, since 2007 until 2012 it does not appear that the value for shareholders has been 
increased by share price appreciation in addition to the cash dividends and bonus shares they have received. 
However, the Kuwaiti stock market is far from efficient, so that it is not clear what can be concluded from this.  
 
The capital adequacy requirement and the fact that retained earnings increase the bank’s 
eligible capital enable it to grow its assets and, hence, potentially its profit.  It should be 
borne in mind that the capital adequacy ratio based, not on unweighted assets, but on risk-
weighted assets, where the risk weights of the assets held by the bank could be anywhere 
between 0 and in excess of 100%.     
 
6.14 KFH ratios 
It is necessary to consider some of the ratios for KFH to analyse the real benefit to 
shareholders, such as DPR in table 6-17, in which KFH pays out less than 50% of its profit as 
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dividends.  The study by KFH, which was based on the pay-out dividends that only account 
for the 50% of profits, took no account of the other 50% as retained earnings.  The other 
50% or more did not simply vanish; the bank would normally reinvest the money to 
continue growth, adding some benefit to shareholders, or to pay off debt, or even use it as 
a cash reserve for future acquisitions.  Also it is worth mentioning the bonus shares issued 
to shareholders (see table 6-21 p. 214), which dilutes the shares so that the share price will 
adjust downwards accordingly. 
On the other hand, market cap and share price are other factors which can be used to show 
how much a company has grown in value; because, presumably, it has been building value 
through retaining earnings. For a bank in particular, the retained earnings increase the 
eligible capital, allowing the bank to expand or to grow the assets on its balance sheet while 
still meeting the capital adequacy ratio of 12%.  The higher the earnings retained by the 
bank, the more it can expand its assets in which its funds are invested, given that most funds 
that are being invested are not equity at all.  Increasing equity can increase the assets under 
management; however, these assets are financed largely by non-equity such as current 
accounts or UPSIA.  In other words, in terms of the amount of equity on which leverage is 
applied, the more equity a firm has, the more equity it can leverage by bringing non-equity 
funds to finance assets.  This is the case even though it creates profit for the shareholders 
and also for the UIAHs (but mainly for the shareholders).  Therefore, by examining market 
capitalisation as set out in table 6-18, it can be seen that it has been increasing over the 
years until 2008, which would be expected during the period of global financial crisis.   
Alternatively, the Market to Book ratio, or price to book ratio, compares a company’s 
market price or market value to its book value (Wahlen et al., 2014).  A higher market to 
book ratio implies that investors expect management to create more value from a given set 
of assets, reflecting confidence in the company's ability to generate profits and future cash 
flows.  If the market to book value is less than 1, then shares are selling at a discount to the 
company’s net asset value (NAV), a situation which may be caused by misjudgement by the 
management, and may create a negative reputation.  Normally, it would be expected that 
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shares are selling at a slight premium to NAV, but occasionally it may be that banks also 
have intangible assets which are not reflected in the balance sheet, such as goodwill or 
reputational assets.  However, as table 6-18 shows, the market to book ratio has always 
been above 1 in this case. 
Kuwaiti stock market is far from efficient, therefor the total shareholder returns (TSR) 
doesn’t really mean anything and that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from it.  
However, since the data is available here, it may be of interest to examine whether or not 
the rate of stock market return to shareholders has a bigger CV than the rate of return to 
UIAHs. (see Appendix G, for TSR)    
6.15 Findings 
By examining the three countries, it has been established that the two subsidiaries in 
Bahrain and Malaysia operate in the context of far more competitor IBs than does the 
parent bank in Kuwait.  Additionally, Bahrain and Malaysia enjoy better regulation than 
Kuwait.  For example, by looking at the annual report for the two subsidiary banks, it can 
be seen that they have greater transparency of financial reporting.  KFH Bahrain and 
Malaysia disclose full details about the PER and IRR reserve accounts in their annual reports, 
while KFH Kuwait does not mention the transactions between these reserve accounts.  KFH 
Kuwait enjoyed a long period as the only Islamic bank in Kuwait before Boubyan bank 
entered in 2005 followed by others later.   However, the newcomers are yet to have an 
effect on the results of KFH Kuwait, which shows in the returns to UIAHs, an increase in the 
amount of UIAHs deposits even though the bank’s return has been lower since 2008. It is 
worth mentioning that the UIAHs are passive investors, not sophisticated ones, who are not 
encouraged to shop around. In general, people mostly change banks because of their 
customer service, location, and Shari’ah compliance (Hanif et al., 2012). 
The roles of the regulator and supervisor in the transparency aspect of the CG are 
important, as can be seen in the difference between the KFH parent and the KFH 
subsidiaries. KFH Kuwait claims that it uses IFRS in its annual report, but the main problem 
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with using IFRS is that IFRS does not specify information about PER and IRR, and the bank 
may claim to be applying IFRS even though it does not disclose these particular reserves, 
which is normally expected in the spirt of the IFRS. One of the contributions of the research 
is to let the Kuwait Central Bank know that some IBs are not as transparent as they claim to 
be, especially toward UIAHs. 
Looking at the board composition of KFH Kuwait, it has been noticed that while the 
chairman and CEO were the same (CEO duality), the UIAHs had a “poor deal”, while when 
the top management was changed, the treatment of the UIAHs also changed.  This may 
suggest that new top management policies have been focused towards better treatment 
for UIAHs returns, and could be an indication of the competition effect brought by the new 
IBs in Kuwait that KFH now have to compete with.  However, looking at the profit of KFH 
Kuwait, the top management policies toward UIAHs may not be the cause, and competition 
could be another (though less important) macroeconomic factor which is a reason why the 
return on assets is lower.  Although there may be some explanation relating to their 
governance structure, it seems that all other influences are simply being dominated by the 
effect of ROA.  For example, when profits are high, shareholders get a higher return; the 
difference in returns between them and UIAHs is biggest in the years when ROA is highest, 
and shareholders receive good returns.  But when ROA is low, the shareholders obviously 
cannot pay themselves out of non-existent profit, and it appears that the bank is treating 
the UIAHs “more fairly” by comparison, which consequently produces the incorrect 
inference that UIAHs are being treated “more fairly” when the profit is low, compared to 
their return when profit is high.  In fact, UIAHs may not be being treated fairly at any stage 
but this is not so apparent when profit is low because the shareholders are also receiving a 
low return on their assets. Therefore, the discrepancy between the rates of return paid to 
shareholders and to the UIAHs is greater when profits are higher, because shareholders 
receive most of the benefit from these higher profits.   
Influential factors other than management policy might include customer service and 
branch locations, since there is a benchmark for return which the central bank is currently 
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imposing.  UIAHs would not generally wish to have to deal with the complexities of closing 
down one account only to go to a different bank and sign a new contract, receive a new 
card, etc., especially if they have been with same bank for a long time and have a Shari’ah 
compliant return.  For example, KFH Kuwait has branches all over the country and if the 
newly arrived bank has very few branches, UIAHs would usually rather not change their 
bank for little extra return.   
In addition, the long period without competition gave KFH advantages over newcomers.  
There is also evidence that the Kuwaiti market is not behaving efficiently; UIAHs are staying 
with KFH even though some competitors are offering a better deal; the obvious reason for 
this that KFH is well-established in the market while the others are newcomers, though this 
situation may not persist.  In a sense, the Kuwaiti market is in a state of transition from the 
virtual monopoly of KFH, which for many years enjoyed a de-facto monopoly in the national 
market.     
In the interview122, KFH management mentioned that IBs are less risky than conventional 
banks.  KFH may be a solid bank, but such an evaluation depends on what kind of risk is 
being discussed.  For example, in conventional banks, the depositors know what return they 
will get, or at least know that their return is based on the market rate of interest, and also 
that their capital is safe unless the bank goes bankrupt.  However, in IBs the capital is not 
necessarily safe; the assets may go down in value.  The bank could be perfectly solid but the 
capital may still be reduced, and returns to UIAHs would be negative.  However, if asset 
allocation is discussed (less risky than in conventional banks) then the situation changes, 
since KFH deal mostly in Murabahah and real estate (that said, real estate can be very risky).   
Therefore, the basic proposition in analysing the return difference between KFH parent and 
its subsidiaries is that the driver is the ROA.  In a sense, KFH Malaysia seems to treat its 
UIAHs well, because their shareholders are not doing well at all.  In fact, KFH Malaysia 
                                                     
 
122 See Appendix E 
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decided to pay the UIAHs when the profit is negative.  As far as Bahrain is concerned, the 
picture is rather mixed; while Bahrain suffered more in the post-crisis period, looking at the 
profit may suggest that the UIAHs are doing quite well, whereas in fact it is the shareholders 
who are doing badly.  Therefore, the suggestion that UIAHs in Bahrain and Malaysia are 
having a better deal than Kuwait because of competition may now seem less convincing 
because to a large extent it appears that the ROA is driving the return.    
In a sense, we would expect the shareholders to obtain higher returns, since this is how 
UPSIA tends to work.  However, with the methods that we have (the CV), the bank could 
still pay shareholders more, but the CV for shareholders would be higher, and this would be 
our criterion for judging whether UPSIA is working fairly.  By answering which party is being 
allocated the higher rate of return, and which party has the higher CV, the rationale is to 
justify higher mean return by having higher risk, but not having higher risk and low return, 
which is the case where CV is higher. 
Even though the interview is crucial, there are some points discussed in the interview that 
needed to be addressed and clarified.  According to KFH-Kuwait (2014), annual report, and 
the statement by Mr. Al-Marzouq, chairman of the KFH board123, KFH BOD has proposed a 
cash dividend of 15% for 2014 with additional issuance of bonus shares of 10% of paid up 
share capital [29.68 fills (KWD 0.02968) earnings per share, equivalent to US$0.0974], 
whereas in 2013 the cash dividend was 13% and bonus shares of 13% were also issued124. 
“GuruFocus” financial analysis125, calculates the average dividends per share growth rate 
                                                     
 
123  Source: KFH website. “Profits Reflect KFH’s Solid Financial Position, Healthy Performance, and Successful 
Implementation of Plans”, 02 August 2015.  Retrieved 29 Nov. 2015 from: 
http://www.kfh.com/en/about/news/ArchiveNewsDetails.aspx?q=okcVzr8Hi3sIPpIwyk7DmQ== 
124 KFH chairman Al-Marzouq announced that KFH Posts net profit of Kuwaiti Dinar (KWD) 145.8 mln for 
2015 17% cash dividends, 10% bonus shares, 31.1 fils (0.031 KWD) earnings per share. Source: Zawya 
website, KFH related news, Kuwait, January 28th 2016. Retrieved 13-6-2016 at 
http://www.zawya.com/mena/en/company/5083/  
125 Source: KFH website. “Kuwait Finance House Dividend Pay-out Ratio”, as of Dec. 2014.  Retrieved 29 Nov. 
2015 from: 
http://www.gurufocus.com/term/payout/KUW:KFIN/Dividend%2BPayout%2BRatio/Kuwait%2BFinance%2B
House. 
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for KFH as 42.90% in the last 12 months.  However, the interviewee claimed that the value 
of 1KD invested in shares back in 1978 has produced slightly more value than 1 KD invested 
in UPSIA. The KFH study used stock price changes and dividends and ignored the bonus 
shares to shareholders and the retained earnings of more than 50% of its profit.  Unlike in 
UPSIA, where no value is created from profit retention, logically the shareholder should 
benefit from retained earnings, otherwise there is no point in having the retained earnings; 
one might as well have a DPR of 100%.  Therefore, UIAHs do not benefit from retained 
earnings the way shareholders do, and UIAHs do not profit from having more assets.   
For example, when the bank needs to expand, it will raise more UIAHs funds to finance 
these extra assets.  The bank raises more non-equity capital given that, under BCBS III, 
equity only has to be about 3% of total assets (97% of assets are financed by non-equity), 
which is a mixture of current account, UIAHs, and possibly CMT-based term deposits.  The 
more the 3% increases, the more the 97% will also increase, but the UIAHs are putting more 
money in and are not receiving better returns on their existing money.  The fact that the 
bank is actually raising more UPSIA money to finance its assets means that the 1KD invested 
in UPSIAs does not grow in the way it does with shares, because to finance these extra 
assets the bank has to raise additional UPSIAs; however, they are not receiving any bonuses 
to fund such extra assets (either from the same UPSIAs or from a different investment 
account). 
Therefore, it is clear that the KFH study disregarded the logic behind the dividend growth 
model.  Shareholders may not benefit much in terms of share price appreciation from 
retained earnings in an inefficient market, so it is therefore difficult to understand why KFH 
retained so much of its earnings, except perhaps to boost its regulatory capital. For this 
reason, it is important to include the hidden value created for shareholders by including the 
market cap in 1978126 compared to the market cap in 2014, as well as looking at the number 
                                                     
 
126 KFH was listed in Kuwait stock exchange in 29/9/1984. 
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of shares outstanding plus the share price.  In fact, the market cap increased between 
1996127 and 2014 (as shown in the table 6-18), and hence, so has the bank size. Similarly, 
growth in the market cap up to 2008 could have been a reflection of the value created by 
the retained earnings in addition to some new share issues, because the earnings retained 
by the bank boosted its eligible capital, allowing it to take on more assets and still maintain 
an acceptable capital adequacy ratio, although the market fall in 2008 (due to the global 
financial crisis) affected the share prices of KFH and many other institutions. 
 
6.16 Concluding remarks 
From the CG perspective, the big difference between KFH Kuwait and the KFH subsidiaries 
in other counties is not only related to the management policy, or at least this is unlikely to 
be the main influence, since the size of the return on the assets is the main factor.  As KFH 
Kuwait’s profit is consistently better than its subsidiaries, with possible exceptions for KFH 
Bahrain in 2005, 2006, and 2008, then arguably the profit is what drives the differences in 
return rather than any issue of management policy.  Also, from a CG perspective issue, 
where UIAHs lack the rights of governance, the management behave as though they are 
only accountable to the shareholders, to give them the maximum return possible128.  The 
profit availability to shareholders arises from the accounting process chosen by the top 
management, and possibly from different asset allocations, which are not really profit 
sharing processes.  CG’s way of working is that top management sees itself as accountable 
to the shareholders, in seeking always to give them the best possible deal.  In contrast, the 
bank gives the UIAHs just enough return to prevent them from transferring to a different 
bank, which seems to be the policy of the top management.  Again, the question is how the 
top management can use the above situation as an ongoing policy. A significant reason for 
the difference in the percentage returns is that UIAHs have no governance rights.  In 
                                                     
 
127 1996 was the earliest data which was obtained from Bloomberg. 
128 This refers to the profit available for dividend rather than the dividend itself. 
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addition, UIAHs lack the ability to use what rights they do have.  UIAHs are unsophisticated 
retail depositors who do not move their deposit to search for best return, unless extreme 
circumstances compel them to withdraw their funds and go somewhere else.  Additionally, 
it is not obvious that even if the UIAHs had the power to appoint and move directors, the 
outcome would be any different, because this would not make most of them any less 
passive as investors. 
It is worth mentioning that UPSIAs are in a number of cases being replaced by sale- 
(Murabahah) based fixed profit deposits such as CMTs (IFSB-Report, 2015).  According to 
the stability report issued by the IFSB in 2015, UPSIAs have slipped by 50% across IBs.  A 
new bank law in Malaysia requires UPSIAs to operate on a strict Mudarabah basis without 
smoothing, etc., while UIAHs expect losses.  This contrasts with the previous authority of 
the central bank’s instructions to banks not to lose the capital invested by UIAHs (similar to 
Qatar). For example, if an Islamic bank lost the capital of UIAHs, then they could find 
themselves in trouble with the supervising authority.   However, this has now been changed; 
Malaysia went from one extreme to the other, and the Malaysian authority might create 
CG issue without realising, by focusing on Mudarabah being Shari’ah compliant.   
In the KFH study, the 1 KWD grew to 102 KWD for shareholders between 1978 and 2014, 
whereas in fact it grew to more than 102 KWD, because there were also several bonus 
issues. This means that a shareholder who bought in 1978 and held until 2014 would have 
ended up with more than 1 share for each share bought.  In fact, in an efficient market, the 
retained earnings cannot simply be ignored129; they must be taken into account.  Therefore, 
the UIAHs receive only a pay-out; in contrast, the shareholders similarly get a pay-out but 
also bonus shares and retained earnings, which normally create value.  This is especially 
true for a bank, because retaining earnings increases the eligible capital, allowing it to grow 
its assets and its earnings streams.  
                                                     
 
129 Even though the retained earnings may have been wiped out by the share price fall in the 2008 global 
financial crisis.  
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It is worth pointing out that most shares in KFH are owned by the government of Kuwait, 
which does not actively trade in the market, making the share price more sensitive.  This 
means that private shareholders who own a percentage (depending on what percentage is 
actively traded) can have an influence on the share price; in particular, if an investor owns 
about 10%, trading this 10% would have an impact on the price (either up or down); this is 
the main reason why stock market data is not used to any large extent. 
Generally, today’s share price depends on future growth in dividends discounted by the 
discount factor minus the growth rate, as the Gordon Growth Model attempts to measure 
the effect on value. Hence, retained earnings lead to a company growing, provided that the 
funds which are retained earned more than the cost of capital.  This will boost the value of 
the company, and hence will be reflected in shareholder value. 
It seems that KFH is using UPSIAs purely to satisfy Shari’ah compliance; they may not believe 
in profit sharing but they have to use it, and they are doing so in such a way that their 
business model is as close as possible to that of a conventional bank model.  It is true that 
when comparing KFH’s returns to UIAHs with those of their competitors, they have 
generally been paying more, since their profit is higher, but if we compare KFH’s returns in 
the last 4 years they have been paying less than their competitors.  KFH pays a low, fairly 
stable return just to keep UIAHs in-house, and they appear to have no ethical problem in 
claiming that this is profit sharing.  In fact, they are just bankers working with prohibitions 
and have no problem with the idea of paying a fixed low return to depositors, with the rest 
going to shareholders, just as Shari’ah allows them to do.  However, the bank is not entering 
into the spirt of Shari’ah, in terms of the issue of juristic compliance.  They are using a 
Mudarabah contract, which is a Shari’ah compliant contract, but they are using the 
flexibility that the Mudarabah contract gives them, such as a high Mudarib share, in order 
to produce an outcome somewhat similar to a conventional bank.  The problem is that they 
are claiming to practise profit sharing, when in fact they are doing something rather 
different. 
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  The Interview Questionnaire 
 
F.1 The interview 
The following numbered sections form a brief questionnaire which was sent to KFH Kuwait 
prior to the interview, and during the meeting it was explained to them that the 
questionnaire is a part of a research project at the University of Reading, UK, with the 
objective of completing a PhD degree in Finance (CG) under the supervision of Professor 
Simon Archer and Dr. Carol Padgett.  
It was further explained to KFH that the main purpose of the research is to evaluate the 
returns between two classes of investors in IBs (shareholders and Unrestricted Investment 
Account Holders).  The research is not interested in the differences in the rates of return as 
such, but the reasons for the differences in the rates of return on a risk-adjusted basis, that 
is to say the coefficients of variation of the rates of return (i.e. the standard deviation of the 
rates divided by the average rate paid by each bank between the period 2002-2013).  
At the beginning of the interview, I explained to the interviewee that it would be greatly 
appreciated if they could kindly spare a few minutes to answer the following brief set of 
questions. I assured them that all information provided would be treated as strictly 
confidential and would be used only for this project130.  
1. How does the management of KFH consider the bank’s fiduciary duties towards 
unrestricted Investment Account Holders (UIAHs) on the one hand, and towards 
shareholders on the other hand? 
KFH operates according to the CG rules and guidelines of the Central Bank of Kuwait.  
It is imperative that KFH meets its CG obligations and implements all the mandatory 
requirements imposed by the Central Bank of Kuwait.  Furthermore, KFH developed 
a set of policies and procedures on the disclosure of material information to 
                                                     
 
130 The focus is in the KFH parent company accounts, not the consolidated accounts. 
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stakeholders, and put in place a new remuneration policy; the approved policies are 
also included in the Code of Conduct and Ethics for the members of the Board of 
Directors, officers and staff. The Board of Directors shall be fully responsible for 
KFH’s operations and sound financial position, and as such the Board shall confirm 
compliance with the Central Bank of Kuwait’s requirements, and protect the 
interests of the shareholders, depositors, creditors, employees and other 
stakeholders and related parties. 
 
2. How are the respective shares of profits available to unrestricted UIAHs and 
shareholders determined? 
Islamic banks create investment accounts to generate profit.  KFH has 4 different 
investment accounts: 
a. Savings account 40-60, where KFH invest 40% and keep 60% for cash 
withdrawals. Savings can be withdrawn at any time, but no cheque books are 
issued. 
b. Investment account (Khumaseia): 5 years’ investment period, intended for long 
run investors. 
c. Sedra is quarterly calculated profit, where the UIAHs gets a return.  
d. Alkuwthar investment account, where the profit is calculated monthly and the 
UIAHs have a monthly return; this account was created based on UIAHs demand. 
Therefore, KFH has different investment accounts for different purposes and 
different investors. The longer the period in which the money is kept in the account, 
the greater the return the investors receive. 
These investment accounts are based on Mudarabah or Musharakah, since the bank 
is an expert in investment and investors have excess cash, and therefore the bank 
invests the excess cash accordingly, based on profit distribution.  
The return to UIAHs could be 0, or they could even lose all their money, or could 
have a very good return.  The return to UIAHs depends primarily on the result of 
activities, which is the return on asset.  However, when KFH gave 8.4% back in 2006, 
the central bank intervened to protect other banks from a potential systematic 
crisis; the market gave 6% and the interest rate was 6.5%.  Nowadays the market 
interest rate is the cost of money, which is used as a benchmark. There is a future 
plan to create a profit index. 
 
3. What have been the Mudarib’s annual percentage shares of profits for the period 
2002-2013? 
It has been different over the year. See the annual report. 
 
4. Do the unrestricted UIAHs receive the full amount of their share of the available 
profits, or are there transfers to or from a Profit Equalisation Reserve or Investment 
Risk Reserve (or similar) accounts? 
There has been a strong debate or argument from the UIAHs (I placed my money in 
an UPSIA and didn't get much return).  A study was done by KFH Kuwait on the value 
of money for both UIAHs and shareholders, which asked: does the 1 KD deposited 
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in the bank by depositors have the same value as the 1 KD placed by the 
stockholder?  Both UIAHs and shareholders carry a risk in investment.  The bank did 
an internal study in 2014 on returns between 1978-2014 for the depositors and 
shareholders, to find out if 1 KD placed by the depositors in the bank in 1978 
compared to the 1 KD placed by the stockholders.  The study found that the 1 KD 
placed by the stockholders in 1978 made 102 KD in 2014, while the UIAHs 1 KD made 
99-100 KD, which shows that there was not much difference.  The study did not 
address the market returns to shareholders in terms of stock prices difference of the 
stock market.  The shareholders’ returns are either dividends or new shares issued 
by the banks. They have found that the shareholders face two types of risk: credit 
and market risk.  For example, the share price now in 2015 is about 0.500 KD, while 
it used to be 3.400 KD in 2006, therefore the shareholders face a higher risk 
according to KFH.  In this case, giving a higher return to shareholders is justifiable.  
However, the depositors who placed their 1KD from 1978 still have the same value 
plus a return of 99-100 KD.  The nature of the risks between the two investors are 
different. KFH distributed a return to UIAHs in 2006-2007 of about 8.4%, and the 
bank also gave 2.2% in 2012-2014; however, depositors are increasing even though 
the bank return is less.   
 
The question now is why customers are still with KFH and have not withdrawn their 
money? The study showed that the UIAHs see KFH Kuwait as more stable; also, some 
customers see that Islamic banks (IB) are less risky than conventional banks and they 
are satisfied with the bank itself and the returns they receive. 
There are different factors which characterize depositors’ interests: 
1. Stability factor 
2. Bank location factor 
3. Customer service and their connection with the bank. 
 
The interest rate is not a strong factor leading customers to switch banks.  For 
example, if a depositor places money in Switzerland, he or she will receive a negative 
return (2.5% service charge); the Swiss banks have high liquidity and many 
depositors; in that case the bank is just holding the money as a safe place for the 
depositors, according to KFH.  Even though Islamic banks represent less than 1% of 
the world’s total capital, investors worldwide are still interested in that 1% because 
it has a fast growth rate of 15-17%. 
 
5. Regarding the purpose of creating a Profit Equalisation Reserve and an Investment 
Risk Reserve: was it a policy by the bank or due to central bank regulation?  
The regulation of KFH by the central bank started in 2004. In 2006-2007, when KFH 
gave 8.4%, the central bank intervened to protect other banks, especially the ones 
that had paid out amounts below the market return, from a crisis of massive 
withdrawals.  KFH thinks that over-regulation will create a crisis; however, 
deregulation with awareness of the importance of IB is better, as KFH worked from 
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1977-2004 without any regulation. Under the Ministry of Commerce, the central 
bank did not have any authority, yet KFH did a great job and had successful growth.   
 
6. What are the implications of the use of unrestricted profit-sharing loss-bearing 
investment accounts by Islamic banks as a type of deposit product in terms of CG, and 
in particular, the rights of unrestricted profit-sharing investment account holders? 
KFH has the largest investment deposits in the country, and also the largest 
investment tools using UIAHs, which poses the challenge of how to manage the high 
liquidity to generate a return in terms of how and where to invest the huge amount 
of cash, while investors are expecting a return even with low market returns.  This 
is in the current context of the world financial crisis in which Greece’s loan default 
is about to finish, and now we are entering a Chinese crisis.   
 
7. Does KFH follow AAIOFI or IFSB standards or guidelines in providing the recommended 
level of information? If not, what are the reasons for this? (IFSB recommends a 
“comply or explain” approach.) 
No Islamic banks follow AAIOFI 100%.  KFH follows the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and International Financial Reporting Interpretations 
Committee (IFRIC), which can be found in the annual report.  However, AAIOFI 
designed two great models which are used as the accounting standard for Islamic 
banks, and also set the standard for investment tools in Shari’ah.  KFH also takes the 
standard regulations from the IFSB, since the IFSB coordinates with central banks to 
make regulations for Islamic banks, for example, in adopting Basel 3 and capital 
adequacy.  Also, the IFSB has many recommendations: considering UPSIA as part of 
bank capital and taking 50% of that capital to adjust the capital adequacy equation 
are recommended by the IFSB (see IFSB standard). 
 
8. From the KFH’s annual reports, it appears that unrestricted UIAHs received a much 
higher rate of returns prior to the 2008 crisis. What were the reasons for this? 
KFH is the largest bank that does research, as well as having research done about it; 
many think that KFH is not fair with UIAHs and don't believe that the return 
calculation represents the real return to UIAHs. But again, if we look at the study of 
the 1KD then we can see the difference.  The main reason is ROA, then the market 
return benchmark.   
 
9. How can you explain the differences between the risk-adjusted annual rates of return 
to unrestricted UIAHs of the parent company and those of the KFH’s subsidiaries in 
Bahrain and Malaysia, which appear to be higher? (The differences in the coefficient 
of variations.) See table 1 below. 
As mentioned before, KFH did a study of both shareholders and UIAHs, showing the 
comparative value of money.  The KFH study calculated that 1KD of UIAHs placed in 
Chapter 6: Appendix E  The interview questionnaire 
 208 
1978131 is still there, however the 1KD from the shareholders is less now, and since 
shareholders are facing more risk in losing their money, then it is deemed acceptable 
for them to receive higher returns.  Comparing KFH parent with its subsidiaries is 
not correct since they are part of us.  KFH values and appreciates the wealth both of 
shareholders and UIAHs. 
 
High returns concerned the head of KFH; Al Yaseen, the former KFH Chairman, was 
worried about the high profit of 8.4%, and told the bank not to undertake large-scale 
advertising because there would be huge demand to open new accounts. KFH was 
less affected by the world crisis; however, all banks (including all Islamic banks) 
suffered from the economic crisis which began back in 2008. KFH has to agree to live 
in a world in crisis since they want to do business.  
 
Also, the Dow Jones has created a new index called ethics funds, which is based on 
Christian doctrine. 
 
 
10. Recently the KFH parent company reformed its structure, separating the retail bank 
and the investment bank. Will this have any effect on the profits payable to the 
unrestricted UIAHs?  (Presumably, the UIAHs will place their funds in the retail bank 
rather than the investment bank.) 
KFH is selling KFH Malaysia.  They are investors; if we can agree a good sale then we 
sell.  It is also closing research in Malaysia, to cut expenses, as previously KFH helped 
the market with that research department almost free of charge.  For example, the 
Sukuk report had a cost to KFH, however the market benefitted from it for free. KFH 
has now transferred the research department to Kuwait.   
KFH is strong in Bahrain, and the strategy of the bank was that they wanted to open 
a bank, not just a branch.  The story started when the Bahraini government gave 
KFH Kuwait land to build on, and open a fully-fledged bank.  As a result, KFH helped 
with residential housing in Bahrain and other investment services.  I think you should 
also look at KFH Turkey, which generates very high profits.   
 
11. Does the CG committee represent the UIAHs as recommended by IFSB 3 and 4? 
The CG committee attached to the BOD does not represent the UIAHs, it represents 
the shareholders, although there is a debate over that.  KFH are improving in CG 
terms over the years. They have an independent director on the BOD, Mr. Noor Al 
Rahman Abid. Mr. Noor started his career in 1976 in the U.K. with KPMG, then joined 
Ernst & Young in Jeddah in 1979 and moved to Kuwait in 1986. He became partner 
in the office in charge of the Bahrain practice in 1993, after previously serving as 
                                                     
 
131  KFH was the first Islamic bank, established in 1977, in the State of Kuwait. 
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Chairman of the Accounting Standards Committee, and Vice Chairman of Accounting 
and Auditing Standards Board of AAOIFI. 
About 20 years ago, the governor of the Bank of England was attending an Islamic 
banking conference when one of the speakers talked about the debt transaction 
from the Holy Quran (Sorat al Dayin) which was translated and explained to him.  
Even though the governor of the Bank of England stopped Islamic banking in 1992 
during the credit crisis and the al Baraka problem, they studied IB tools and opened 
the first IB in the UK after 7 years.  Now, the British government have issued Sukuk.  
CG is built within IBs. The Shari’ah goal simply relates to ethics, in terms of organising 
how business is conducted. Therefore, IB had CG committees before the US even 
came up with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. 
 
12. Does the Shari’ah board have any fiduciary duties towards unrestricted Investment 
Account Holders? Or have any influence on their rate of returns, or is it only the board 
of directors’ decision?  
The Shari’ah board does not intervene in the return distribution; however, they 
advise on other issues which concern UIAHs, like the zakat of the return and so on.  
The Shari’ah board know that UIAHs should receive a return when there is a profit.  
The supervisory committee is a monitoring system which includes CG monitoring, 
not just Shari’ah monitoring, that existed before the BOD CG committee.  There has 
been criticism that IB uses people’s beliefs toward Islam; however, when KFH 
opened they did not open under the banner of an Islamic bank.  It was, and still is, a 
Kuwaiti finance house, and customers are increasing even if in some years there is 
no return.  The first BOD was well aware of the name of KFH; they didn't want to use 
the name of Islam in case the bank did not succeed.   
13. How did KFH maintain good relations with its customers? What is the different effect 
that KFH made compared to conventional banks? 
KFH did two things and these are considered as a model in IB: 
a. They made a connection between the current account and the asset market, not 
the interest rate itself; look at the oil price and the fluctuation of the US dollar, 
which go in opposite directions.  KFH works with commodities, and if the $ 
increases against the KD, that means that the supply will decrease and demand 
will increase.  But in conventional deposits, if the $ increases against the KD, that 
means that my money is worth less against the $. A middle commodity has to be 
in the process to lower the risk; that is a Shari’ah requirement. 
b. Also, in real estate, in the 1980s Kuwait had a housing crisis; most Kuwaitis lived 
with their parents, then KFH started facilitating the process of Ijarah and 
Musharakah, which enabled lots of people to buy their own homes.  As the 
saying goes, don't put all your eggs (or money) in one basket; IB bank has at least 
two baskets, not just one. 
 
14. Why do the KFH subsidiaries seem to generate a higher rate of return than the KFH 
parent? 
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It is unfair to compare the KFH parent with its subsidiaries, as the subsidiaries are 
part of us; please refer to the study done by KFH Kuwait. 
 
15. Although in the pre-crisis period the UIAHs received a higher return, their return is 
now much lower than that of the shareholders; what is the reason for that? Why did 
the shareholders get most of the benefit from the high return rather than the UIAHs? 
This shows that the concept of profit sharing is being interpreted in another way.  
Profit sharing is expected in a partnership.   
The argument of profit is always there; however, look at the factors to which 
depositors refer when depositing their funds: the stability of the bank, customer 
service, bank location, and of course the return. As I said, the return to UIAHs 
depends on the results of the bank’s activities and the return on assets.  For 
example, before the economic crisis, KFH gave 8.4%, because profit was high. KFH 
has many types of UIAHs and the longer the period the funds stay in the account, 
the higher the return will be.    
 
16. There is evidence that IB uses UPSIAs as leverage.   
Remember that Islamic banks created investment accounts to generate profits, not 
as leverage. 
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Table 6-19: Returns comparison between the KFH parent company and subsidiaries 
Kuwait Financial House KFH - Kuwait KFH - Bahrain KFH - Malaysia 
Year ROAE UIAHs ROAE UIAHs ROAE UIAHs 
2002 20.85% 3.35% 6.82% 1.75% NA NA 
2003 21.28% 2.95% 8.70% 1.75% NA NA 
2004 24.38% 3.91% 23.77% 3.50% NA NA 
2005 25.63% 5.55% 26.10% 3.51% 0.11% 0.22% 
2006 24.87% 6.89% 26.65% 3.19% 2.03% 0.99% 
2007 28.79% 7.03% 25.77% 5.00% 4.72% 2.29% 
2008 12.81% 3.50% 14.97% 6.00% 4.46% 3.08% 
2009 9.57% 2.27% 0.91% 5.00% 0.00% 2.46% 
2010 8.37% 1.94% 2.08% 2.79% 0.00% 2.56% 
2011 6.22% 1.54% 1.86% 3.75% 0.00% 2.97% 
2012 6.69% 1.72% 2.57% 3.00% 4.07% 3.20% 
2013 7.58% 1.74% 1.52% 2.50% 6.29% 2.77% 
Observations 12 12 12 12 9 9 
Mean return 16.42% 3.53% 11.81% 3.48% 2.41% 2.28% 
Standard Deviation 8.62% 1.97% 10.92% 1.31% 2.50% 1.01% 
Coefficient of Variation 52.49% 55.80% 92.43% 37.56% 104.05% 44.38% 
Comparison between the return for shareholders and UIAHs for the Kuwait finance house parent and its 
subsidiaries.  ROAE is the return on average equity, and UIAHs return is the average annual rate of return 
from the annual report.  A higher CV means worse off.  The subsidiary banks of KFH have a lower CV which 
indicates that the UIAHs have a better or fairer risk-adjusted return than those of the parent bank based in 
Kuwait.  This may suggest that the market and regulatory environment have a strong influence on this 
particular behaviour. In addition, Bahrain and Malaysia have more Islamic banks than Kuwait, which may 
signal that competition is strong and that Islamic banks have to offer better returns in order to attract 
investors.  Note that in 2009-2011, negative ROE (losses) in KFH Malaysia were adjusted to 0, to be more 
comparable with UIAHs returns. 
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 - Total Shareholders Return 
 
G.1 KFH Stock Market Return 
In efficient stock markets, it is also usual to calculate the total shareholder return (TSR), 
which is the return received by a shareholder on a share bought at the beginning of a period, 
earned a dividend, and received a payment at the end of the period equal to the most recent 
share price (Quiry et al., 2009).  This study has avoided using stock market return as a 
measure because the GCC markets are not efficient, the data may not be available, there is 
insufficient data for subsidiaries, etc. but given that the data is available here for KFH 
Kuwait, it may be of interest to examine whether or not the rate of stock market return to 
shareholders has a bigger CV than the rate of return to UIAHs.  TSR can be calculated as: 
 
 Total shareholder returns = 𝑇𝑆𝑅 =  
𝑃1−𝑃0
𝑃0
 + 
𝐷𝑖𝑣1
𝑃0
 Equation 6-3 
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Table 6-20: Total Shareholder Return 
Year Market Cap Share outstanding DPS Market price/share TSR (Market) UIAHs return 
1996 367.21 2785.14 0.004 KWD 0.132 NA 5.96% 
1997 434.74 2785.12 0.006 KWD 0.156 6.14% 6.07% 
1998 423.31 2785.12 0.007 KWD 0.152 4.13% 6.13% 
1999 431.67 2785.12 0.008 KWD 0.155 5.59% 5.75% 
2000 460.07 2627.47 0.009 KWD 0.175 7.21% 5.64% 
2001 598.22 2837.67 0.010 KWD 0.211 8.17% 3.69% 
2002 778.33 3007.93 0.011 KWD 0.259 8.93% 3.35% 
2003 1147.02 3007.93 0.012 KWD 0.381 15.38% 2.95% 
2004 1281.51 3007.93 0.013 KWD 0.426 7.43% 3.91% 
2005 2603.64 3936.62 0.015 KWD 0.661 25.85% 5.55% 
2006 2671.03 3936.62 0.018 KWD 0.679 4.32% 6.89% 
2007 4940.21 4223.56 0.026 KWD 1.170 51.37% 7.03% 
2008 2799.44 4223.56 0.020 KWD 0.663 -47.74% 3.50% 
2009 2500.62 4223.78 0.014 KWD 0.592 -4.78% 2.27% 
2010 2859.62 4223.78 0.012 KWD 0.677 10.24% 1.94% 
2011 2377.37 4223.56 0.010 KWD 0.563 -9.71% 1.54% 
2012 2302.77 4223.56 0.007 KWD 0.545 -0.50% 1.72% 
2013 3013.40 4765.04 0.011 KWD 0.632 10.38% 1.74% 
2014 3118.93 4765.04 0.014 KWD 0.655 4.29% 1.69% 
2015 2716.07 4765.04 0.016 KWD 0.570 -5.65% NA 
TSR Mean 5.32% 4.07% 
TSR SD 18.29% 1.96% 
TSR CV 343.99% 48.16% 
TSR Mean up to 2007 13.14% 5.24% 
TSR SD up to 2007 14.15% 1.40% 
TSR CV up to 2007 107.74% 26.62% 
TSR Mean after 2007 -5.43% 2.06% 
TSR SD after 2007 18.61% 0.68% 
TSR CV after 2007 -342.44% 33.03% 
Source: Bloomberg.  Market price per share is calculated as market cap over share outstanding.  UIAHs’ 
returns are taken directly from the bank annual report and is the average of all UIAHs accounts in one 
year. CV to shareholders is bigger than the CV to UIAHs, because looking at the market cap there is a 
peak in 2007, and if 2007 is excluded then there is little variation for shareholders.  Also, new shares 
have been issued, and there is growth, but this is corrected by the fact that the market cap is being 
divided by the share outstanding. 
 
The share price peaked in 2007 but has continued falling since 2008, so the shareholders 
would have made losses.  However, if the calculation is corrected for bonus issues to 
shareholders (as indicated in table 6-21), which dilute the share price, the shareholders will 
make back some of those losses. 
 
Chapter 6: Appendix E  Total Shareholders Return 
 214 
Table 6-21: KFH cash dividends and bonus share 
Year Cash Dividend Bonus Share capital 
1991 NA NA 
1992 NA NA 
1993 5% 10% 
1994 14% 6% 
1995 20% 6% 
1996 25% 6% 
1997 32% 6% 
1998 36% 6% 
1999 40% 6% 
2000 42% 6% 
2001 45% 5% 
2002 47% 5% 
2003 50% 6% 
2004 50% 10% 
2005 55% 12% 
2006 57% 15% 
2007 65% 20% 
2008 40% 12% 
2009 25% 8% 
2010 20% 8% 
2011 15% 8% 
2012 10% 10% 
2013 13% 13% 
2014 15% 10% 
Source: KFH annual report.  Bonus share issued at no cost to the shareholders, as an alternative to increasing 
the dividend pay-out; hence, the share price will adjust downwards accordingly to reflect the dilution effect. 
 
For example, in 2011, cash dividends of 0.015 KWD per share were paid on outstanding 
shares and bonus shares of 8% of paid-up share capital, and in 2012 every 100 shares 
received a bonus share of 10 shares and a 10% dividend.
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Chapter 7: The Comparison of Dividend Yield 
and UIAHs Return 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the shareholders’ dividend yields to the UIAHs’ percentage returns, 
both of which are based on cash pay-outs.  This is necessary to complement the analysis in 
chapter 4 and 5, which was based on accounting returns. This cannot be satisfactorily 
achieved using stock market returns, since the GCC stock markets are inefficient (as 
discussed later, in section 7.2), which means that basing a comparison of returns on stock 
market returns would not yield reliable results. 
It is therefore appropriate to re-evaluate the assessment between UIAHs and shareholders 
by comparing the rates of return based on cash pay-outs for the sample of IBs used in 
chapters 4 and 5. As UIAHs’ percentage returns are also based on cash pay-outs, this will 
provide a useful basis for comparison between shareholders and UIAHs, especially in the 
post-crisis period. However, the data are available only for 20 banks out of our sample.  
Nevertheless, it can be seen that the results of the comparison are supportive of the 
conclusions reached in chapter 4 and 5. The dividend yield used to measure the 
shareholders’ returns, as explained by Quiry et al. (2009), is the ratio of the last dividend 
paid to the closing share price: 
 
 
Dividend Yield =
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 Equation 7-1 
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7.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
Because of the lack of market efficiency in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stock 
markets, another examination is to be conducted to observe the differences in rates of 
return between the UIAHs and the shareholders.  The shareholders’ dividend yield is 
compared against the UIAHs’ rate of return, which are similar in that both are based on cash 
payments. 
7.3 Overview of Stock Market Efficiency 
Fama (1970) argued that an efficient market reflects all available information, and this 
author categorised market efficiency into three different groups. First is weak-form 
efficiency, where current prices reflect all the information in historical prices, which cannot 
be used to predict future prices.  Second is the semi-strong form, where prices efficiently 
and quickly adjust to new information that becomes publicly available, such as stock split 
and annual earnings announcements.  Normally, in a semi-strong form of efficient market, 
the retained earnings would flow through to increases in share price, as the Gordon Growth 
Model suggests.  However, in a real world market (in particular in thin markets such as the 
GCC thin market), it cannot be assumed that the retained earnings will create any realisable 
value for the shareholders. See table 7-1 stock market trading volume. 
 
Table 7-1: Stock Market Trading Volume 
Stock Market Volume 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bahrain 426 738 1494 840 610 489 574 1813 1123 513 
Kuwait 111540 66232 2826 1155 973 380 42062 126764 52867 41510 
Saudi Arabia 32453 50066 47943 40426 22956 34807 63100 42182 65437 61141 
Abu Dhabi  9301 47821 48312 37272 17603 15845 16372 51019 56965 25474 
Dubai (DFM UH Equity) 
 
14476 8541 14444 5053 2031 3066 7185 6728 2817 
Dubai (DFMGI Index) 33813 93733 72488 106287 36011 21410 34319 97425 115060 65034 
Malaysia (BURSA MK Equity) 444 663 419 309 199 225 172 264 143 127 
Malaysia (FBMKLCI Index) 28980 55755 54651 55513 28574 31862 33545 37113 30763 33374 
Qatar 266 573 1586 2883 1646 1671 1063 1601 2805 1893 
Note: stock market trading volume in millions of dollars. Source: Bloomberg. 
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For example, after the exposure of shareholders to the stock market in the 2008 financial 
crisis, the shareholders could withdraw their funds by selling their shares; however, if they 
chose to do so at that time then they were likely to face losses132.  Finally, the strong form 
of efficiency is where the available information includes public and private information, and 
all investors have information symmetry.  According to Basu (1977), stock prices in an 
efficient market reflect the available information in an unbiased and quick mode, by 
providing an estimate of underlying values.   
According to Hassan et al. (2003), GCC stock markets are relatively small, trade infrequently 
and at low volume, and have few listed companies, which indicates a thin market.  Also, 
their study found that the Kuwaiti stock exchange is an example of weak-form inefficiency.  
Abdmoulah (2010) agreed, finding that the GCC markets are highly sensitive to previous 
stock prices (in the absence of ‘random walk’)133, and are thus weak-form inefficient (i.e. 
not even weak-form efficient) markets.  
7.4 Examining the dividend yield 
The coefficient of variation test is used again here to compare the return differences 
between shareholders and UIAHs. In this test, dividend yield represents the percentage 
return that investors receive as a cash pay-out on stocks (Berk, 2014),  where the dividend 
plus/minus the change in share price would give the total return to investors from stock.  
The information is available for 20 IBs rather than 28 as was the case in chapter 4. By 
examining the dividend yield relative to the UIAHs pay-out rate of return, as shown in table 
7-2, we can observe that in most cases, shareholders have a higher rate of return and 
sometimes a lower degree of variation.  This is apparent, for example, if we look at the BARK 
                                                     
 
132 In fact, this can and does happen when markets are semi-strong or even strong-form efficient, not just in 
a weak-form efficient market, but the issue is whether shareholders are able to reliably ‘cash in’ their stock 
market returns in thin and shallow markets where bid-ask spreads are very wide and transactions tend to 
move prices. 
133 Random walk where the future directions of the stocks cannot be predicted in the basis of past actions 
(Malkiel, 1999).  
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bank, where shareholders received a mean return of 4% and their CV (risk-adjusted return) 
was 29%, while UIAHs received a mean return of 3% but had a higher degree of variation of 
34%. 
Table 7-2: Dividend yield and UIAHs % pay-out for 2002-2013 
2002-2013 Dividend yield IAH pay-out 
Bank Mean SD CV Mean SD CV 
BARK 0.04 0.01 29% 0.03 0.01 34% 
SALM 0.08 0.03 41% 0.02 0.02 85% 
BAHN 0.04 0.01 36% 0.03 0.01 19% 
ITHM 0.07 0.03 49% 0.04 0.01 18% 
AHLI 0.05 0.02 34% 0.02 0.01 26% 
KFH 0.02 0.01 34% 0.04 0.02 56% 
KIB 0.02 0.01 38% 0.03 0.01 44% 
MASF 0.07 0.04 61% 0.03 0.02 59% 
QATR 0.04 0.03 69% 0.04 0.02 42% 
DHABI 0.05 0.03 60% 0.03 0.02 78% 
DUBAI 0.05 0.04 72% 0.03 0.01 48% 
SHAJ 0.05 0.02 44% 0.04 0.01 32% 
AFFN 0.02 0.01 68% 0.03 0.01 22% 
ALLN 0.02 0.01 51% 0.03 0.01 27% 
ISLM 0.03 0.02 57% 0.02 0.01 37% 
MUAT 0.02 0.01 52% 0.03 0.00 16% 
CIMB 0.02 0.01 41% 0.03 0.01 40% 
HONG 0.03 0.02 49% 0.03 0.01 18% 
MAY 0.04 0.02 45% 0.03 0.01 46% 
OCBC 0.03 0.01 32% 0.03 0.01 45% 
Mean 3.90% 
  
3.07% 
  
Source: Bloomberg and annual report.  In 7 banks out of 20 the CV of UIAHs’ returns were higher, which 
indicates that UIAHs are not treated fairly according to the risk adjusted return. 
As can be seen from the table above, shareholders have somewhat higher average returns; 
however, if the risks between UIAHs and shareholders are comparable, there are 
nevertheless 7 banks out of 20 for which the CV of UIAHs rates of return was higher.  As can 
be seen in table 7-2, shareholders at OCBC, for example, enjoyed higher rates of return with 
a much lower degree of variation compared to UIAHs.  It is interesting to notice that AlSalam 
Bank, KFH-Kuwait, Abu Dhabi Islamic, and Maybank Islamic Berhad are the same banks that 
have a higher CV to UIAHs as in chapter 4. 
The (unweighted) mean of the means of dividend yields equals 3.90%, while the unweighted 
mean of the UIAHs rates of return is only 3.07% (22% lower). Indeed, for a total of 7 cases 
out of the 20 banks (35%), the CV of the UIAHs rates of return was higher than the CV of 
Chapter 7  Dividend Yield vs UIAHs Return 
 219 
the dividend yields. Apart from the fact that the bank is entitled to remuneration as fund 
manager (Mudarib), the only benefit held by the UIAHs which may be considered to justify 
the lower rates of return, is a kind of ‘put option’ whereby they are generally able to 
withdraw their funds and in so doing, to obtain repayment of the NAV of the assets financed 
by their funds.  While these considerations may justify the lower rates of return in the 65 
percent of cases where the CV if the shareholders’ dividend yield is higher than that of the 
UIAHs’ percentage returns, they do not do so in the 35 percent of cases where it is lower.   
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
As was seen in the analyses presented in chapters 4 and 5, the term “profit sharing” is 
somewhat misleading as a description of the actual practice of the treatment of 
Unrestricted Profit Sharing Investment Accounts in IBs. The “profit shares” paid to UIAHs 
are largely a matter of management discretion, which operates on two levels. In the first 
place, the Mudarib share is set at a very high level. Secondly, the use of reserves such as the 
PER and IRR to “smooth” the pay-outs provides management with a further means of 
manipulating the UIAHs profit pay-out. It is therefore questionable whether such practices 
constitute “profit sharing” in any meaningful sense.   
It would be misleading to point to the use of Mudarabah to indicate that there is no issue, 
because what is actually being used is a form of “tweaked” Mudarabah which does not 
behave like the classical Mudarabah, and more closely resembles a conventional deposit 
account.  There is no contradiction with Shari’ah here, since the UPSIA product has been 
approved by the Shari’ah supervisory board, but the UPSIA product currently used in IBs is 
a tailored Shari’ah-compliant account which is certainly not the same as classic Mudarabah.  
The principle of profit sharing applied to the UIAHs has been reduced to an absolute 
minimum, and this is apparently what the market wants, or at least, what it is prepared to 
put up with.  From a purely juristic point of view, it is “profit sharing” since it does not have 
a contractually pre-determined rate either based on a benchmark or fixed rate. But, it is 
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shared profit of a type managed in order to provide a return which is perceived as 
competitive in the market compared to conventional deposit accounts.  
Hence, this chapter focuses on cash pay-outs in order to consider the issue from a different 
perspective. Thus, table 7-2 indicates that during a 12-year period (2002-2013) in 7 cases 
out of 20 (35%), the CV of the UIAHs returns was greater than the CV of the dividend yields, 
while the mean percentage cash pay-out to UIAHs was 83 basis points (22%) lower than 
that made to shareholders – arguably the price the former pay for management of their 
funds and their “put option” whereby UIAHs may withdraw the NAV of their funds, normally 
at short notice.  
Consequently, we may say that generally, UIAHs are looking for a safe place for their funds, 
and do not want to take any market risk; otherwise, they would buy shares or invest in 
collective investment schemes.  IBs are looking for a product that behaves as closely as 
possible to a conventional deposit while also paying a Shari’ah compliant return.  However, 
calling this product “profit sharing” is somewhat misleading, and does not reflect the actual 
operation of the account.  Often, in pure profit sharing terms, UIAHs are not getting a fair 
deal, and there is also the problem of a significant lack of transparency.  
In terms of profit sharing, a significant proportion of the UIAHs receive a return that is low 
in relation to the amount of risk that they are taking, compared to the risk taken by 
shareholders.  Bearing in mind that UIAHs are typically passive investors and are not likely 
to move their funds for a 0.5% change in returns, a major event would be needed to drive 
them to take such action.  Muslim investors seek IBs because of their Shari’ah compliance 
compared to conventional banks. However, the choice between two IBs usually depends on 
the confidence in the bank held by the UIAHs. Also, some Muslim investors may look at who 
sits on the Shari’ah board as an additional factor in selecting an Islamic bank with which to 
invest.  A more knowledgeable UIAHs may look at the level of transparency with regard to 
the rate of returns and investment risk.  In practice, it is hard for UIAHs to move their funds 
based on the small amount of relevant information available to them or small differences 
in returns; however, in theory, the lack of such confidence by UIAHs in an Islamic bank may 
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result in their withdrawing funds, which in turn reduces the bank’s liquidity and opportunity 
for more investment, and hence its chance to make more profit.  As a result, passive 
investors are easy victims for the banks or, more precisely, for the management of the 
banks.  
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Chapter Eight: General Discussion and 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research findings in terms of the implications for UPSIA 
concerning their CG rights and the conflict of interest which they face compared with the 
shareholders, in the light of their respective risk-adjusted rates of return, in terms of both 
profit-sharing and cash payouts.  In addition, the contribution and the significance of the 
research will be assessed, with some concluding remarks. 
8.2 Research Summary  
This research has examined the difference in the rates of return received by shareholders 
and by UIAHs at various IBs from a CG perspective, by undertaking various methods of 
measurement, such as profit-sharing and cash payouts, and in doing so, an unfavourable 
picture of the treatment of UPSIA has emerged.  The scope of the study was based on the 
GCC countries plus Malaysia, which represent the main markets of IBs worldwide.  For 
example, looking at the share of the IBs’ assets by including the GCC and Malaysia, the 
majority of the market is likely to have been covered.  According to the World Islamic 
Banking Competitiveness Report by Ernst & Young, 93% of the Islamic banking industry’s 
assets, estimated to exceed US$920 billion in 2015, were located in nine core market 
nations, including the GCC (but excluding Oman), Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, and Pakistan.  
GCC countries and Malaysia account for 84% of the Islamic banking industry (Ernst & Young, 
2016). 
For IBs, UPSIAs raise some complex CG issues.  On the one hand, UIAHs are a type of equity 
investor, but as Rabb Al Maal in a Mudarabah (sleeping partners) they have no governance 
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rights. The question then arises as to whether this leads to them being treated unfairly 
compared to shareholders, who do possess governance rights. 
From a purely (accounting) profit-sharing point of view, UIAHs generally receive a much 
lower rate of return on investment than the bank as Mudarib for the benefit of 
shareholders. Moreover, the variability of this rate (measured by the coefficient of 
variation) is not significantly lower on average than that of the shareholders; in fact, in 
about 1/3 of cases it is actually greater.  For example, at KFH Kuwait, UIAHs’ rates of return 
had a CV of 55.80%, while that of shareholders had a CV of 52.49%, which means that UIAHs 
are exposed to a high level of risk despite being compensated with a low level of rates of 
returns.  The much higher rates of return that shareholders receive are supposedly justified 
by their taking on more risk than UIAHs. Theoretically, both UIAHs and shareholders should 
be paid a rate of return on their investment corresponding with the risk exposure that they 
are facing, subject to the banks receiving a level of remuneration as fund managers which 
does not distort the respective rates of return.  As the normal investment model describes, 
when the relative risk increases, known as the uncertainty of payment, the expected return 
on investment should also increase.  In contrast, in the other 2/3 of cases where the CV of 
UIAHs is lower than shareholders, the rates of pay-out to UIAHs are less variable than the 
ROE to shareholders; this is simply because the higher rates of return in good years are 
going to the shareholders but not to the UIAHs.  In fact, the profit payouts to UPSIAs are 
being “smoothed” up in bad years when returns on investment are low, and “smoothed” 
down with the profits being transferred to “smoothing reserves” (the PER and IRR) in good 
years.  The implication here is that IBs “skim off” the higher returns when the banks have 
good years of profit, rather than sharing these higher returns with the UIAHs as a profit 
sharing contract such as a Mudarabah would normally imply.  This suggests that IBs are in 
fact stabilising the returns to UIAHs in return for taking significantly higher rates of return, 
which answer the research question that IBs do attempt to make the UPSIA behave similarly 
to conventional deposit in term of stability of returns.  Also by using the PER and IRR IBs 
attempt to protect the UPSIA against losses as well as stabilising the returns. Therefore, 
focusing on profit sharing, the UIAHs appear to be getting a bad deal, because what is 
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happening is not really profit sharing; the banks simply share the profit as they see fit, and 
the share going to the UIAHs tends to be relatively small. 
A panel data approach provides enough data to fit a statistical model given the limited 
number of years of data was undertaken in chapter 5 of this research to investigate the CG 
effect on the CV difference between shareholders and UIAHs. In this analysis, different CG 
variables were included together with non-CG factors that impact differently on the 
differences in rates of return.  The results indicated that for the banks in the sample, the 
usual GC independent variables had little explanatory power with regard to the ‘fairness’ of 
the profit sharing.  Instead, what was observed was that when profits were high, the 
Mudarib (i.e. the shareholders’) % return was considerably higher than that of the UIAHs, 
while when profits were poor, the Mudarib % share fell much more than that of the UIAHs.  
In other words, the main driver of the differences in the levels of % return was the Return 
on Assets measure.  In addition, a large discretionary element is apparent in the way 
management divides profits between the Mudarib and the UIAHs as Rabb Al Maal.  Again, 
this suggests that “profit sharing” in the normal sense does not actually exist; rather, the 
banks make what is in effect a discretionary payment to UIAHs in place of interest, in order 
to make the deposit product Shari’ah compliant. Thus, if the profit is high, most of the 
benefit goes to the shareholders and the share passed to UIAHs is low.  It thus seems that 
in the absence of control rights and lack of information there is an unfair treatment of the 
UIAHs, as well as a highly questionable version of profit sharing.  
On the other hand, in the light of the interview with KFH, it appeared important to look at 
other returns besides the sharing of the accounting profit.  However, stock market returns 
in inefficient markets such as those in the GCC countries are not very reliable; this means 
that the value of the retained profits is questionable.  They represent unrealised gains that 
may not be truly realisable in terms of sustainable share price appreciation. This is especially 
true when the shares are listed in inefficient markets such as those in the GCC countries.  
For similar reasons, using stock market returns (dividend plus the change in share price) to 
measure shareholders’ returns for the purpose of a comparison with UIAHs returns is 
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unlikely to be reliable enough for the purpose of this research.  This suggests that the issue 
of the ‘fair treatment’ of UIAHs should rather be considered by comparing the percentage 
(cash) returns paid to them against those paid to shareholders as dividend yields. Making 
this latter comparison, based on the data presented here, the average dividend yields of 
this study’s sample of IBs is 83 basis points higher than the average UIAHs return, while the 
degree of variability is comparable. Given that, in the case of KFH Kuwait at least, there 
were numerous bonus share issues, the difference of 83 basis points is an underestimation.   
Although it perhaps does not present the evident injustice that has been observed through 
looking at profit sharing, the situation is still questionable from the UIAHs’ point of view. 
The results were robust and the dividend yield is in line with the information from the CV in 
chapter 4, which presents a similar picture of the UIAHs being paid a lower return without 
obvious justification for doing so in terms of risk.  For example, looking at the sample of 20 
banks over 12 years, the UIAHs on average are receiving a lower mean pay-out than the 
average dividend yield (see table 7-2) while encountering similar levels of variability.  Nearly 
40% of the UIAHs variability is higher than that faced by the shareholders.  
 An additional 83 basis points might perhaps be considered as a return to the bank for 
managing the funds, but does a difference of at least 83 basis points constitute unfair 
treatment of UIAHs? The latter benefit from having the right to withdraw the net asset value 
of their investment, which may or may not be subject to a minimum notice period (UPSIAs 
are classified as ‘puttable instrument’ according to IAS 32 Financial Instrument Presentation 
(2008)).  Thus, comparing UPSIA to a managed fund, it might be argued that cost of fund 
management plus the price of this withdrawal or ‘put’ option is at least 83 basis points.  
Whether this is a fair price is not an easy question to answer, as different UIAHs might have 
different opinions on the issue. However, fairness would require that they at least have the 
necessary information to make an informed decision. This is generally far from the case, 
and the lack of information is indeed an important CG issue. It was addressed by the IFSB in 
its Standard IFSB-4, issued in December 2007, but implementation of this Standard has been 
poor. 
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One of the main CG issues highlighted by this research is the lack of transparency which 
deprives actual and potential UIAHs of the basis for making informed decisions about the 
management of their funds.  This is relevant to the research question, to the effect that 
UIAHs have no rights of information or control rights. Hassan and Christopher (2005) have 
argued that, because of the characteristics and values of Islam, at least in Malaysia, there is 
an expectation of IBs to make additional governance disclosures that differentiate them 
from conventional banks.  Therefore, the actual lack of transparency is aggravated in two 
ways.  First, by the use of a form of ‘profit sharing’ which is profit sharing in name only 
rather than in substance, because of the degree of discretion used by management in 
deciding the share allocated to UIAHs.  Second, by the lack of governance rights granted to 
UIAHs, as a result of which their only recourse if they are dissatisfied with returns is to 
withdraw their funds, a right which is considerably weakened by the lack of transparency. 
The IFSB has pointed out the questionable nature of the way these UPSIAs are operated, in 
various publications.   This, however, has had little practical effect, although it might be one 
reason why Bank Negara in Malaysia decided to ban smoothing and to require ‘pure 
Mudarabah’ in their products.  This might be in response to IFSB whistle blowing, which has 
had no other effect on the industry.  The market is now moving towards a preference for 
CMT-based term deposits.  For example, AFFIN Islamic Bank in Malaysia started CMT-based 
term deposits in 2013 with 1,021,789,000 RM, increasing in 2014 to 5,190,631,000 RM 
(AFFIN Annual Report, 2014). 
As a result of the issues raised here, authorities at the central bank or capital market 
supervisors should examine the problems with UIAHs, rather than simply leaving them up 
to the BOD or to the Shari’ah board to resolve.  Indeed, there is no evidence that the 
Shari’ah board is as active in CG issues, as their statements in banks’ annual reports would 
indicate.  In most of the cases Shari’ah boards deal with the Shari’ah compliance issue in 
the juristic sense, rather than attending to issues of the best ethical practice and social 
expectations. In fact, the evidence from the results of the empirical chapters suggests that 
Shari’ah boards have no inclination, even if in principle they have the power, to affect such 
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outcomes as unfair treatment of UIAHs.  This may raise an issue regarding the scope of the 
influence of Shari’ah Boards, since they go along with the ‘tweaking’ of the Mudarabah 
contract to produce an acceptable deposit product (as UPSIAs are approved as a product by 
the Shari’ah Board), instead of having a more far-reaching involvement extending to the 
ethical aspects of such matters. 
Even though the evidence is that IBs are less unethical than some conventional banks (no 
IBs have yet been found to have been guilty of market malpractice, as has been the case 
with a number of major international banks which have been sanctioned for seriously 
unethical conduct), our analysis suggests that supervisory authorities should place more 
emphasis on UIAHs’ rights. Nevertheless, the discrepancy we noted between the treatment 
given by a significant proportion of IBs to shareholders and to UIAHs is an indication of 
ethical shortcomings in general and a breach of Islamic principles in particular, as the 
working of the Mudarabah-based deposit accounts raises serious questions which may be 
considered to be ethical issues. Indeed, it seems that each of the stakeholders in the banks 
have compromised so far (UIAHs haven’t really been given any choice) in creating a 
“tweaked Mudarabah” and shifting the operational nature and mechanism of Mudarabah 
and importantly the nature of profit-and-loss sharing, which has become an arranged profit-
sharing mechanism.  According to Asutay (2012), insofar as Islamic finance principles are 
supposed to be based on ethics, values and norms which derive from Islamic deontology, 
the principles followed by IBs should likewise reflect these ethics, norms and values in their 
policies and operations, beyond mere juristic compliance. 
In the line with new regulations designed for IBs, supervisors should place additional 
emphasis on fiduciary responsibility or the establishment of detailed regulations intended 
to monitor potential conflicts of interest.  Regulators should highlight the fiduciary 
responsibility of IBs to comply at all times with Islamic Shari’ah rules and principles (IFSB-3, 
2006).  There should be an adequate disclosure of relevant information about IBs, their 
investment objectives, policies, and the operational guidelines that govern the relationship 
between the IB and its stakeholders, as higher levels of disclosure reduce information 
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asymmetry between UIAHs and IBs, which may help UIAHs to make informed decisions 
about their investments (IFSB-4, 2007). 
 
8.3 UPSIA Implications 
If UPSIAs are genuinely PLS (‘pure Mudarabah)’, then in principle they should have 
governance rights as equity investors, as argued by Williamson (1996), although in Fiqh 
investors in Mudarabah are treated as sleeping partners with no such rights, which was 
logical when Mudarabah was used to fund one-off trading ventures.  ‘Pure Mudarabah’ for 
banking deposits seems to be a misuse of a contract devised for an entirely different 
purpose (originally, this was for one-off commercial ventures normally involving export-
import using ships or caravans, in which the “Rabb Al Maal” could not exercise any 
governance over the Mudarib until he returned, when the profits were calculated and 
divided and the Mudarabah was terminated).   
If in fact they are a type of secured creditor (through ownership of the NAV of the underlying 
assets as “Rabb Al Maal”), then UIAHs’ governance rights as creditors only come into play 
in the event of the bank’s financial failure, in which case they depend on the bankruptcy 
laws of the relevant jurisdiction.  Thus, if in substance UIAHs have the status of a type of 
secured creditors, to whom a type of ‘profit sharing’ applies which is manipulated to pay 
them a sort of ‘going rate’ to prevent them from going elsewhere, then the profits that they 
forego are the price they pay (more or less willingly) for not being exposed to stock market 
losses, as they are potentially exposed only to the losses (reductions of the NAV) of their 
underlying assets.   
The use of the pure (unmanipulated) Mudarabah model for bank deposits (as in Malaysia 
under the new Banking Act) is exceptional, and raises a major CG issue: the existence of a 
class of equity investor who has no governance rights as an investor, and uncertain rights 
as a creditor.  In the event of a bank insolvency, UIAHs should be able claim the NAV of their 
underlying assets as “Rabb Al Maal”, but the success of this would depend on whether 
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bankruptcy law recognises this claim, which is different from that of a conventional 
depositor.  Their exposure is thus different from that of shareholders.  
Such a state of affairs might not be accepted in more advanced regulatory environments; 
however, it is accepted in Malaysia, which seems to have become an exception to the 
general rule that UPSIAs are treated as a type of secured creditor134.  According to IFSB-
Report (2015), Bank Negara of Malaysia used to insist that UPSIAs were not exposed to 
losses, but the recent Islamic Financial Services Act (2013)135 takes the opposite position 
and requires them to be ‘pure Mudarabah’.  Also according to the IFSB report, there is some 
evidence that following recent Malaysia’s new rule, the percentage of UPSIAs in Malaysian 
IBs’ balance sheets has fallen and the percentage of CMT-based term deposits has risen (the 
case of Affin Bank was cited above).  
By examining the way that profits are shared, it seems likely that UIAHs are being treated 
unfavourably (by receiving a small share of the profit compared to Mudarib).  Moreover, in 
investigating the situation more deeply by making a comparison of dividend yields to UPSIA 
rates of return, the impression of unfairness in relation to the UIAHs’ returns is largely 
corroborated. This issue was examined in chapter 7.  
From table 7-2 on p.218, it can be seen that the (unweighted) mean of the means of 
dividend yields equals 3.90%, while the unweighted mean of the mean UIAHs returns is only 
2.99%.  In 7 cases out of 20 (35%), the CV of the UIAHs returns was greater than the CV of 
the dividend yields. Apart from fund management, the only benefit to the UIAHs, which 
may be considered to ‘justify’ the lower returns, is the previously-discussed ‘put option’ 
whereby they are generally able to withdraw their funds and obtain the repayment of the 
NAV of the assets financed by their funds.  On the other hand, there is also the issue of what 
the bank gets as a return for fund management, typically a high Mudarib share. 
                                                     
 
134 Quite possibly, the Malaysian courts would uphold the UIAHs’ claim to the NAV of the Mudarabah assets 
in liquidation. 
135 For more details of the banking Act see http://www.bnm.gov.my/documents/act/en_ifsa.pdf 
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Thus, while UIAHs are close to being secured creditors, albeit in principle (juristically) having 
the status of equity investors, then there is certainly a CG issue: this is not just a lack of 
clarity regarding their status and rights, but the fact that in a significant proportion of cases 
the variability of the percentage cash pay-outs to UIAHs is greater than the variance of the 
dividend yields to shareholders.  
While the UPSIA is a Shari’ah-compliant product, it appears that there is an issue with the 
terminology of ‘profit sharing’ in the Mudarabah that has been “tweaked” into something 
different from the historic understanding of Mudarabah, in order to create a deposit 
product which is acceptable under this term.  Indeed, the way that Mudarabah is used for 
the UPSIA is misleading, because in general no genuine profit sharing takes place.  The 
UPSIA have been engineered to minimise the degree of profit sharing and risk sharing and 
to ensure that the account behaves as closely as possible to a conventional deposit, while 
still juristically adhering to the form of Mudarabah. Asutay (2012) argued that IBs have 
converged towards conventional banking practices in order to operate in global markets, 
and have not followed the moral principles of Islamic economics. In a sense, this strategy is 
market driven, in that the IBs and their Shari’ah advisors have come up with a product that 
more or less meets the market requirement to be a viable product. In the process, the banks 
have distorted the concept of profit sharing and risk sharing (to the extent that these are 
reduced to the point where they resemble a mere shadow of these concepts).  The evidence 
is that IBs have been influenced by juristic considerations and the ‘real world’ of banking, 
and have never been much influenced by the ‘ideal world’ of Islamic economics. 
 
8.4 Significance of the research outcome 
The background of the research has centred upon the issue of the fair treatment of UIAHs, 
from the CG perspective of the rights of stakeholders.  The study is based on the function 
of CG in ensuring the accountability of certain individuals within an organisation to its key 
stakeholders; this is a function that a number of international bodies have indicated, 
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including the OECD, the BCBS, and the IFSB, whose standards draw attention to issues 
concerning the interests of UPSIAs. The research casts light on some significant anomalies 
in the treatment of UIAHs, and calls for urgent reconsideration of this treatment in the 
context of the CG of IBs.  This implies that IBs have unique CG requirements that must both 
fit their business model and function effectively to address the issues concerning UIAHs. 
The analysis conducted in this research shown that the main issue is not simply that, on a 
risk-adjusted basis, UIAHs are (in a significant proportion of cases) treated unfavourably in 
terms of profit sharing.  Perhaps more serious is the fact that, as the analysis in chapter 7 
shows, the percentage cash pay-outs to UIAHs, also on a risk-adjusted basis, compare 
unfavourably in a significant proportion of cases to those made to shareholders. In addition, 
the mean percentage pay-out to UIAHs for the whole sample is somewhat lower than the 
mean dividend yield. This raises the question of how far this difference is justified by the 
banks’ entitlement to remuneration for fund management and the UIAHs’ withdrawal 
rights. More generally, there is the CG issue that UIAHs are treated in an ambiguous and 
non-transparent manner because their status and rights as stakeholders in IBs are unclear. 
The new Banking Law in Malaysia may appear to clarify the issue, but it also raises the 
question of whether the resultant Mudarabah product can be perceived as an acceptable 
alternative to a conventional deposit.     
It is worth noticing that the empirical results show a better position of Bahrain and Malaysia 
in the rates of return treatment of UIAHs, which may also be because of the role of AAOIFI 
and IFSB on the nature of regulation and governance in general at country level and their 
impact on individual banking. For example, AAIOFI designed two models that are used as 
the accounting standard for IBs, and also set the standard for investment tools in Shari’ah, 
where Bahrain follows AAIOFI financial reporting standards. 
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8.5 Research limitations 
Even though the literature on CG is widely available, the CG resources in the context of 
Islamic banking remain limited and in need of further development.  The availability of data 
for IBs is often restricted to secondary source data, especially for CG issues, because Islamic 
banking is a relatively new industry, and there are limitations in the historic data.  It is 
therefore necessary to generate new primary resource data, for example by carrying out 
interviews where the researchers have to produce the primary data.  Therefore, there are 
two aspects to the limitations of the present research; one is that the industry has a 
relatively brief history (so there is an inevitable lack of historical data); a number of banks 
have been operating for less than 10 years.  In addition, there is the problem of the 
disclosure issue; more specifically, the fact that international financial reporting standards 
do not result in high levels of disclosure of Shari’ah compliant transactions, assets and 
liabilities.  Hence, there is gap in the financial reporting regime which affects what 
information is available, such as that relating to the use of smoothing techniques. Also, 
there is very limited information about the UIAHs returns in any data base, or the 
percentage return; these are not even stated clearly in the annual report, so researchers 
often have to calculate these figures manually, except in Bahrain where the AAIOFI financial 
reporting standards are followed. 
However, it is argued that this research has successfully overcome these limitations and has 
been able to reach a significant result, as noted in the previous chapters’ findings. For 
example, the panel data has produced the clear conclusion that the way in which profit 
sharing is operated is primarily driven by the size of the ROA, whereas there is only a 
relatively small influence from the CG variables.      
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8.6 Recommendations for Future Study 
This research has covered the bulk of IBs in the GCC countries and Malaysia; however, most 
IBs are relatively new and have not yet implemented the IFSB recommendations.  For 
example, by testing the proposal of the IFSB to establish a governance committee attached 
to the board of directors which is specifically responsible for oversight of the fair treatment 
of UIAHs, the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the governance committee in mitigating 
UIAHs’ governance problems within IBs could be assessed.  Most of the CG committees 
which have been created in IBs do not represent the UIAHs and are more focused on 
protecting shareholders’ interests.  The IFSB has issued a CG standard which explicitly 
recommends a Governance Committee to watch over the interests of the UIAHs. The 
problem with this seems to be that the banking regulators and supervisors in most, if not 
all countries have so far failed to act on this proposal.  In addition, in order to study the 
impact of the governance committee proposed by the IFSB to oversee UPSIAs, research 
should be conducted to examine CG principles and regulations at Islamic financial 
institutions where it has been adopted by banks in any GCC countries. Then, the 
effectiveness of the governance committee in solving CG complications within IBs could be 
tested, especially with regard to issues with UIAHs.  For example, how would good CG 
practice increase the efficiency and the financial performance of Islamic financial 
institutions? How would it improve the relationship between IBs and UIAHs, assuming that 
the governance committee implementation has safeguarded disclosures to UIAHs in a 
timely and effective manner?  A comparative evaluation could be performed using the 
CAMELS criteria of the performance of selected case study banks with a particular emphasis 
on the capital, asset quality, and earnings of IBs which have adopted the proposal on the 
one hand, and of banks that have not on the other. 
UIAHs capital impairment risk would also be an interesting and worthwhile research area.  
Historically, capital impairment cases at IBs have been rare, although the risk of losing the 
UIAHs capital still exists.  Even in the present study’s test of the coefficient of variation 
where the shareholders’ return was higher than the UIAHs’, did not measure the risk of 
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capital impairment, and the test results do not necessarily mean that UIAHs are getting a 
fair deal.  A very unfair deal for UIAHs may be measured, but we cannot measure whether 
or not UIAHs appear to receive a fair deal based on CV, and this therefore remains a subject 
for further research. 
Furthermore, the data needed to compare concentrated vs. not concentrated shareholders 
were not available for our entire sampled banks; such research would be very interesting in 
the future if data became available, to see if it has any effect on the UIAHs’ returns.  For 
example, IBs could be divided into three categories; non-subsidiaries (controlled by 
relatively few shareholders), non-subsidiaries (controlled by a large number of dispersed 
shareholders) and subsidiaries (which by definition are non-dispersed, but are in a separate 
category from banks with concentrated private shareholders).  The hypothesis would be 
that if the shareholders are more concentrated, this allows the shareholders to take a more 
strategic view of the market position of the bank.  However, when the shareholders of the 
bank are more dispersed, this may mean that they are only shareholders of the bank for a 
short term, and that they expect a return and a dividend and so on, leaving less returns for 
UIAHs. On the other hand, an ownership concentration such as a wealthy family can afford 
not to take more profit than a dispersed bank, although the level of information disclosure 
can vary and is likely to be lower because less information is demanded than in a dispersed 
ownership situation (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).  However, the data required to compare the 
concentrated vs. not concentrated shareholders were not available for our entire sample of 
banks; future research along these lines would be very interesting. 
 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
The research has examined the consequences of the absence of governance rights for UIAHs 
rather than looking at the governance rights themselves (in fact, they have barely any).  The 
fact that the absence of these governance rights is well established in the literature meant 
that the objective was to explore the consequences of the lack of governance rights in terms 
Chapter 8             General Discussion and Conclusion 
 235 
of the rates of return paid to the UIAHs.  The findings of the empirical chapters 4 and 5 show 
the consequences arising from the lack of governance rights.  In about a third of the cases, 
it is clear that if UIAHs had information and control rights they would probably demand 
better treatment than that they are receiving.  IBs operate using a weak form of governance 
and with inefficient market discipline, which implies that the authorities should take an 
active role to protect the interests of the UIAHs.   
The reflection of the findings in the light of the material presented in the empirical chapters 
recognises the tensions in relation to the best practices which would be consistent with the 
normative theory of Islamic economics. Specifically, IBs would need to have some changes 
in their CG practice to avoid the questionable uses of Mudarabah for their deposit products, 
and to achieve the ethical goals of equity and fairness in the treatment of UIAHs. In the 
extreme, the whole use of Mudarabah may need to be removed for deposit products (not 
from asset management products), that is, IBs should use another contract, like 
Musharakah. However, the main problem is how we look at governance rights, is it from 
the proper international standard viewpoint or from the bank perspective of CG. At a 
minimum, IBs should have proper disclosure especially concerning the UPSIA, to allow UIAH 
to exercise their governance right of ‘voting with their feet’ in a well-informed way.  Thus, 
IBs should be more transparent in the annual report, as IBs do not mention how profit 
distribution has been calculated and governance rules on how PER and IRR are being used 
and transferred. Also, as a minimum, they should have, as IFSB-4 recommended, a 
separated report to address the issues of IAH, using a simple language, and to have the CG 
committee as recommended by IFSB-3 and working effectively representing the IAH.  
We need to distinguish between different forms of governance rights; one is the control 
rights, and the other is information rights. The control rights will not be valuable without 
the information rights.  The IAHs as Rabb Almaal are sleeping partners and will not get 
control rights (apart from ‘voting with their feet’) so long as Mudarabah is used.  However, 
the IAHs are not being giving proper information rights which would allow them to vote 
with their feet in a well-informed way. The CG committee is compatible with the very 
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limited rights of Rabb Almaal and could be used as a proxy for, or a mitigation of the absence 
of, control rights, provided members are appointed to represent IAHs.  Therefore, from the 
CG perspective is not just a matter of fairness and unfairness, it is the fairness in the 
descriptions of what happening: the IBs claim to be profit-sharing but in fact they pay what 
they want to pay by using various devices, but at least they avoid interest. 
This research has fulfilled its objectives as the results in the previous chapter have shown.  
The research therefore calls for urgent reform to the CG of IBs in terms of the fair treatment 
of UIAHs.  
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 - Returns to shareholders and UIAHs 
 
H.1 Calculations of ROE and UIAHs return 
The following tables are based on the country currency reported in the annual report.  This 
does not need to be converted to a uniform currency since we are trying to calculate the 
percentage return, in order to calculate the percentage CV for the purpose of comparison, 
and to illustrate the point. 
H.2 Bahrain Islamic banks 
Table H-1: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Bahrain Islamic bank (A) 
Bahrain 
IBs Albaraka Islamic Bank AlSalam Bank 
Year Net Profit Equity 
Return 
ROAE UIAHs Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2006 NA NA NA NA        16,418             136,401  12.04% 5.20% 
2007 NA NA NA NA        23,148             159,470  15.65% 3.20% 
2008       2,510,979   185,657,440  1.35% 5.26%        25,542             172,483  15.39% 4.60% 
2009  (26,463,032)  156,590,063  -15.46% 2.55%        13,962             198,191  7.53% 1.25% 
2010       4,955,557   161,695,247  3.11% 2.34%           7,209             198,628  3.63% 1.00% 
2011       1,777,659   157,022,224  1.12% 3.27%              312             196,469  0.16% 1.00% 
2012     (8,607,741)  150,594,500  -5.60% 2.91%        10,272             208,065  5.08% 0.70% 
2013          968,876   148,176,234  0.65% 2.74%        12,372             235,279  5.58% 0.60% 
Number (N) 6 6 
  
8 8 
Mean -2.47% 3.18% 
  
8.13% 2.19% 
Standard Deviation 7.03% 1.07% 
  
5.66% 1.87% 
Coefficient of Variation -284.36% 33.65%     69.62% 85.02% 
Alsalam bank currency is presented in thousands of Bahrain Dinars. SD refers to Standard Deviation; Obs. N 
refers to the number of observations.  ROAE is an average of stockholders’ equity that is based on one year of 
profit attributed to the equity holder of the bank divided by (two years of the equity attributable to the equity 
holders of the bank / 2), i.e. 2010 and 2009 shareholders’ equity divided by 2. 
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Table H-2: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Bahrain Islamic bank (B) 
Bahrain 
IBs Bahrain Islamic Bank Ithmaar Bank 
Year Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
Net 
Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 
  
5.81% 3.45% 
   
  
2003 2500 40000 6.25% 3.45% 13,800  62,400  NA NA 
2004 3700 53000 7.96% 3.45% 22,133  214,533  15.98% 4.00% 
2005 7400 72000 11.84% 3.45% 36,533  247,359  15.82% 3.40% 
2006             13,053  74,924  17.77% 3.83% 168,200  758,491  33.44% 3.70% 
2007             25,025  187,176  19.10% 3.96% 102,755  1,087,808  11.13% 3.80% 
2008             22,313  166,447  12.62% 3.51% 22,168  923,909  2.20% 3.80% 
2009            (19,397) 140,501  -12.64% 2.34% (247,415) 711,435  -30.26% 3.60% 
2010            (39,712) 100,061  -33.02% 2.16% (150,149) 654,016  -21.99% 3.70% 
2011            (17,352) 101,329  -17.23% 3.11% (23,708) 217,464  -5.44% 5.15% 
2012            (36,195) 69,763  -42.31% 3.07% (11,491) 222,096  -5.23% 4.82% 
2013               6,069  76,874  8.28% 2.34% (30,300) 200,401 -14.34% 5.57% 
Number (N) 12 12 
  
10 10 
Mean -1.30% 3.18% 
  
0.13% 4.15% 
Standard Deviation 20.23% 0.59% 
  
19.48% 0.75% 
Coefficient of Variation -1558.03% 18.71%     14770.45% 17.95% 
Bahrain Islamic bank and Ithmaar bank currency is presented in thousands of Bahrain Dinars. 
Table H-3: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Bahrain Islamic bank (C) 
Bahrain 
IBs Khaleeji Commercial KFH Bahrain 
Year Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA             242                 35,242  6.82% 1.75% 
2003 NA NA NA NA          3,244                 38,439  8.70% 1.75% 
2004 NA NA NA NA  NA   NA  23.77% 3.50% 
2005            4,107                33,907  12.11% 4.25%        15,166                 63,802  26.10% 3.51% 
2006            7,986                42,573  20.88% 4.73%        21,130                 87,103  26.65% 3.19% 
2007          20,836              134,990  23.47% 5.21%        31,399               153,782  25.77% 5.00% 
2008          27,304              137,982  20.00% 5.50%        35,686               348,833  14.97% 6.00% 
2009            3,100              126,574  2.34% 5.60%          6,132               351,114  0.91% 5.00% 
2010          (6,533)             118,158  -5.34% 5.27%          9,325               360,248  2.08% 2.79% 
2011               518              118,923  0.44% 3.61%          9,586               372,924  1.86% 3.75% 
2012               751              119,448  0.63% 3.26%        10,043               381,806  2.57% 3.00% 
2013        (19,209)             100,011  -17.51% 3.35%          7,392               367,782  1.52% 2.50% 
Number (N) 9 9 
  
12 12 
Mean 6.34% 4.53% 
  
11.81% 3.48% 
Standard Deviation 13.75% 0.94% 
  
10.92% 1.31% 
Coefficient of Variation   217.03% 20.74%     92.43% 37.56% 
Khaleeji Commercial and KFHB currency is presented in thousands of Bahrain Dinars. 
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H.3 Kuwait Islamic banks 
Table H-4: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Kuwait Islamic bank (A) 
Kuwait 
IBs Ahli United Bank Boubyan Bank 
Year Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 NA NA NA NA          6,854        106,917  6.41% 3.00% 
2006            45,111           235,097  NA NA        10,259        118,175  9.12% 3.00% 
2007            48,179           269,884  NA NA        18,562        137,187  14.54% 4.85% 
2008            51,365           243,006  NA NA          1,846        135,148  1.36% 5.70% 
2009            14,262           213,159  NA NA      (51,695)         87,135  -46.51% 1.76% 
2010            27,444           245,679  11.96% 3.03%          6,109        238,190  3.76% 2.70% 
2011            31,544           262,190  12.42% 2.03%          8,025        244,245  3.33% 2.22% 
2012            38,539           282,809  14.14% 1.72%        10,050        253,650  4.04% 1.70% 
2013          579,374        3,148,824  13.87% 1.96%        13,408        269,487  5.13% 0.56% 
Number (N) 4 4 
  
9 9 
Mean 13.10% 2.19% 
  
0.13% 2.83% 
Standard Deviation 1.07% 0.58% 
  
17.92% 1.59% 
Coefficient of Variation 8.17% 26.46%     13996.42% 56.27% 
Currency is presented in thousands of Kuwaiti Dinars 
Table H-5: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Kuwait Islamic bank (B) 
Kuwait 
IBs Kuwait Financial House Kuwait International Bank 
Year Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002           54,613             261,969  20.85% 3.35% NA NA NA NA 
2003           58,160             284,586  21.28% 2.95% NA NA NA NA 
2004           74,412             325,938  24.38% 3.91% NA NA NA NA 
2005         118,687             600,210  25.63% 5.55% NA NA NA NA 
2006         162,004             702,489  24.87% 6.89%           9,491          142,532  6.66% 3.24% 
2007         275,266          1,210,000  28.79% 7.03%         17,982          157,852  11.97% 5.19% 
2008         156,960          1,240,283  12.81% 3.50%         19,800          164,818  12.27% 3.31% 
2009         118,741          1,241,817  9.57% 2.27%         (8,235)         173,203  -4.87% 2.22% 
2010         105,983          1,290,330  8.37% 1.94%         16,754          196,128  9.07% 2.60% 
2011           80,342          1,292,353  6.22% 1.54%         10,841          207,629  5.37% 2.49% 
2012           87,676          1,328,098  6.69% 1.72%         13,165          216,573  6.21% 2.41% 
2013         115,893          1,728,865  7.58% 1.74%         13,208          224,362  5.99% 0.83% 
Number (N) 12 12 
  
8 8 
Mean 16.42% 3.53% 
  
6.58% 2.79% 
Standard Deviation 8.62% 1.97% 
  
5.36% 1.23% 
Coefficient of Variation 52.49% 55.80%     81.35% 44.27% 
Currency is presented in thousands of Kuwaiti Dinars 
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H.4 Qatar Islamic banks 
Table H-6: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Qatar Islamic bank (A) 
Qatar 
IBs Masraf Al Rayan Qatar Islamic Bank 
Year Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE 
UIAHs 
Return 
2002 NA NA NA NA        101,000         422,000  23.93% 4.50% 
2003 NA NA NA NA        145,000         542,000  30.08% 4.50% 
2004 NA NA NA NA        294,000      1,497,000  28.84% 4.50% 
2005 NA NA NA NA        511,252      2,095,786  28.46% 4.50% 
2006 NA NA NA NA     1,012,039      4,254,538  31.87% 5.55% 
2007 1,192,451  5,158,618  23.12% 5.37%     1,255,404      4,628,962  28.26% 5.50% 
2008 917,040  5,694,265  16.90% 4.45%     1,642,541      7,142,892  27.91% 5.75% 
2009 880,658  5,961,754  15.11% 5.32%     1,322,106      9,005,103  16.37% 5.75% 
2010 1,211,344  7,126,449  18.51% 3.75%     1,334,535      9,124,004  14.72% 2.30% 
2011 1,408,350  8,503,934  18.02% 1.54%     1,365,149    11,202,419  13.43% 2.11% 
2012 1,504,213  9,595,991  16.62% 1.19%     1,241,445    11,473,875  10.95% 1.70% 
2013 1,702,270  10,523,348  16.92% 1.09%     1,335,400    11,859,714  11.45% 1.25% 
Number (N) 7 7 
  
12 12 
Mean 17.89% 3.24% 
  
22.19% 3.99% 
Standard Deviation 2.55% 1.93% 
  
8.09% 1.68% 
Coefficient of Variation 14.25% 59.44%     36.47% 42.12% 
Currency is presented in thousands of Qatari Riyals. UIAHs returns are taken directly from the annual report, 
as Qatari Islamic banks do publish the UIAHs returns. 
Appendix F        ROAE and UIAHs return 
 241 
H.5 UAE Islamic banks 
Table H-7: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for UAE Islamic bank (A) 
UAE 
IBs Abu Dhabi Islamic Dubai Islamic Bank 
Year Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA             159,798              1,573,986  10.15% 2.964% 
2003 NA NA NA NA             234,456              1,698,180  14.33% 3.136% 
2004 122,910  1,505,643  8.16% 3.92%             461,033              2,986,596  19.68% 3.057% 
2005 344,677  2,014,799  19.58% 6.57%          1,061,069              3,717,559  31.65% 2.847% 
2006 571,014  2,768,359  23.88% 7.79%          1,560,093              8,537,150  25.46% 3.978% 
2007 768,475  5,417,845  18.77% 4.77%          2,500,421            10,414,307  26.39% 5.051% 
2008 851,262  5,634,108  15.40% 1.88%          1,554,327              8,749,271  16.22% 2.866% 
2009 77,778  5,141,681  1.44% 1.55%          1,207,491              8,975,890  13.62% 2.314% 
2010 1,023,345  8,107,577  15.45% 1.56%             553,153              9,326,079  6.04% 2.032% 
2011 1,154,969  8,568,458  13.85% 1.55%          1,010,141              9,135,435  10.94% 1.070% 
2012 1,199,931  12,598,107  11.34% 1.26%          1,150,072              9,588,562  12.28% 0.977% 
2013  1,447,829  13,017,705  11.30% 0.87%          1,610,939            14,291,685  13.49% 0.858% 
Number (N) 10 10 
  
12 12 
Mean 13.92% 3.17% 
  
16.69% 2.60% 
Standard Deviation 6.34% 2.46% 
  
7.61% 1.25% 
Coefficient of Variation 45.54% 77.51%     45.62% 48.01% 
Currency is presented in thousands of UAE Dirhams.  Customer deposits (including investment, saving and 
Wakalah accounts) exclude current accounts and margins.  Distribution to depositors includes investment 
accounts and savings accounts (but excludes amounts payable to Sukuk holders and investment accounts by 
financial institutions since the amounts of the profit distribution to depositors in the balance sheet are not 
separately identifiable).  
Table H-8: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for UAE Islamic bank (B) 
UAE IBs Emirates Islamic Bank Sharjah Islamic Bank 
Year Net Profit  Equity Return  ROAE UIAHs Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA  NA   NA   NA  NA   NA   NA  NA  
2004 19,570  816,321 2.40% 0.84% NA NA NA NA 
2005 50,753  859,841 6.06% 1.13% 186,068  2,107,699  8.83% 5.84% 
2006 117,460  965,872  12.87% 2.44% 200,648  2,109,339  9.52% 4.64% 
2007 238,533  1,332,906  20.75% 2.84% 301,839  2,226,357  13.92% 4.47% 
2008 400,583  1,581,197  27.49% 4.02% 231,579  4,159,197  7.25% 3.98% 
2009 130,794  2,780,498  6.00% 3.48% 260,135  4,264,311  6.18% 4.32% 
2010 61,262  2,836,735  2.18% 3.29% 266,409  4,348,809  6.19% 3.63% 
2011  (401,495) 2,434,702  -15.23% 2.41% 251,121  4,406,158  5.74% 2.86% 
2012   81,220  2,578,748  3.24% 1.60% 272,003  4,443,898  6.15% 2.23% 
2013  139,488  4,157,505  4.14% 1.17% 307,068  4,535,907  6.84% 2.17% 
Number (N) 10 10 9 9 9 9 
Mean 6.99% 2.32% 
  
7.85% 3.79% 
Standard Deviation 11.58% 1.10% 
  
2.62% 1.21% 
Coefficient of Variation  165.65% 47.39%     33.40% 31.88% 
Currency is presented in thousands of UAE Dirhams.   
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H.6 Malaysia Islamic banks 
Table H-9: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Malaysia Islamic bank (A) 
Malaysia IBs Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 
Year 
Net 
Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2006 36,568 196,696 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2007 39,440 235,607 18.25% 2.00% 47,784 1,041,809 4.59% 3.68% 
2008 28,002 262,671 11.24% 3.41% 31,722 333,794 4.61% 4.41% 
2009 32,784 398,071 9.92% 2.10% 83,770 416,468 22.33% 2.27% 
2010 26,026 433,504 6.26% 2.70% 56,121 467,942 12.69% 3.14% 
2011 50,020 481,498 10.93% 2.99% 72,630 547,090 14.31% 2.93% 
2012 74,062 655,439 13.03% 3.66% 55,742 592,554 9.78% 3.00% 
2013 59,151 705,067 8.70% 3.19% 54,705 626,062 8.98% 1.96% 
Number (N) 7 7 
  
7 7 
Mean 11.19% 2.86% 
  
11.04% 3.06% 
Standard Deviation 3.77% 0.63% 
  
6.19% 0.82% 
Coefficient of Variation 33.71% 22.08% 
  
56.04% 26.88% 
Currency is presented in thousands Malaysian Ringgit.  
 
Table H-10 the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Malaysia Islamic bank (B) 
Malaysia 
IBs Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad  Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 
Year Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
Net 
Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 34,259 1,042,416 3.29% 3.21% 9,617 349,434 2.75% 2.82% 
2003 78,210 1,113,126 7.26% 0.67% 3,586 353,020 1.02% 2.60% 
2004 75,262 1,163,188 6.61% 0.70% -26,302 498,147 -6.18% 2.47% 
2005 -507,807 730,181 -53.64% 2.53% 32,328 523,683 6.33% 2.31% 
2006 -1,296,789 -277,840 -573.37% 2.76% 72,520 713,126 11.73% 3.08% 
2007 232,460 1,014,212 63.14% 3.50% 48,138 737,331 6.64% 3.69% 
2008 384,117 1,308,950 33.07% 2.80% 31,951 702,640 4.44% 3.24% 
2009 160,607 1,519,553 11.36% 2.20% 82,273 1,312,782 8.16% 2.58% 
2010 411,778 2,526,968 20.35% 3.37% 97,528 1,318,454 7.41% 2.45% 
2011 376,333 2,800,957 14.13% 2.34% 134,014 1,361,287 10.00% 2.16% 
2012 430,785 3,099,615 14.60% 2.73% 84,370 1,428,993 6.05% 2.50% 
2013 491,645 3,329,374 15.29% 3.00% 167,186 1,596,372 6.05% 2.58% 
Number (N) 12 12 
  
12 12 
Mean -36.49% 2.48% 
  
5.37% 2.71% 
Standard Deviation 171.10% 0.92% 
  
4.64% 0.43% 
Coefficient of Variation -468.85% 37.18% 
  
86.56% 15.98% 
Currency is presented in thousands Malaysian Ringgit. 
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Table H-11 the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Malaysia Islamic bank (C) 
Malaysia IBs Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad MAYBANK ISLAMIC BERHAD 
 
Year 
Net 
Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2006 43,096 541,283 7.96% 3.38% NA NA NA NA 
2007 56,811 600,135 9.95% 4.10% NA NA NA NA 
2008 64,156 664,732 10.14% 3.14% 115,966 1,684,840 6.88% 1.41% 
2009 74,353 740,031 10.59% 2.84% 357,419 2,558,461 16.85% 4.86% 
2010 84,188 818,810 10.80% 2.13% 297,958 3,633,674 9.62% 2.02% 
2011 67,478 883,246 7.93% 2.91% 388,508 4,111,483 10.03% 1.92% 
2012 112,238 1,165,803 10.96% 3.54% 886,327 4,545,371 20.48% 2.82% 
2013 226,655 1,352,741 18.00% 3.48% 1,049,337 6,435,555 19.11% 2.93% 
Number (N) 8 8 
  
6 6 
Mean 10.79% 3.19% 
  
13.83% 2.66% 
Standard Deviation 3.15% 0.59% 
  
5.68% 1.22% 
Coefficient of Variation 29.16% 18.35% 
  
41.10% 45.84% 
Currency is presented in thousands Malaysian Ringgit. 
Table H-12: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Malaysia Islamic bank (D) 
Malaysia IBs OCBC AL-AMIN BANK BERHAD 
 
PUBLIC ISLAMIC BANK BERHAD 
Year 
Net 
Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
Net 
Profit 
Equity 
Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2006 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2007 NA NA NA NA -286 131,453 NA NA 
2008 -1,762 196,548 -0.90% 0.42% 47,638 984,432 8.54% 0.36% 
2009 17,319 210,287 8.51% 3.34% 346,640 1,505,887 27.84% 1.88% 
2010 23,844 294,504 9.45% 3.68% 395,301 1,815,388 23.80% 2.55% 
2011 20,028 318,731 6.53% 3.88% 456,547 2,116,926 23.22% 3.57% 
2012 46,094 471,751 11.66% 4.76% 410,966 2,287,279 18.66% 1.87% 
2013 107,493 595,167 20.15% 3.47% 357,040 2,591,446 14.64% 2.71% 
Number (N) 6 6 
  
6 6 
Mean 9.23% 3.26% 
  
19.45% 2.16% 
Standard Deviation 6.86% 1.48% 
  
7.02% 1.08% 
Coefficient of Variation 74.32% 45.35% 
  
36.09% 50.11% 
Currency is presented in thousands Malaysian Ringgit. 
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Table H-13: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Malaysia Islamic bank (E) 
Malaysia IBs RHB Islamic Bank Berhad  Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 
Year Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 41,484 565,154 7.34% 3.73% NA NA NA NA 
2006 86,362 651,674 14.19% 3.44% NA NA NA NA 
2007 118,278 739,434 17.00% 3.30% NA NA NA NA 
2008 85,886 843,396 10.85% 2.95% 3,078 202,177 1.52% 1.24% 
2009 63,469 895,462 7.30% 2.22% 12,843 316,492 4.95% 2.85% 
2010 67,489 984,665 7.18% 2.88% 47,491 442,130 12.52% 5.07% 
2011 97,854 1,332,236 8.45% 4.12% 56,437 498,571 12.00% 4.61% 
2012 155,896 1,693,673 10.30% 3.79% 65,846 501,322 13.17% 4.98% 
2013 166,500 2,027,132 8.95% 3.74% 48,294 549,680 9.19% 4.46% 
Number (N) 9 9 
  
6 6 
Mean 10.17% 3.35% 
  
8.89% 3.87% 
Standard Deviation 3.41% 0.59% 
  
4.71% 1.52% 
Coefficient of Variation 33.52% 17.49% 
  
53.00% 39.28% 
Currency is presented in thousands Malaysian Ringgit. 
Table H-14: the calculation of ROAE and UIAHs return for Malaysia Islamic bank (F) 
Malaysia IBs CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad  KFH Malaysia 
Year Net Profit Equity Return ROAE UIAHs ROAE UIAHs 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2005 -16,405 84,217 -19.48% 0.19% 0.11% 0.22% 
2006 5,921 601,622 1.73% 4.24% 2.03% 0.99% 
2007 64,743 672,241 10.16% 4.46% 4.72% 2.29% 
2008 73,319 745,403 10.34% 3.73% 4.46% 3.08% 
2009 123,742 871,058 15.31% 2.45% -1.52% 2.46% 
2010 301,122 1,338,667 27.25% 3.69% -3.48% 2.56% 
2011 335,732 1,928,550 20.55% 3.63% -33.84% 2.97% 
2012 401,070 2,343,444 18.78% 3.45% 4.07% 3.20% 
2013 365,560 2,670,902 14.58% 3.13% 6.29% 2.77% 
Number (N) 9 9 9 9 
Mean 11.03% 3.22% -1.91% 2.28% 
Standard Deviation 13.53% 1.28% 12.39% 1.01% 
Coefficient of Variation 122.67% 39.75% -649.62% 44.38% 
Currency is presented in thousands Malaysian Ringgit. 
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  List of banks 
I.1 Name of the sample banks used in the model 
I.2 GCC countries 
Bahrain 
1. AL Baraka Bank 
2. Al Salam Bank 
3. Bahrain Islamic Bank 
4. Ithmaar Bank 
5. Khaleeji Commercial 
6. KFH Bahrain 
Kuwait 
7. Ahli United Bank 
8. Boubyan Bank 
9. Kuwait Finance House 
10. Kuwait International Bank 
Qatar 
11. Masraf Al Rayan 
12. Qatar Islamic Bank 
UAE 
13. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
14. Dubai Islamic Bank 
15. Emirates Islamic Bank 
16. Sharjah Islamic bank 
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I.3 Malaysia 
Malaysia 
17. Affin Islamic Bank 
18. Alliance Islamic bank Berhad 
19. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
20. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 
21. CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 
22. Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 
23. KFH Malaysia 
24. Maybank Islamic Berhad 
25. OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 
26. Public Islamic Bank 
27. RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 
28. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 
I.4 Special case study for RPSIA in Saudi Arabia 
29. Albilad Bank 
30. Alinma Bank 
31. Aljazira Bank 
32. Alrajhi Bank 
 
I.5 Bank abbreviations 
BARK AL Baraka Islamic Bank EMIT Emirates Islamic Bank 
SALM AL Salam Bank SHAJ Sharjah Islamic Bank 
BAHN Bahrain Islamic Bank AFFN Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 
ITHM Ithmaar Bank ALLN Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 
KHAJ Khaleeji Commercial ISLM Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
KFHB Kuwait Finance House Bahrain MUAT Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 
AHLI Ahli United CIMB CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 
BOU Boubyan HONG Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 
KFH Kuwait Finance House KFHM Kuwait Finance House Malaysia 
KIB Kuwait International Bank MAY Maybank Islamic Berhad 
MASF Masraf Al Rayan OCBC OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 
QATR Qatar Islamic Bank PUBC Public Islamic Bank Berhad 
DHABI Abu Dhabi Islamic RHB RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 
DUBAI Dubai Islamic Bank STAD Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 
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